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ABSTRACT
Electoral environments in democracies are complex. One of the key tools voters use to
simplify the information environment in elections is the party-label heuristic. However,
party labels themselves change and with considerable frequency. Therefore, this
dissertation investigates the consequences of party-label changes for voters’ information,
partisan identities, and corresponding behavior. As a result, this dissertation makes a series
of contributions to our understanding of voter decision-making and partisanship. First, I
create an original dataset of party-name changes across 43 democracies from 1990-2017,
allowing scholars to quantify instances of party relabeling. Second, using these data paired
with electoral surveys, I demonstrate that party relabeling limits the information voters
have about the party, alters their voting considerations, and is associated with decreased
levels of partisanship to such parties. Third, using a case study in Germany, I demonstrate
that changes as innocuous and a party relabeling itself alters how that party’s followers see
themselves, other parties, and even limits their willingness to engage with political actors.
Fourth, I use the same case in Germany to highlight that parties can opt for new names
that include informative signals, thereby improving voters’ knowledge about them. Finally,
I contend that voters may come to rely on different heuristics when party labels are no
longer reliable information shortcuts, pointing to party leaders as an alternative heuristic.
In doing so, I develop two new measures to capture how voters view the "typicality" of
party leaders vis-a-vis the party and the level of attachment voters express toward leaders
over the party, expanding our extant understanding of partisanship and personalization.
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Electoral environments in democracies are complex. Even in the most stable of contexts,
voters are faced with a menu of political parties and candidates and extensive information
during campaign periods. Such stability, however, is rare. Parties enter and exit the
electoral arena, new candidates come on to the political scene, and parties change the way
they present themselves to their electorates. How do voters navigate and adapt to these
dynamic electoral environments?
Political scientists have identified that voters frequently use party-label heuristics and
their own partisan identities to process and understand information in these arenas.
However, our extant knowledge about the ways in which voters use these shortcuts and
partisan lenses to traverse complex information environments is often grounded in the
assumption of stability; situations which, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, are not
archetypal features of democratic politics. In other words, the very information shortcut
that voters often rely on to navigate complex electoral environments, frequently change.
We have not yet accounted for: (1) the role that these changes play in the knowledge
voters have about parties, (2) how their partisan identities are shaped by such changes, and
(3) the alternative heuristics voters seek out when party-labels are no longer informative.
Therefore, this dissertation endeavors to address these three features of electoral politics.
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Plan for the Dissertation
This dissertation is not an exhaustive investigation of party-label change and their myriad
consequences for voters. It is, however, the first study to my knowledge that documents
cross-national instances of party relabeling beyond the borders of Europe. In Chapter 2, I
introduce a novel dataset of party-label changes across 43 democracies from 1990-2017. I
provide some descriptive investigation of these changes and find that they have occurred in
approximately 18% of political parties in old democracies and around 40% of parties in
new democracies. I also identify that they often co-occur with other structural changes to
parties.
This further amplifies the complexity that party relabeling can represent for voters: not
only do popular party-name heuristics change with considerable frequency, but they also
take place in the context of other structural changes like party mergers, splinters, and
joint-list modifications. This means that not only will the average voter face new party
names in a given election, but that these names can come along with larger, underlying
modifications to party options. In this chapter, I argue that party-label change will
decrease the utility of the label heuristic and, subsequently, the information that voters
have about the party. I find support for this argument as well as correlational evidence
that party relabeling is associated with voters’ decreased willingness to vote for or declare
partisanship to such parties.
Chapter 3 provides a deeper examination into the consequences of party relabeling for
partisans. This chapter builds on Chapter 2 by providing a causal investigation into the
relationship between party relabeling, voters’ partisanship, and their engagement in
politics. I also use this chapter to advance an updated theory of partisanship in the context
of social identities. I argue that party labels, in addition to serving as information
shortcuts for the average voter, also act as an identifying heuristic for partisans. I apply
this theory to the phenomenon of partisan stability, arguing that political scientists have
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largely neglected to consider the role of political parties in imbuing instability in voters’
partisanship. Using the case of the Party of Democratic Socialism’s name change to the
Left Party.PDS in Germany, I adjudicate between the social identity perspective of
partisanship and the revisionist perspective, testing the observable implications of each in
the context of PDS partisan’s stability and behavior.
I find no support for the revisionist perspective of partisanship in this case. Instead, I
find that the PDS-relabeling decision diminished PDS partisans’ views of parties and their
willingness to engage with them in politics, and weakened their partisan attachments.
These results underscore the importance of party labels and parties’ behavior for partisan
identities. Therefore, I contend that studies of partisanship and heuristics should pay closer
attention to the consistency of party names when attempting to document these
phenomena. Furthermore, by providing evidence in favor of the social identity perspective
of partisanship, this chapter highlights that partisanship need not be an "unmoved mover"
in order to act as a social identity. Instead, partisans respond to changes that their parties
undergo – a key finding that, I argue, should encourage scholars to move away from the
expectation that partisan instability is only common if it is the result of instrumental
considerations.
Does party relabeling only pose negative consequences for voters? In Chapter 4 I use
the same case of the PDS to illustrate that parties can opt to include meaningful and
informative signals in their new name that can allow voters to overcome informational
deficits about the party. In particular, I use variation in the PDS renaming to identify how
the length of time and the magnitude of the party-name change (full versus partial) can
influence the variation in the information that voters have about the party’s ideological
position. I find that the PDS’s new name: The Left Party(.PDS), by virtue of including
the strong ideological signal "left" in its name, improved the consensus with which voters
placed the party on an ideological spectrum. This chapter highlighted one instance wherein
party relabeling actually improved the information that voters have about the party. In
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conjunction with the original dataset presented in Chapter 2, it paves the way for future
research into the relationship between party-label change, the informational content of new
party labels, and the information voters’ have about parties.
An underlying theme in this dissertation is that scholars have often taken for granted
the ubiquity of party-labels as information shortcuts for voters. In Chapter 5, I contend
that party-label changes could compound such that the party-label no longer stands as a
viable information shortcut for voters. In the absence of these useful heuristics, I argue
that voters will seek to develop other shortcuts that will still allow them to make political
decisions while cutting the costs of becoming fully informed. I offer party leaders as one
such alternative to party-labels in these circumstances.
Therefore, I create measures of leader attachment and leader prototypicality for
scholars’ future use in this research arena. These measures are also useful for addressing
concerns in comparative politics about growing political personalization that often conflate
growing leader affect with waning partisan attachment and decreased importance of the
party in determining vote choice. I validate these measures using a sample of U.S. college
students. Given the current political climate in the United States in the aftermath of the
2016 election, some American politics scholars have also started to consider the role of
personalist appeals from leaders in voter decision-making. Therefore, in addition to offering
new measures that can help us determine whether voters use party leaders as heuristics in
the absence of meaningful party labels, this chapter also demonstrates the role of leader
attachment in the U.S. and provides useful measures for political personalization scholars
to capture better their phenomenon of interest.
In Chapter 6, I offer some concluding remarks regarding party-label change and its
consequences for voters, the nature of partisanship, and the role of party leaders in voters’
political identities. I also discuss some potential avenues for future research on these topics.
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CHAPTER 2
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME? PARTY-LABEL
CHANGE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR VOTERS
Are names important? Some parents agonize over selecting a name for their child, as names
can signal information to others about a person’s gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic
status (Kasof 1993), have psychological consequences (e.g. Harari and McDavid 1973), and
even correlate with individuals’ decisions, like where to live or which occupation to choose
(Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones 2002). But names are important not only for individuals.
In fact, scores of research on the naming conventions of different brands emphasize that
companies should choose names deliberately and with certain characteristics in mind to
improve the image conveyed by the name (e.g. Argo, Popa, and Smith 2010; Klink 2003;
Lowrey and Shrum 2007; Robertson 1989). In a similar vein, scholars have found that
political parties often choose names that convey important information to voters, such as
the ethnic groups they represent (Ishiyama and Bruening 2011), their ties to specific social
movements (Mensah 2017) or rebel organizations (Ishiyama and Marshall 2017), and, more
broadly, their ideological leanings (Mair and Mudde 1998).
Voters make use of political parties’ names as informational shortcuts. These condition
their choices, attitudes, and behavior. Voters use these heuristics to overcome (or reduce)
the cost of acquiring information in a complex electoral environment (Downs 1957). In
particular, many voters will draw conclusions about the expected behavior from a party, or
candidate under a party’s label, based on the ideological position, policy stances, and even
general affect they associate with the party (Butler and Powell 2014; Lau and Redlawsk
2001; Lupia 1994; Lupu 2013; Popkin 1991; Rahn 1993; Stokes 1963). At times, these
shortcuts can aid voters in making decisions as if they were fully informed, while bearing a
5
fraction of the cost to becoming fully informed. When parties behave in ways that do not
conform to the heuristics voters have developed about them, these information shortcuts
can also lead voters to make incorrect inferences (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Lau and Redlawsk
2001; Merolla, Stephenson, and Zechmeister 2008), and vote in ways they may not have,
had they been fully informed (Althaus 1998).
While scholars have built a mountain of knowledge on partisan heuristics in
democracies, most of this information comes from examining environments where party
labels are constant, which is rarer than most of these studies imply. This is not to say that
scholars have ignored how voters respond to party changes; however, the changes on which
research has concentrated have remained separate from these name changes. Baker et al.
(2016) and Lupu (2016) addressed partisan identification when party brands (or,
reputations) change, but their focus was on parties with constant labels. Marinova (2016)
examined variation in voters’ information about parties when parties undergo structural
changes, but does not examine the consequences of name changes, which often accompany
such structural modifications to parties. Finally, Kim and Solt (2017) is the only study of
which I am aware that has quantified party-label changes. The purpose of their study,
however, was to determine the factors that led parties to change their name; they were not
focused on assessing the consequences of these changes for voters, nor were they focused on
quantifying name changes for parties that underwent any structural changes (e.g. mergers,
splinters, etc.).
The lack of attention to the consequences of party-name changes for voters stands in
stark contrast to the frequency of such changes across democracies. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the proportion of parties that have undergone name changes from 1990-2017.1 Because
many scholars have established that party systems in new democracies are characterized by
1Author’s data. The description of the coding process is discussed in the Cross-National
Instances Party Relabeling: an Original Dataset section. Values for each country were com-
puted by taking a count of the number of party-name changes that occurred between 1990-
2017 divided by the total number of political parties that had competed electorally in the






















































Figure 2.1: Proportion of Parties with New Labels (1990-2017)
instability due to the relatively young nature of democratic parties and voters (Mainwaring
and Zoco 2007; Marinova 2015; Tavits 2008), I distinguish between new and old
democracies in the figure. Grey bars represent new democracies and black bars, old
democracies. Although an imperfect distinction, it is apparent that a number of new
democracies have exhibited high rates (nearly 50% or above) of party-label change during
the past 27 years. A group of old democracies also demonstrates some sizable rates of label
changes (at or above 25%), meaning that these trends are not merely an artifact of the age
of a democracy.
7
Why do these changing labels matter? Given the fundamental role they play as
heuristics and partisan markers, I argue that label changes can alter their heuristic value
and voters’ subsequent behavior. Generally, this chapter provides answers to the following
question: how do voters respond to party-label changes? In particular, how does
party-label change affect the information that voters have about the party?
I argue that changes to party labels reduce the information that voters can rely on
about the party. Using an original dataset of party-name changes across 43 democracies
from 1990-2017, I demonstrate that party relabeling results in voters who are more likely
to be unaware of the parties’ ideological leanings and, more drastically, unfamiliar with the
parties themselves such that they do not even feel comfortable guessing how they feel
about the party or placing the party on an ideological spectrum in something as low stakes
as a survey. I also show that voters shy away from voting for as well as declaring
partisanship to parties that have undergone label changes.
This chapter introduces a novel dataset of party-name changes across a large span of
countries. To my knowledge, it is the first dataset to track party renaming decisions along
with structural changes parties underwent (as such changes often come with new party
labels). It also contributes to our understanding of the role of heuristics in voters’ electoral
decision-making, highlighting how something as innocuous as a name change can reshape
how citizens vote and see their partisan identities.
Party Labels as Information Shortcuts
Party labels are a ubiquitous information shortcut, or heuristic, for voters. Specifically, a
heuristic is “a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making
decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods”
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, 454). The benefits voters obtain for actively finding
information about the parties (and candidates) competing in an election rarely outweigh
the costs of doing so, because information-seeking can be a costly endeavor when it comes
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to politics (Downs 1957). As a result, voters will rely on sources that aggregate information
about parties (e.g. the media or elites) (Mondak 1993) as well as passively acquire
information from their exposure to electoral campaigns and political processes over time
within a country. This information helps to shape the effectiveness of party label heuristics
for voters. These label shortcuts allow voters to infer information about the party (and, in
some cases, the candidate competing under a specific party label), like potential issue
positions (Lupia 1994), general ideological stances (Woon and Pope 2008), expectations
about the types of voters who support the party (Lupu 2013; Lupu 2014; Lupu 2016), the
party’s established reputation and image (Kim and Solt 2017), and other valence issues
(Brady and Sniderman 1985; Butler and Powell 2014; Stokes 1963).
Although voters could use a party’s label as a heuristic as soon as they find out any
information about a party, the effectiveness of a heuristic improves as voters’ experience
with a party’s repeated behavior increases. This can occur as the result of citizens
observing a party’s positions on specific issues over time, where consistent stances on the
same issues can help reinforce what voters may expect from that party. However, this is
not to say that heuristics will always improve as the length of time with a party increases.
Merolla, Stephenson, and Zechmeister (2008) highlight that some Canadian political
parties are not as clearly differentiated ideologically than others, decreasing the utility of
the party label as a heuristic for Canadian voters. Therefore this effect is conditional on
the cohesiveness of elites’ behavior within a party and the consistency with which a party
stands on particular issues or, more broadly, ideology. Nevertheless, consistency in party
labels will contribute to voters’ familiarity with the party, even if at a superficial level.
Therefore, if a party changes its label from one election to the next, the utility of the
party’s label as a heuristic inherently changes. In the least disruptive of circumstances,
voters are able to recognize the continuity between the party’s names and determine the
applicability of existing shortcuts for reasoning about the party under the new label. Of
course, this still requires considerable cognitive effort on the voter’s part, as they must first
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recognize that the two party names are related and then undergo some decision-making
calculus to recognize which information they associated with the party’s previous name
that can be transferred to the new one and which is no longer applicable.
Given that acquiring information during elections is already a costly endeavor that
most voters try to avoid, it is likely that a party-label change could result in voters’ having
fewer informational items associated with the new label, thereby inhibiting their knowledge
about the party. By limiting voters’ knowledge and increasing the costs required to amass
the same level of information they had about the party previously, this could drive some
voters to opt for a different party for which they feel they have more information, or
diminish the information they are using to make a voting decision. Finally, in addition to
altering the factual information voters associate with a relabeled party, their affect toward
that party might even change under the presence of a new label, as the name no longer
evokes the same affective reaction as the previous one had.
Therefore, I expect that, all else equal, party-label changes will diminish the
information that voters have about the party, driving the following hypotheses:
H1 : Voters will be less familiar with relabeled parties than with
parties with constant labels.
However, not all name changes are similar in magnitude. Some parties change their
name to variants of their old ones (what I describe as partial name changes later in the
chapter), whereas others opt for wholesale changes in their names (what I describe as full
changes later in the chapter). Therefore, I also expect:
H1a: Voters will be less familiar with parties that undergo full name
changes than with those that have made partial name changes.
H2 : Voters will be less familiar with the ideological positions of
relabeled parties than with parties with constant labels.
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As I argue, party relabeling reduces voters’ information and familiarity with the parties,
therefore I also expect this to affect their voting behavior. In particular, limiting the
information that voters can glean about a party because of a name change should also
deter voters from casting a ballot for these parties or declaring partisanship to the party.
H3 : Voters will be less likely to vote for relabeled parties than parties
with constant labels.
H4 : Voters will be less likely to declare partisanship to relabeled
parties than those with constant labels.
To test my hypotheses, I use an original dataset of party relabeling across 43
democracies from 1990-2017. Next, I detail the coding decisions used to create the original
dataset and provide an overview of party relabeling decisions in those countries.
Cross-National Instances Party Relabeling: an Original Dataset
In this section, I describe the coding process for the party relabeling dataset. Then, I
provide a descriptive overview of name changes: their frequency, the rate of co-occurrence
with structural changes, and some text analysis of party labels.
I included parties in this dataset provided that they had obtained at least 1% of the
vote share in the election at time t. I selected the countries to include in this dataset based
on whether they met the following criteria: (1) their elections were considered democratic
at the time they were held (according to Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) and, for
later years, Polity IV) and (2) the country appeared in at least one election survey in the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). This latter criterion was for practical
purposes to allow me to evaluate the effects of relabeling decisions on voters. I collected
data during the 1990-2017 time period to allow for comparisons between established
democracies and those that developed just after the collapse of the communism. The
observations in the dataset are at the party-election year level, and I refer to the country’s
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most recent election as time t and previous election as time t− 1. Below I describe the
variables included in the dataset and the coding decisions I employed to create them.
Name Change: I coded a party as changing its name provided that the party label
used at time t differed from the label it used at time t− 1. I focused here on substantive
differences to the name – changes that entailed only the inclusion or removal of an article
(e.g. “the” or “a”) or punctuation were not coded as name changes.
Full Change: I coded name changes as full changes provided that none of the
substantive words in the party label at time t were included in the party label at time t− 1.
Partial Change: I coded name changes as partial changes provided that at least one
of the substantive words in the party label at time t were included in the party label at
time t− 1.
Therefore, the full and partial change variables are mutually exclusive. As I show later
in this chapter, name changes rarely occur in isolation from other party changes. In fact,
they often occur in conjunction with or because of structural changes parties undergo like a
merger, splinter, or joint-list endeavor. In these instances, name changes may act as signals
that alert voters to the structural changes of the party. Therefore, attributing any change
in voters’ perceptions or behavior solely to name changes in these instances would be
spurious. As a result, I also code for structural changes, as described below.
Merger: I coded a party merger provided that the party at time t− 1 merged with
another party after time t− 1 and before time t. This includes instances where two parties
merged together to form a newly named party and situations where a party acquired
another one under its same name.
Split: I coded a party split provided that the party at time t was created as the result
of party members splintering off from its parent party after time t− 1.
Joint-list Entry: I coded a joint-list entry provided that the party at time t entered
into a joint-list agreement with another party after time t− 1 for the election at time t. I





































































































Figure 2.2: Rates of Party Change by Type
the electoral periods.
Joint-list Exit: I coded a joint-list exist provided that the party at time t exited a
joint-list agreement that it had been in for the election at time t− 1.
New: I coded a party as new provided that it existed at time t but did not exist at
time t− 1. As this variable is intended to capture genuinely new parties, parties that
participated in mergers or underwent a split are not coded as new.
Disbanded: I coded a party as disbanded provided that it existed at time t− 1 and
ceased to exist by the election at time t. Similar to new parties, this variable is intended to
capture parties that no longer participated in elections in any form; therefore, joint list
exits, and constituent parties of mergers are not coded as disbanded.
The rates of name changes and structural changes that parties have undergone between
1990 and 2017 are displayed in Figure 2.2, separately for new and old democracies. Some
trends are noticeable from these data. First, name changes that are not accompanied by
any structural changes to parties are relatively uncommon (they occurred approximately
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7.4% of the time in new democracies and 4% of the time in old democracies). If we allow
for instances where parties that underwent structural changes also changed their name, the
frequency of new labels is fairly high: approximately 40% in new democracies and 18% in
old democracies. In terms of the types of name changes that parties employ, full name
changes are more popular than partial ones, across both new and old democracies. This
may be due, in part, to an artifact of the label-change coding scheme: new parties and
disbanded parties, by their very nature, cannot have the same name as they did in the





















































































Figure 2.3: Types of Names Changes
Therefore, Figure 2.3 illustrates the proportion of name changes that correspond with
structural changes to the party, the overall proportion of name changes that are partial or
full changes to the label, and the proportion of name changes that happen absent of
structural changes. Based on this figure, party-name changes overwhelmingly occur in
conjunction with structural changes, regardless of the age of the country’s democracy. The


































































Type of Name Change
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Figure 2.4: Rates of Partial and Full Name Changes
changes also appear largely uniform between new and old democracies. Finally, a majority
of label changes are full changes rather than partial ones.
Figure 2.4 shows the proportion of label changes, broken down by full and partial
changes, that correspond with different structural changes. This figure reveals some
interesting variation between the types of structural changes that tend to correspond with
different types of name changes. In particular, a higher proportion of partial name changes
(relative to full changes) are due to party mergers. Additionally, a larger proportion of
partial name changes take place absent any structural changes to parties at approximately
30% than compared to full name changes (approximately 20%).
Party-label changes are inherently endogenous to voter behavior: parties often make
strategic considerations based on their previous or projected electoral performance and,
among these considerations, relabeling stands as an option. As the previous figures
illustrate, relabeling often occurs in conjunction with structural changes. Scholars have
established that structural changes, specifically mergers and electoral coalitions like
15
joint-lists, are associated with parties’ attempts to overcome an electoral threshold
(Ibenskas 2015; Ibenskas 2016), which means that smaller parties may be more likely to
undergo name changes as a result. Splinters, however, are associated with larger parties
(Ibenskas and Sikk 2017).2 Perhaps, then, a majority of label changes occur among smaller
parties, which are likely less known among voters by virtue of having less electoral
influence and lower levels of popularity among the electorate. Kim and Solt (2017),
however, find no relationship between party size and relabeling decisions.
To address this possibility, I examine parties’ vote share in the election prior to
relabeling among the European3 countries in my data, shown in Figure 2.5. The average
vote share in the election prior to relabeling among these parties was 10.53, with a median
of 6.3 and a standard deviation of 11.19. This descriptive assessment of the data does
highlight that changes appear to be more popular among smaller parties. However, it is
important to note that even the median vote share preceding parties’ relabeling stands
above every electoral threshold in European countries. Therefore, while relabeled parties
do tend to be smaller in size, they do not appear to be so small that the results in my
subsequent analyses are directly a result of these parties being unknown among voters
regardless of label change decisions. However, future work directly testing this relationship
would be valuable to uncover the costs and benefits that parties face when relabeling.
Altogether, these figures highlight some key aspects of party labeling in democratic
elections: (1) party-name changes occur both in new and old democracies; (2) most name
changes take place in conjunction with structural changes; (3) full name changes happen
more often than partial name changes; (4) name changes are more frequent in new
democracies than in old democracies; (5) although name changes are more popular among
smaller parties, they are by no means exclusive to them. Each of these dimensions of party
labeling illustrates that the electoral information environment for voters is likely more
2Ibenskas and Sikk (2017) measured party size as the vote share of the party in the
previous election.
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Figure 2.5: Rate of Vote Share in Election Prior to Relabeling
complex than typically understood. Not only are voters likely to face some instances of
party-name changes, all else equal, but when these changes happen, they also tend to
happen in tandem with other structural changes to the party – further complicating the
information environment – and more name changes tend to be wholesale rather than
partial. This complexity appears to be further amplified in new democracies given the
greater rates of name changes when compared to old democracies.
Beyond the mere occurrence of names changes, I also examine the content of party
labels, both changed and unchanged. Figure 2.6 illustrates the frequency of substantive
words among new and old party names. New labels are those that parties opted for upon
relabeling, whereas old names are those that parties initially had before relabeling. Figure
2.7 indicates the frequency of words among labels that did not undergo any changes in my
dataset. Across all three groups, “party” and “democratic” are the first- and second-most
popular words, respectively. Although the words “union”, “national”, “alliance”, “social”,
“people’s”, and “christian” were among the most frequently used in each group, the
popularity of these words did fluctuate between each type of party label.
Interestingly, some words that were used in one type of label are notably absent in
others. In particular, “new”, “first”, “wins”, “great”, and “young” are among the most-used
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substantive words in new party labels that do not appear among old and unchanged labels.
This difference seems rather intuitive: parties with new labels may be trying to capitalize
on their “newness” to the electorate. Unsurprisingly, “communist” did not appear in any
new party labels, which fits the time period of the data and is likely a reflection of the
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Figure 2.7: Frequency of Words among Unchanged Labels
Among old labels, excluding country-specific words like “Finnish” or “Peruvian”, the
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most popular words that were not shared by the other types of labels were “majority” and
“rural”. For unchanged labels, “ecological” is the most popular word (excluding
country-specific words as described above) that did not appear in the other types of labels.
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the differences from these two groups are artifacts of
larger trends.
Finally, it is important to note that party labels across each group are much more
similar than they are different. Aside from the word “new”, each of the words that were
unique to their constituent groups occurred less than 0.01% of the time. Similarly, the
frequency of words between each group are highly correlated with one another (r>0.9).
Data and Methods
To test my hypotheses, I use my original dataset of party-name changes and the CSES to
examine voters’ self-reported behavioral outcomes that follow from label changes from
1996-2016.4 This produced a dataset at the respondent-party-election year. Therefore, each
respondent appears in the data multiple times during a given election year – the same
number of times as the number of parties included in the country’s survey. It is important
to note that the CSES is comprised of post-election surveys. This means that all
respondents in the data will have already experienced their country’s election. This
increases the likelihood that they will have, at the very least, heard of the parties
competing – even those that changes their names. Therefore, using this sample could
potentially dampen the effects that party-name changes appear to have on voters. In this
respect, using the CSES serves as a more conservative test of my expectations than using
pre-election surveys where voters may not have had any exposure to all party alternatives
and had not begun preparing to make their ballot box decisions.
4This encompasses all available waves of the CSES.
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Separating Old and New Democracies
Because party-label changes are considerably more frequent in new democracies than in old
democracies, I perform my analyses separately on these populations to allow for
heterogeneity in the effects that label change has on voters. As mentioned previously in
this chapter, scholars have demonstrated that new democracies are characterized by greater
electoral instability than old democracies. Scholars have argued that this instability is due,
in part, to the young age of party systems and voters (e.g. Marinova 2015; Tavits 2008)
and others have contended that the instability in new democracies appears to be unique in
kind relative to older democracies (e.g. Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Powell and Tucker
2014). Marinova (2016) operationalized instability using a new measure, the Electoral
Instability of Parties, which is an additive index of structural party change5 between
subsequent elections within a country. She illustrated that this measure was strongly
correlated with Powell and Tucker (2014) measure of vote share volatility driven by party
entry and exit; where new democracies exhibited much higher rates of such instability than
old democracies. Powell and Tucker (2014) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) both showed
that younger democracies had much greater levels of vote volatility than did old
democracies in the same time period, and Powell and Tucker (2014) found that such
distinctions were due to the fact that volatility in new democracies was largely driven by
party changes (entry and exit).6
As a result, I separate old and new democracies in my analyses, not only because of the
different rates of party instability, but also because the length of time that voters have
experienced democratic elections in these two different groups has been shown to shape the
levels of attachment that voters develop toward parties (Converse 1969; Lisi 2015) and
5This is comprised of the six types of structural change that I also coded in my dataset.
6For their measure of such volatility (Type A), entries and exits are not restricted ex-
clusively to genuinely new and disbanded parties. The authors also develop a strategy for
coding party mergers and splinters; some of which contribute to this party system volatility
measure. See Powell and Tucker (2014) for greater detail on their coding strategy.
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voters’ electoral behavior (Tavits and Annus 2006). Similarly, I expect that voters could
adapt to instability when it is largely the norm for their electoral experience and be less
affected but any individual party-label change. Marinova (2016) finds some evidence for
this, wherein voters in new democracies are generally more knowledgeable7 about parties
that have undergone structural changes than voters in old democracies; but knowledge
about such parties decreases as the rate of overall party instability in an election increases.
As I demonstrated previously, party-label changes quite often go hand-in-hand with
structural changes that parties undergo. Structural party changes are generally more
popular among new democracies than old democracies, which also lends to my decision to
distinguish countries based on this characteristic.
Of course, as Figure 2.1 shows, this dichotomy is an imperfect proxy for party-label
instability. Some older democracies, like Italy, exhibit considerably high levels of
party-label change, whereas some newer democracies, like Spain and Portugal, exhibit very
low levels. However, because the rate of generational experience with democratic elections
has been shown to affect citizens’ rates of strategic voting (Tavits and Annus 2006),
political socialization (Converse 1969), and partisan attachment (Lisi 2015), I find this
distinction to be analytically and theoretically useful. Future work on the consequences of
party-label change for voters that assesses how increasing and consistent rates of such
instability affect voters would be valuable.
Dependent Variables
Familiarity with parties. For hypothesis 1 (voters will be less familiar with relabeled parties
than parties with constant labels), I measure voters’ familiarity with parties using two
survey questions from the CSES. Respondents were asked to place each party on an
ideological spectrum and were also asked about their general affect toward each party. For
7As mentioned previously, Marinova (2016) operationalizes party knowledge as the degree
of closeness between a voter’s and an expert’s ideological placement of a party; the smaller
the value, the more knowledgeable the voter is about the party.
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both questions, while respondents were not encouraged to indicate whether they were
familiar with the party or confident in their placements, the CSES did code unprompted
answers that expressed the respondent’s unfamiliarity with the party. Specifically, this was
coded as “Volunteered: haven’t heard of party.”8 The order in which respondents were
asked about their affect toward parties and their perception of parties’ ideological positions
varied depending on the country in the survey. By asking respondents about specific
parties and naming those parties, I expect that respondents would be less likely to
volunteer that they had not heard of a party after already being introduced to it in a
previous survey question. Therefore, I create a binary variable where 1 indicates that the
respondent answered at least one of the party questions (ideology or affect) by stating they
had not heard of the party and 0 indicates otherwise.
Familiarity with parties’ ideological position. For hypothesis 2 (voters will be less
familiar with the ideological positions of relabeled parties than parties with constant labels),
I measure voters’ familiarity with parties’ ideological positions using the party ideological
placement question from the CSES. I created a binary variable where 1 indicates that the
respondent answered that they did not know the ideological position of the party and 0
indicates otherwise. This differs from others’ approaches to measuring ideological
familiarity with parties. For example, Marinova (2016) compared respondents’ placements
of parties to that of experts and created a measure of distance between the two where
larger values indicated less accuracy on the part of respondents and smaller values, greater
accuracy. I avoid using this measure as it is unclear to me whether party relabeling would
also affect how country experts perceived the party, or whether experts are the appropriate
reference category to which to hold voters.
Voting. For hypothesis 3 (voters will be less likely to vote for relabeled parties than
parties with constant labels), I measure respondents’ voting behavior using the CSES
8This differs from answers that indicated the respondents didn’t know where to place or
how they felt about the party, whether the respondents were unfamiliar with the scale the
CSES enumerator asked them to use, or if respondents refused to answer the question.
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survey question that asked voters which party they voted for in the most recent election. I
focus specifically on respondents’ party list votes. I do not examine how voters’ candidate
selections differed, alleviating any concerns regarding the interactive effects of relabeling
and individual political candidates. I use this question to create a binary variable where 1
indicates that the respondent voted for the party and 0, otherwise. For those who did not
vote in the election, each party-respondent observation is coded as 0 and these respondents
are included in my later analyses.
Partisanship. For hypothesis 4 (voters will be less likely to declare partisanship to
relabeled parties than those with constant labels), I measure respondents’ partisanship using
the CSES party identification question that asked respondents which party they felt closest
to, among respondents who indicated they felt close to one party over others. I use this
question to create a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent declared
partisanship to the party and 0, otherwise. Functionally, apartisans are coded NA as they
do not have partisanship to declare.
Independent Variables
I measure a party’s name change using a binary indicator where 1 indicates that the party
changed its same between the previous election and the current one and 0 indicates the
party did not undergo any name change. In subsequent models, I separate full changes
from partial ones using binary indicators for each, coded according to the scheme discussed
previously. I expect that full name changes will create greater informational burdens for
voters than partial name changes, because a full name change necessarily means that the
party’s new name does not correspond in any way to its old one; whereas, for partial
changes, the new name bears some substantive similarity to the party’s old name, which
may lessen the informational complexity for voters relative to full name changes.
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Control Variables
Given the hierarchical nature of my data, I control for characteristics of political parties,
respondents, and the electoral system.
Control Variables: Parties
As illustrated in the previous section, party-label changes often correspond with other
structural changes to the party. Therefore, I use binary indicators to control for these types
of structural changes, including mergers, splits, new parties, joint-list entries, and joint-list
exits, as these types of changes can have disparate effects on voters (see Marinova 2016 for
a detailed discussion). These are also coded according to the scheme discussed previously.
Because of the nature of the CSES survey, respondents were not asked about parties that
no longer existed (i.e. that disbanded); therefore, these are not included in the subsequent
analyses.
Control Variables: Respondents
A variety of individual characteristics have been shown to moderate how voters seek out
information and participate in politics. I control for age to account for the possibility that
older voters may be more habituated with their country’s elections and, subsequently, be
marginally more informed about the menu of political options (Lau 2003). Additionally,
older voters are more likely to participate in elections, increasing the likelihood that they
will be more familiar with political parties (Franklin 2004). It is important to note that the
role of age is contextual: aging voters in old democracies will have had more experience
with democratic elections than aging voters in new democracies. Therefore, I anticipate
age to have less of an effect on respondents’ behavior in new democracies. I control for
respondent gender, as well, because women are generally less confident than men in their
political knowledge, which would extend to party knowledge (Mondak 2004) I also include
controls for respondents’ income and education, as wealthier and more educated individuals
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are more likely to be interested in politics and, likely, more informed about politics
(Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
Control Variables: Elections
Finally, I include some election-level control variables in my analyses. Specifically, I control
for the total number of label changes in any given election, as I expect that additional
changes to parties will further increase the complexity of the electoral environment and
make it more difficult for voters to navigate the party competition (Marinova 2016). For
testing hypotheses 1 and 2, I also control for the type of election included in the CSES, as
different types of elections shape the informational environment for voters. For example,
voters in a presidential election are likely more concerned with candidate-specific
information than they are general party information; whereas, for parliamentary elections,
information about the party may dominate. The types of elections included in these data
are parliamentary elections, presidential elections, and parliamentary-presidential elections.
I do not control for election type when testing hypotheses 3 and 4. The population of
respondents within the data I use to test hypothesis 3 come from countries with the same
election type: parliamentary elections. I don’t control for election type when testing
hypothesis 4 as I do not have clear theoretical expectations for the consequences of election
type on partisan identification.
Results
To test my hypotheses, I use a series of hierarchical logistic regressions, which allow me to
account for the nested nature of the data. Because each individual is repeated in the
dataset as many times as the number of parties they are asked about and the only
individual-level data that differ across these observations are the dependent variables, each
model includes a random intercept for each respondent in the data. I also include fixed
effects for the election year and country (not reported here). As I mentioned previously, I
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conduct my analyses separately for old and new democracies. I discuss results for these
populations in turn.
Familiarity with Parties
The results from the analyses assessing the relationship between party-label change and
voters’ familiarity with parties (H1 ) are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for old and new
democracies, respectively.9 Positive coefficients indicate an increase in the likelihood that
respondents declare they have not heard of the party before. With regard to old
democracies, party-name changes generally increase the likelihood of respondents
indicating they are unfamiliar with the party (Model 1). This effect disappears once
controlling for general structural change to the party (Model 2), but reappears in Models 3
and 4, once the type of name change (full or partial) are separated. After controlling for
the different types of structural changes, it becomes clear that full name changes
significantly increase the likelihood that respondents in old democracies are unfamiliar with
the party; however, partial name changes exhibit no effect. These results support my
additional expectation that voters will be less familiar with parties that undergo full name
changes than partial ones (H1a).
Although the total number of name changes in an election significantly increase the
likelihood of voters’ unfamiliarity with parties (Models 1 and 2), this effect disappears after
separating the name changes by type (Model 3) and including additional controls for
parties’ structural changes (Model 4). This is likely due, in part, to the fact that few
country-election years exhibit high rates of total name changes within this sample and, the
inclusion of fixed effects for election years and countries in the data explain the variation in
that variable. The specific type of structural change that a party experiences also yields
some interesting results for voters in old democracies. Specifically, mergers, splits, and new
parties do not have any statistically significant effects on voters’ familiarity with parties.
9Although included in the analyses, election and country fixed effects and the controls
for election type are not reported in the tables.
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These findings contrast with Marinova’s (2016), who finds that new parties and mergers
significantly decrease respondents’ knowledge of them.10 The decision to enter or exit a
joint-list, however, does have a significant effect for voters: when parties enter a joint-list,
voters are statistically significantly more likely to indicate that they have not heard of the
party, whereas, when parties exit a joint-list, voters are significantly less likely to be
unfamiliar with the party.
The manner in which the CSES asks respondents about parties is likely playing a large
role in these results: when parties enter a joint-list or electoral alliance, rather than
inquiring about each constituent party, the CSES only refers to the list itself (by its
distinct name). Therefore, even if a party did not change its name upon entering a
joint-list, it will appear under a new name in the CSES (provided that the joint-list itself
had a different name). Therefore, participants are likely responding to the joint-list name
similarly to how they would if the party had actually changed its name. For joint-list exits,
however, the opposite may be the case. In other words, if parties exit a joint-list, the CSES
will no longer refer to them by the name of the list and, instead, as the party itself.
Therefore, respondents may appear to be more familiar with parties upon their joint-list
exits as they are “returning”, in a sense, to their “old” name. To test this explanation,
however, we would need panel data of the same respondents over time who were asked
about parties before, during, and after their joint-list experiences, which is outside the
scope of this chapter.
Among new democracies, name changes have a positive and statistically significant
effect on voters’ familiarity with parties (Models 5 and 6), supporting H1. In contrast to
label changes in old democracies, the total number of name changes in an election among
new democracies has a profound effect on voters’ familiarity with parties: they are
10Marinova (2016) operationalizes knowledge as the distance between the respondent’s
and an expert’s ideological placement of the party. While not directly comparable with
respondent’s familiarity with a party, it does point to some differences worth exploring
further in future work. The results regarding my second hypothesis also shed some light on
this relationship.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Name Change 0.81∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.07) (0.12)
Total Name Changes −1.17∗ −1.00† −0.19 0.12
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54)
Structural Change 0.94∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12)
Full Change 0.28∗ 1.08∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.24)












Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education −0.23∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gender 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
AIC 26273.87 26219.24 26147.60 26068.38
Log Likelihood -13088.94 -13060.62 -13023.80 -12980.19
Num. obs. 408135 408135 408135 408135
Num. groups: resid1 68229 68229 68229 68229
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.1: DV: Familiarity with Party (Old Democracies)
significantly more likely to be unfamiliar with parties as the total number of name changes
increases, across all models. Here, too, the type of name change conditions the effect that
relabeling has on voters. Facing full name changes, respondents are significantly more
likely to be unfamiliar with a party (Models 7 and 8), standing in stark contrast to partial
name changes, which leads voters to be less likely to indicate unfamiliarity with a party, as
compared to parties with names that went unchanged (Model 8). Although this difference
in effects supports my expectations (H1a), it is somewhat surprising that respondents seem
more likely to be familiar with parties that have undergone partial name changes than
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those with constant labels. These changes happen less frequently than full changes, so this
effect may be due to the individual parties that partially changed their names rather than
the nature of the name change itself.
Structural changes also affect voters’ familiarity with parties, albeit differently than in
old democracies. Mergers and joint-list entries significantly increase the likelihood that
respondents are unfamiliar with the party, while joint-list exits and splits significantly
decrease this likelihood. These findings are directly opposed to those from Marinova (2016)
who finds, among democracies in eastern Europe, mergers and joint-list entries increase the
knowledge that voters have about the parties’ ideological positions while splits and
joint-list exits decrease voters’ knowledge. Although the purpose of this chapter is not to
replicate Marinova’s (2016) analyses, these disparities are worth investigating further in
future work to improve our understanding of the effects that structural changes have on
voters’ knowledge of parties.
Overall, these findings support my expectations that voters will be less familiar with
relabeled parties than parties with constant names (H1 ), with strong evidence among new
democracies than old democracies. Similarly, my expectations that full name changes will
have larger effects on voters’ unfamiliarity as supported in both samples (H1a), although
partial changes in new democracies are associated with a decrease in the unfamiliarity
among voters as compared to parties without name changes. Thus far, these findings
highlight that party-name changes have negative implications for the information voters
have available about them – even after participating in the election that would be most
likely to introduce the parties. Next, I discuss the results from tests of my second
hypothesis (voters will be less familiar with the ideological positions of relabeled parties than
parties with constant labels), separately for old and new democracies.
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Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Name Change 1.55∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08)
Total Name Changes 6.65∗∗∗ 6.69∗∗∗ 6.34∗∗∗ 7.50∗∗∗
(1.17) (1.17) (1.16) (1.18)
Structural Change 0.03 0.31∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07)
Full Change 1.51∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.10)












Age −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Education −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gender 0.43∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
AIC 26574.29 26576.25 26617.20 26313.10
Log Likelihood -13240.15 -13240.12 -13259.60 -13103.55
Num. obs. 165191 165191 165191 165191
Num. groups: resid1 32765 32765 32765 32765
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.2: DV: Familiarity with Party (New Democracies)
Familiarity with Parties’ Ideology
The results for my tests of H2 are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for old and new
democracies, respectively. As a reminder, familiarity is reverse-coded in these analyses,
such that positive coefficients indicate an increase in a voter’s unfamiliarity with a party’s
ideology (more specifically, an increase in the likelihood that a voter indicates they don’t
know a party’s ideology). Among old democracies, as anticipated, name changes
significantly increase the likelihood that voters are unfamiliar with a party’s ideology
(Models 9 and 10).
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Against my expectations, however, is the effect that the total number of name changes
has on this outcome. As total name changes increase, the likelihood that voters are
unfamiliar with any given party’s ideology decreases (Models 9-12). This could be an
indication that changes to multiple parties in an election motivate voters to find additional
information about each party, as the number of potential, “constant” alternatives is
smaller. Or, in an electoral environment where multiple parties undergo changes, this may
prompt the media to report more about the changes, as they become more widespread.
Further tests of these conjectures, however, are outside of the scope of this chapter.
When separating the types of name changes, both full and partial changes elicit similar
effects among voters: a small, statistically significant increase in the likelihood that they
are unfamiliar with the party’s ideology (Models 11 and 12). Structural changes also
increase the likelihood that respondents are unfamiliar with a party’s ideology (Models 10
and 11); and these effects are consistent across different types of structural changes (Model
12), with the exception of new parties (insignificant) and joint-list exits (negative and
statistically significant).
Within new democracies, name changes similarly increase the likelihood that
respondents are unfamiliar with the party’s ideology (Models 13 and 14), in support of H2.
The total number of name changes does not have any statistically significant effect on this
outcome, however (Models 13-16). Interestingly, structural changes to the party appear to
decrease the likelihood that a voter is unfamiliar with the party’s ideology (Models 14 and
15). After controlling for the different types of structural change, it becomes clear that this
is effect is driven by mergers and joint-list entries (Model 16), which both significantly
decrease the likelihood of respondents’ unfamiliarity with a party’s ideology.
These findings comport with Marinova’s (2016) that mergers and joint-lists in eastern
European countries appear to increase the knowledge that voters have about the parties’
ideology. This concordance, and the contrast with the previous findings, could be explained
as follows: any changes to parties are likely to increase the likelihood that voters have not
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Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Name Change 1.52∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07)
Total Name Changes −2.60∗∗∗ −2.54∗∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −1.90∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
Structural Change 0.78∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
Full Change 0.47∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)












Age −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
AIC 79647.13 79499.11 79586.96 78558.79
Log Likelihood -39775.56 -39700.56 -39743.48 -39225.39
Num. obs. 408135 408135 408135 408135
Num. groups: resid1 68229 68229 68229 68229
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.3: DV: Familiarity with Party’s Ideology (Old Democracies)
heard of the parties that have undergone such changes; however, among those voters who
are familiar with the party name, mergers and joint-lists help further clarify ideological
positions, such that voters are less likely to be unfamiliar with where to place the party.
Finally, full name changes have a stronger and larger effect on the likelihood that
respondents do not know the party’s ideological position than partial name changes (Model
16).
Overall, these findings support by second hypothesis. Altogether, these analyses, and
the previous ones that assessed the effects of name changes on general unfamiliarity with
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parties, underscore the potential problems that name changes pose for an electorate.
Navigating electoral competition can already be a cognitively costly process; facing parties
with different names, which thereby reduces the effectiveness of party-label heuristics, only
further exacerbate informational deficits.
There is an important caveat to interpreting these findings, however. Some subsets of
individuals are more likely to declare that they do not know the answer to a question than
are others. In particular, those with low self-confidence, competitiveness, and propensity to
take risks are more likely to answer “don’t know” to questions; or, put another way, less
likely to guess the answers to questions designed to tap into their knowledge (Mondak
2000). Unfortunately, the CSES does not include any personality questions that would
allow me to control for such traits. However, concerns that personality differences are the
primary factor driving these results should be assuaged by the fact that respondents were
not encouraged to indicate when they did not know the answer to a question or were
unfamiliar with a party; instead these responses are indicated only if the respondent
volunteered them, which dampens the concern that personality alone is driving these
results (Mondak and Davis 2001).
Thus far, these findings do not provide any insight into how the informational deficits
brought on by party-label changes affect voter behavior. Therefore, I test these
relationships in the next two sections, for hypotheses 3 (voters will be less likely to vote for
relabeled parties than parties with constant labels) and 4 (voters will be less likely to declare
partisanship to relabeled parties than those with constant labels), among old and new
democracies.
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Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Name Change 0.16∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
Total Name Changes 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.02
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Structural Change −0.51∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
Full Change 0.52∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)












Age 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education −0.26∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gender 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
AIC 52382.66 52322.02 52300.08 52365.20
Log Likelihood -26144.33 -26113.01 -26101.04 -26129.60
Num. obs. 165191 165191 165191 165191
Num. groups: resid1 32765 32765 32765 32765
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.4: DV: Familiarity with Party’s Ideology (New Democracies)
34
Vote Choice
I discuss the results11 relating to hypothesis 3 in this section, separately for old (Table 2.5)
and new democracies (Table 2.6). Among old democracies, voters are less likely to vote for
a party that underwent a name change (Models 17 and 18) in support of H3, or a
structural change (Models 18 and 19). This relationship holds regardless of the type of
name change or structural change (Model 20), with the exception for joint-list exits, which
significantly increase the likelihood of a respondent voting for the party.
Given the endogeneity of party change, interpreting these results as evidence for a
causal story where party-name changes deter citizens from voting for them would be
spurious. Broadly speaking, name changes can occur as the result of a party’s decision to
change it, or, more indirectly, the result of a party’s decision to change its structure,
thereby necessitating a name change as well. A party’s decision to change its name usually
results from a considerable loss in vote share (Kim and Solt 2017), something that might
signal to the party that it is no longer as viable as it once was. Structural changes can
result from a wider variety of causes, with mergers and entries into joint-lists more common
when parties are seeking to overcome an electoral threshold or improve their chances at
gaining access to office (Ibenskas 2015; Ibenskas 2016). Party splinters are causally distinct
from other structural changes (Ibenskas and Sikk 2017), and are likely to occur due to
in-fighting among elites within the party (Ceron 2013). Therefore, given the motivations
parties have to change their names and the informational deficit that these changes can
create for voters, the direction of the causal arrow in the relationship between party-name
11As I discussed previously, I use hierarchical logistic regressions to test the effects of
party-label change on vote choice and partisanship. Using this estimation strategy afford me
the ability to assess the average effect of party-label change on vote choice and partisanship
across countries, but it does not allow me to make any claims regarding how party-label
change affects voters’ propensity to vote for (or declare partisanship to) a specific, newly
labeled party over another. To do this, multinomial logistic regressions would be necessary
for each country-election-year to assess how, among the party options available to voters,
party-label change influences the likelihood that a voter chooses a relabeled party over the
other party options.
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change and voter behavior is likely bidirectional.
Without the counterfactual where some of these parties faced incentives to change their
name but opted not to, it is impossible to tell whether name changes on their own drive
voters away from parties. They do, however, decrease the likelihood that voters are familiar
with the parties, which should further deter voters from selecting these parties on election
day. Finally, because name changes take place less frequently in old democracies than in
new ones, their occurrence could foster some risk-aversion among voters, where they are
less inclined to cast a ballot for a party that has changed its name when a number of stable
alternatives exist. Next, I examine the results within new democracies (Table 2.6).
This relationship plays out very differently in new democracies. Specifically, voters are
more likely to cast a ballot for a party that has undergone a name change (Models 21 and
22), contradicting H3. These disparate effects could be due to the fact that name changes
happen more frequently in new democracies and, despite creating additional information
complexity for the electorate, voters are more accustomed to these changes, making them
less risk-averse to changed parties. The total number of name changes in a given election,
however, does have a dampening effect on whether citizens cast a ballot (Models 21-24).
While voters in new democracies may be more adept at coping with such changes and the
consequences they have for their information environments, the accumulation of these
changes are likely difficult to overcome.
Not only are voters more likely to cast a ballot for any party that has undergone a
name change, but also both types of name changes are associated with an increase in the
likelihood that citizens voted for such parties (Model 24). Interestingly, partial name
changes seem to encourage a greater likelihood in casting a ballot for the party than full
name changes, do. This fits in line with my expectations that partial name changes pose
less informational complexity for voters, as the name bears some resemblance to the party’s
previous name.
Among the different types of structural changes, splits and both entries and exits into
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Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
Name Change −0.64∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Total Name Changes 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Structural Change −0.18∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Full Change −0.68∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)












Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.01† 0.01† 0.01† 0.01∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AIC 202155.44 202139.66 202080.36 201085.10
Log Likelihood -101039.72 -101030.83 -101000.18 -100498.55
Num. obs. 268109 268109 268109 268109
Num. groups: resid1 40150 40150 40150 40150
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.5: DV: Vote Choice (Old Democracies)
joint-lists are associated with a decrease in the likelihood that the respondent votes for the
party. New parties overwhelmingly elicit the largest positive effect on vote choice, which
falls in line with extant findings in electoral politics of new democracies (see for example,
Tavits 2007). Overall, while these findings support my general expectations regarding types
of name changes and their effects on voters, they do not support my expectations about
party relabeling and vote choice (H3 ).
This section illustrated some mixed evidence for H3. In old democracies, party
relabeling is associated with a decreased in voters’ propensity to vote for such parties;
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Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24
Name Change 0.40∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Total Name Changes −1.59∗∗∗ −1.56∗∗∗ −1.75∗∗∗ −1.41∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
Structural Change −0.17∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Full Change 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)












Age 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education −0.02† −0.02† −0.02† −0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender 0.04∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
AIC 81510.90 81498.27 81553.35 80334.44
Log Likelihood -40714.45 -40707.13 -40733.68 -40120.22
Num. obs. 100965 100965 100965 100965
Num. groups: resid1 18349 18349 18349 18349
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.6: DV: Vote Choice (New Democracies)
however, the relationship is inverted in new democracies: voters are more likely to select
parties that changes their names, regardless of the extent to which the name differed from
its previous one. It is unclear whether this differences means that voters in new
democracies are more acclimated to party changes and, consequently, better at navigating
changing party competition. Future work that directly addresses this possibility would help
clarify these differences. Next I evaluate the results for tests of hypothesis 4 (voters will be
less likely to declare partisanship to relabeled parties than those with constant labels).
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Partisan Identification
Similar to previous analyses, I discuss results for old (Table 2.7) and new democracies
(Table 2.8) separately. In support of H4 and corresponding with previous results, voters in
old democracies are less likely to declare partisanship to parties that have undergone name
changes (Models 25 and 26). These findings hold when differentiating between full and
partial changes (Model 28) and are similarly reflected for parties that undergo any type of
structural change (Models 26 and 27), with the exception of joint-list exits (Model 28).
This result, where voters are more likely to declare partisanship to parties that exited
joint-lists could be due to voters’ preferences for parties that are distinct from others (Lupu
2016), where voters are pleased once parties decide to compete on their own rather than in
conjunction with other parties.
Similar to the relationship between voting and party-name changes, these overall
findings are likely manifestations of two things: (1) parties opting to modify their names
and/or structure in the face of waning partisan attachment; and (2) voters shying away
from identifying with parties that recently changed, because they cannot rely on
information they had stored on the party’s old name to make inferences about the behavior
they expect from the newly named party or, because they are put off by the party changing
its name (see chapter 1 for a greater theoretical discussion of this possible relationship).
The results among new democracies are less consistent and differ again from that of old
democracies. Per Models 29 and 30, voters in new democracies appear more likely to be
partisans of parties that have undergone name changes. These findings are inverted,
however, once the structural changes that parties experienced are also included in the
analysis (Model 32). The initial positive associations between name change and
partisanship appear to have been driven by party mergers and new parties, which are the
specific types of structural changes that exhibit this relationship. This contrasts with party
brand scholars, like Lupu (2016), who argue that voters dislike when parties’ brands
become less distinctive, especially through alliances or coalitions with other parties.
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Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28
Name Change −0.82∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Total Name Changes 0.78∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Structural Change −0.48∗∗∗ −0.61∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Full Change −0.43∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)












Age 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender 0.02† 0.02† 0.02† 0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AIC 341725.70 341501.26 341444.76 340790.98
Log Likelihood -170817.85 -170704.63 -170675.38 -170344.49
Num. obs. 408135 408135 408135 408135
Num. groups: resid1 68229 68229 68229 68229
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.7: DV: Partisan Identification (Old Democracies)
Overall, these findings do mirror those for voting behavior in new democracies.
All other changes, including full and partial name changes, are associated with a
decrease in voters’ likelihood of declaring partisanship to such parties. This is an
interesting departure from the voting behavior results discussed previously, where voters in
new democracies are more likely to vote for parties that have undergone name changes.
This highlights the distinction between partisanship and voting – although voters may be
strategic and recognize that voting for a party with a new name may be necessary, it does
not mean that voters are inclined to identify or feel close to that party. Altogether, these
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Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32
Name Change 0.22∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Total Name Changes 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ −0.06
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Structural Change −0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03)
Full Change −0.11∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)












Age 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AIC 141581.88 141573.96 141621.83 140234.13
Log Likelihood -70745.94 -70740.98 -70763.91 -70066.07
Num. obs. 165191 165191 165191 165191
Num. groups: resid1 32765 32765 32765 32765
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 2.8: DV: Partisan Identification (New Democracies)
results support H4 that voters are less likely to be partisans of parties that underwent
name changes as compared to parties with constant labels.
Discussion and Conclusion
Although party-label heuristics are considered a near ubiquitous information shortcut for
voters, this chapter drew attention to the fact that party-labels change with considerable
frequency in democratic politics. In particular, party-name changes occurred around 40%
of the time in new democracies and around 18% of the time in old democracies from
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1990-2017. While the frequency of this phenomenon alone warrants further investigation,
the importance of party-labels for the inferences that voters make about parties and the
partisan identities voters attach to them make these changes all the more important to
understand. This chapter introduced an original dataset on party-label changes in 43
democracies from 1990-2017. I found that these changes rarely occur in isolation of
structural changes – in fact, in both new and old democracies, these changes took place
alongside structural changes over 90% of the time. That these tend to co-occur could
introduce an additional burden for voters: not only do they often face new party names in
elections, but these party names represent parties that have merged, splintered, or modified
their joint-list agreements.
While these types of changes are more common among smaller parties, they are by no
means exclusive to parties that are trying to overcome electoral thresholds or enter office
for the first time. Therefore, voters are likely familiar with (in some capacity) the parties
that opt to change their names, making it less likely that this is an electoral phenomenon
that occurs at the fringes of political competition such that the majority of voters can
ignore these changes and remain relatively well informed about their electoral options.
Some cursory text analysis of new, old, and unchanged party labels revealed remarkable
similarity in the names that parties have across these groups. One key difference, however,
was the use of words that signaled newness among new party names. Further research as to
the effectiveness of such signals in a party label would be advantageous to understand if
such strategic considerations imbue excitement among the electorate or encourage a
distinction between these parties and those with unchanged labels.
This chapter also illustrated how voters react to such relabeling decisions. In particular,
I found that, when faced with a new party label, voters are more likely to offer that they
have not heard of the party or do not know the party’s ideological position, especially if
that label was a full change from the one previous. These findings pose some concerns for
citizen competence: given the frequency of party relabeling, the fact that such changes
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increase the likelihood that voters are unfamiliar with such parties, particularly in
post-election surveys, indicates that these changes might be reducing the set of electoral
choices that voters are willing to consider at the ballot box. This means that some voters
may be making suboptimal electoral decisions when, in fact, a relabeled party might be the
best option for them. This perspective, however, presumes that voters’ uncertainty about
such parties is not, on its own, an informative signal to voters about the utility of a political
party. In other words, if a voter has not heard of a party before, they could infer that the
party is not effective enough at campaigning or popular enough to gain attention in the
media such that the voter would hear about them. Therefore, it is not my intention to cast
a normative perspective on whether party relabeling is good or bad for democratic politics,
but instead to point to the implications it may have for voters’ information and behavior.
I also find that voters in old democracies are less likely to vote for relabeled parties,
while I find the opposite for voters in new democracies. These findings could be due, in
part, to the fact that relabeling is more common in new democracies. Therefore, voters in
these contexts may find it nearly unavoidable to encounter relabeled parties in an electoral
contest. Furthermore, these voters could adapt to the frequency of relabeling such that
they opt to rely on other heuristics to make their electoral decisions, which ultimately lead
them to vote for these relabeled parties. From another perspective, in these new
democracies, renamed parties could be signals of refreshed political competition that might
galvanize the electorate. Additional research addressing these possibilities would be
valuable for our understanding of how voters interpret these changes.
For partisanship, I find that in both old and new democracies, voters are less likely to
identify themselves as partisans of relabeled parties. In this chapter, I did not examine the
mechanisms that explain these results, nor did I establish a causal relationship between
party renaming and partisan identification. Instead, I can simply point to a relationship
that is likely bidirectional: parties are strategic actors that make decisions designed to
improve their electoral chances and their political power; therefore, parties may opt to
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relabel themselves when they face waning support in the electorate or dissatisfaction
among their partisans, similar to Lupu’s (2016) examination of party rebranding in Latin
America that contended that parties would seek to revamp their reputation (i.e. their
brand) in the face of scandal or crisis. On the other hand, partisans could grow
disillusioned with their party if they find that the party decided to change its label
independent of partisans’ preferences.
Chapter 3 examines a case where party relabeling was the result of an entrepreneurial
attempt to expand a party’s electoral base. In that chapter, I establish the causal
relationship between party relabeling and partisan responses, illustrating that, although
relabeling can be a successful move at widening a party’s electoral support, it can also
leave partisans disillusioned with parties, hindering their willingness to engage with them
and weaken their partisan attachments.
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CHAPTER 3
OF HEURISTICS AND PARTISAN (IN)STABILITY
If political scientists could use only a single piece of information about voters to predict
their political behavior, many would likely choose partisan identification. Knowing voters’
partisanship can help us predict whether and for whom they will vote, how they seek out
and interpret political information, and how they participate in politics. If partisanship is
so important for determining voter behavior, then under what conditions will voters retain
their partisanship? Most studies on partisan stability have focused on the voter side of the
partisanship dynamic. On the other side of that relationship stands the party — the group
without which such partisan identity would not be possible. Therefore, in this chapter I
examine how party decisions affect partisans and their identities. In doing so, I build on
the social identity perspective of partisanship to develop a theory of partisan stability that
considers further how partisans interact with their parties and their information
environment. To test the implications of this theory, I examine how a party’s seemingly
innocuous decision — to undergo a partial name change — affects partisans, using a series
of difference-in-difference designs along with a natural experiment. Specifically, I find that
this decision diminished partisans’ attitudes toward political parties, inhibited their
political engagement, and fractured their partisanship. These findings have implications for
our conceptualization of partisanship, expectations for partisan stability, and political
engagement.
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Partisan Identity and Stability
The notion that partisanship should be stable comes out of the perspective that partisan
identities are the “unmoved mover” within political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960). In
this vein, scholars view partisanship as an emotional attachment to a political party that
mirrors the psychological bonds that people have with other social groups (Campbell et al.
1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Because of
the nature of these attachments, scholars expect that changes to partisanship should be
rare: only in the face of large-scale, cataclysmic political events should partisans be
inclined to change their identities (Miller and Shanks 1996). Yet, as early as Converse
(1969), scholars recognized that some partisans would be more susceptible to changes than
others; namely, younger voters and those with less experience participating in a political
system would have weaker ties to parties and be more likely to alter their partisan
identities as they had yet to habituate their relationship to a specific political party (see
also Dinas 2014; Gomez 2013; Lisi 2015).
Other scholars, however, disagree about the social identity nature of partisanship.
These “revisionists” argue that voters are rational actors seeking to maximize the utility in
their partisan identification (and vote choice). Voters do this by selecting the party that
most closely aligns with their own (perhaps fleeting) ideological position or stances on
specific issues (Fiorina 1981). Within this framework, that means that partisan
identification can be influenced by short-term changes to the political environment, such as
presidential performance in office, affinity toward individual political candidates, or
changes in the economy. Therefore, revisionists contend that partisanship should not
behave as a stable construct in voters’ lives and will instead be influenced by an array of
short-term political factors.
One can envision these two characterizations of partisan stability as opposite poles on
the same spectrum. At one end is the perspective that partisanship functions as a social
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identity and should therefore change rarely and, at the other end, is the revisionist view,
where partisanship is a running tally of considerations that are constantly updated in the
face of new political information. The empirical reality appears to sit somewhere between
these two poles. While scholars have found substantial levels of partisan identification1
across Europe (e.g. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema
2017), Latin America (Lupu 2016; Samuels and Zucco 2014), and even in nascent
democracies (Brader and Tucker 2012; Carlson 2016; Conroy-Krutz, Moehler, and Aguilar
2016), others have also shown that individual-level party attachments do vacillate between
parties and between attachment and independence (e.g. LeDuc et al. 1984; Schmitt-Beck,
Weick, and Christoph 2006; Zuckerman and Kroh 2006). Although some of these
fluctuations have been due to measurement error (Schickler and Green 1997; Green,
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), they are also driven by a variety of individual factors, such
as personality traits (Bakker, Hopmann, and Persson 2015; Gerber et al. 2012),
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Converse 1969), social networks
(Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006; Zuckerman and Kroh 2006; Zuckerman,
Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007), and life events (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007;
Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006). In other words, while some voters are more
predisposed toward stable partisanship than others, variation in individuals’ social contexts
and lifespans can also generate changes to partisan identities.
The Role of Heuristics in Partisan Identification and Stability
This evidence has led to the continued debate about the nature of partisan identities.
While there is much to be gained from evaluating the individual characteristics that drive
partisan (in)stability, we have largely neglected the other side of the partisan coin: political
parties. This call for bringing the party back into our understanding of partisanship and
1A body of literature has also found evidence of decaying levels of partisan identification,
particularly within developed European countries (Dalton 1984; Dalton 2012).
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stability is not a novel one.
Lupu (2013) made a similar argument regarding our extant conceptualization of
partisan stability. He argued that instability and the social identity perspective of
partisanship need not be incompatible. Developing a branding model of partisanship, Lupu
(2013) emphasized the importance of comparative fit for voters’ partisan attachments.
Specifically, he highlighted that parties’ brands are the group prototypes that voters use to
assess how closely they align with each party group; and, voters will develop their partisan
attachments based on the degree of closeness between themselves and a party’s brand,
along with the distinctiveness of the party (Lupu 2013, 50). Put simply, voters not only
seek closeness between themselves and their party, but they also prefer parties that are
distinct from other options. In fact, using a survey experiment, he demonstrates that
voters are not only more likely to declare partisanship to parties that appear distinct from
others, but also their attachments are stronger in those contexts than when parties’ brands
appear to converge with others’.
Following the substantial evidence presented by Huddy and colleagues,2 I also contend
that partisanship operates as a social identity for voters. As others have argued, this
partisan identity forms a perceptual lens through which voters see themselves, political
information, their party (and other parties), and other voters (Campbell et al. 1960;
Gaines et al. 2007; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012); it also motivates and conditions
partisans’ participation in politics (Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Huddy, Mason, and
Aarøe 2015). Much of these perceptions are tied to the name of the party with which
partisans identify. In other words, their preferred party’s name acts as a heuristic not only
for the behavior they expect from the party, but also for their own identity.
Like Lupu, I also argue that instability can be a feature of partisanship when it
functions as a social identity, particularly when the party itself undergoes a change.
However, the type of change I investigate in this chapter is not one where a party obscures
2See Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017), Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015), Huddy and
Bankert (2017), and Huddy, Bankert, and Davies (2018).
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its brand – instead, it is a change that seems far more superficial and innocuous: a change
to a party’s name. Based on our extant theories of partisanship, and assuming that
partisans are fully informed, we would not expect such a change, all else being equal, to
alter partisans’ identities. From the revisionist perspective, we would only expect a name
change to alter voters’ partisan attachments provided that the change alerted them to
another modification of the party, like a change in its ideology or position on a key issue.
From the extant social identity perspective of partisanship, a name change alone should
similarly elicit little reaction from partisans, provided that the name change did not tip
them off about a change in the group’s prototype, esteem, distinctiveness, or other key
characteristics.
However, psychologists and sociologists have demonstrated that social group names are
central to groups’ identities and how they are conveyed to others (Larkey, Hecht, and
Martin 1993; D. Mason 1990; Sigelman, Tuch, and Martin 2005; Zola 1993). Therefore, the
names that parties choose are meaningful for voters; and changes to such names are
important, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2. Yet, unlike the consequences for the average
voter that I investigated in the previous chapter, I do not expect that a change to the name
of a party will necessarily result in the same loss of information for partisans, as these
voters are already more likely to follow their party in politics and seek out information
about them (Lodge and Hamill 1986; Redlawsk 2002; Redlawsk 2004). Therefore, I assume
that these partisans are similarly more likely to identify a name change and its relationship
to the party.
Although these voters are likely more informed about their party undergoing a name
change, partisans are still navigating electoral environments where the cost of becoming
fully informed is high, leading them to rely on informational shortcuts to make decisions.
Because the name associated with a party is central to the party itself and partisans’
identities, I argue that a party’s decision to change its name will act a signal – or heuristic
– for partisans that the party is no longer the same as it once was, similar to Marinova’s
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(2016) argument that voters will use structural changes to individual parties as heuristics
for party instability. Using relabeling as a heuristic for the party undergoing a change will
result in observable implications for partisans that are conditional on the nature of
partisan identities.
If voters’ partisanship fits the revisionist perspective, a party-label change will affect
partisans’ attachment to the party provided that they interpreted the name change as a
signal of a substantive change to the party, like its ideology. If voters’ partisanship fits the
social identity perspective, as I argue, a party-label change will alter their partisan
identification, which will consequently affect their perceptions of parties and their political
engagement. To test these expectations, which I state formally later in the chapter, I use
the case of Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism and its 2005 name change to The
Left Party.PDS. I turn to a discussion of this case and the factors that led to the name
change and then state my hypotheses in the context of this case.
The Case of Germany’s Die Linke (The Left)
As Chapter 2 illustrated, party-name change is not an uncommon phenomenon; and the
case of the PDS’s name change mirrors relabeling decisions among other, smaller European
parties in recent history that reflected successful attempts to expand parties’ electorates,
like the Left Party-Communists in Sweden dropping “Communists” from its name in 1991,
Lega Nord in Italy dropping “Nord” from its name in 2018, the Finnish Christian Union’s
change to the Christian Democrats in 2001, and the Christian Democratic Socialist Party
in Sweden changing its name to the Christian Democrats in 1996. As I demonstrate in this
chapter, the PDS’s attempt at expanding its electorate, like the parties mentioned above,
was successful. The party improved on its prior federal election vote share by 4 percentage
points and achieved the largest vote share (8.7%) in the party’s history. The relabeling
decision was not as successful, however, for the PDS’s partisan base, as I demonstrate later.
This suggests that, not only can voters heed party relabeling as a signal that the party has
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undergone some sort of change, but that this heuristic can be interpreted differently among
non-partisans and partisans. Therefore, such changes, while successful, can ultimately leave
some voters behind.
Although Germany presents a unique case of a democracy that is both old (among
western states) and new (among eastern states), the PDS itself was the holdover party
from former East Germany, representing an old party in a new context for its partisans.
Therefore, this case can also suggest the types of consequences that partisans of parties
that withstand democratization and subsequently attempt to expand their electorate.3
Although the case of the PDS relabeling shares similarities with other parties, as I have
described, it is also unique in that the decision to change the party’s name was quick and
unexpected, propelled by unforeseen political events, as I discuss in the next section. The
abruptness of the change is analytically useful, as it allows me to rule out other factors
that could have conditioned the results I present later, but it also means that this case may
be distinct from others. Additionally, the party’s relabeling was driven by elite-led
negotiations. Although that is not anomalous to many name-change decisions, it is
dissimilar from cases where partisans were urging their party to make such a change or
cases where parties were forced to change their name due to being outlawed, as with the
Flemish Bloc in Belgium4 or Islamist, Kurdish, and parties with names that included
“Communist” in Turkey (Hakyemez and Akgun 2002).
The German Party of Democratic Socialism’s (PDS) abruptly changed its name and
effectively entered a joint-list with the Electoral Alternative for Work and Social Justice
(WASG) prior to the 2005 Bundestag (federal parliament) election. Although the parties’
decision to enter a joint-list reflected a desire to improve electoral performance in western
Germany, the events described below illustrate that neither the PDS’s name change, nor
3As Dalton and Weldon (2007) show, some voters in new democracies exhibit standing
partisan ties to the parties from the ancien regime.
4The party was outlawed for violating a Belgian anti-racism law and reemerged as the
Flemish Interest in the subsequent election (Erk 2007).
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the party’s decision to compete together with the WASG were conditioned on waning
interest from PDS partisans or an electoral disruption to their established voting base. In
what follows, I provide an overview of the evolution of the PDS until the party’s decision
to enter a cooperation agreement with the WASG, discuss the key components of the
joint-list agreement that I will leverage in my analyses, and detail my expectations for the
consequences of this agreement for voters. The case of the PDS relabeling allows me to
adjudicate between the competing expectations derived from the social identity and
revisionist theories of partisanship.
Why the PDS Changed its Name
The Party of Democratic Socialism emerged on Germany’s political scene following the
reunification of East and West Germany,5 enjoying considerable support among eastern
Germans through the 1998 federal election. In 2002, the party realized its precarious
position among the German electorate when its vote shares decreased in eastern Germany
and, without additional support in the west to buoy its votes, the party did not surpass the
5% electoral threshold. However, in the subsequent Landtag (state parliament) elections in
2004, the PDS staged a comeback and improved on its vote shares in each state, both in
comparison to their performance in the 2002 Bundestag elections and the 1999 Landtag
elections. If we were to only examine how the PDS performed in the national
parliamentary elections prior to changing its name, we might conclude that their poor
performance in 2002 was the catalyst. However, the considerable improvement in their
electoral success in the 2004 elections paints a different picture. I discuss their electoral
performance in the context of Figures 3.1-3.3.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the party vote share6 that the PDS obtained in the 1994, 1998,
5The PDS was the successor to the ruling party of the German Democratic Republic, the
Social Unity Party of Germany (SED).
6In Germany’s mixed electoral system, voters’ first vote is for a candidate in their single-
member district and the second vote is for the party list competing at the state-level. The















Figure 3.1: PDS Vote Share in Each State (Federal Elections)
2002, and 2005 Bundestag elections by state. The grey lines represent states from former
East Germany and the black lines, states from western Germany. The vertical dashed line
represents the timing in which the PDS changed its name – approximately two months
before the 2005 federal election. First, it is important to note the change in vote share
trends from 2002 to 2005. In the election just following the PDS’s change, they improved
on their vote share across the board, both in eastern and western states. This illustrates
the electoral success of the party after its change – the PDS improved on its previous vote
share by approximately 4 percentage points and secured 8.7% of the party vote. That the
PDS was successful following its change is a stark distinction from the way PDS partisans
seem to have reacted to it, as I examine in this chapter. Next, this figure highlights the
negligible vote share that the PDS received among western states prior to the party’s name
change. Among eastern states, as mentioned previously, the PDS struggled somewhat in
the 2002 election, where vote shares appear to have returned to 1994-levels, if not lower.











































Figure 3.3: PDS Vote Share in Eastern State Elections
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trend. Figure 3.2 shows the party’s vote share in western state elections between 1990 and
2005 – prior to the federal election that September. The range of the y-axis in Figure 3.2 is
from 0 to 5, to illustrate better the marginal fluctuations in the party’s performance. Four
states are entirely absent from this figure, as the PDS did not compete in
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Hessen, or Rheinland-Pfalz. Relatedly, the party did not
start competing in Hamburg, Niedersachsen, or Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine
Westphalia) until the late 1990s to early 2000s.
In eastern states, the PDS generally improved on its vote share in Landtag elections
prior to the 2005 federal election. Only in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern did the PDS’s vote
share drop between its penultimate and final state election prior to the 2005 Bundestag
election. Otherwise, assumptions that the PDS’s waning support was the catalyst for its
change are not reflect in the party’s 2004 state-level performance in eastern states. In fact,
it was not until the beginning of 2005 that the PDS started to consider the possibility of
modifying their party to improve their competitive advantage.
On January 22, 2005, the Electoral Alternative for Work and Social Justice (WASG)
was registered as a political party. From the perspective of PDS elites, the WASG occupied
a similar ideological space as the PDS and appeared poised to capitalize on the western
Germans who had evaded the PDS thus far (Heunemann 2008). For WASG politicians, the
PDS had far more resources than the new party possessed. These differences presented the
parties with an opportunity to cooperate: for the PDS, this could help secure them the
western votes they had been hoping for and, for the WASG, this could vastly improve their
available resources for electoral participation (Heunemann 2008).
Elites from both parties expressed a desire to see how the parties fared when competing
against one another, before committing to future cooperation (Heunemann 2008). On May
22, 2005, the parties competed against each other for the first time in the Landtag election
in North Rhine-Westphalia. Both parties performed poorly and neither of them amassed
enough votes to secure any seats. Despite their poor electoral outcomes, elites from both
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parties expressed their preferences to wait for future contests to see how the parties
continued to perform against one another (Heunemann 2008).
However, events immediately following the election changed their calculations. That
evening, in the wake of the poor performance of the nationally governing party, the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), the SPD-party leader and the Chancellor unexpectedly
announced plans to hold early elections in the fall of 2005 (Niedermayer 2007). Days later
in a media interview, Oskar Lafontaine, a prominent SPD politician, urged the SPD, PDS,
and WASG to join forces and form a left coalition similar to that of Italy’s L’ulivo
(Heunemann 2008). Scholars and former leaders of both the PDS and WASG contend that
Lafontaine’s statement, combined with the now-looming federal elections, drove
representatives from both the PDS and WASG to meet later that week to discuss possible
avenues for cooperation in the upcoming Bundestag election (Heunemann 2008; Olsen
2007). Consequently, on June 10, 2005, the parties signed an agreement detailing their
plans for cooperation: the parties would start negotiations over a “new Left in Germany,”
they would not compete against one another in any district, the WASG would field
candidates on the PDS’s list, and the PDS would change its name – they later settled on
“Die Linkspartei.PDS” (The Left Party.PDS) and the change took effect on July 17, 2005
(Heunemann 2008). Obviously, a strong ideological signal was included in the new label,
making it likely that partisans would be primed to pick up on any ideological or issue
changes the party underwent.7
As these events illustrate, the PDS name change (and the “joint-list” with the WASG),
were primarily driven by elite actions rather than voter behavior. Although the PDS
suffered an electoral setback in the 2002 federal election, the party had made substantial
gains in the 2004 state elections. Furthermore, according to Heunemann (2008) and Olsen
(2007), the parties’ decision to cooperate hinged on the PDS’s goal to improve its foray
7Interestingly, the inclusion of the ideological signal “Socialism” in the PDS’s initial name
did not seem to be as meaningful to western voters than did the inclusion of “Left” in the
new name. I explore this in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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into the west and the WASG’s goal to increase its resources ahead of the unexpectedly
early 2005 federal election.8 Therefore, the decision to change was not the result of any
waning interest among existing supporters, nor did the press at the time interpret this
impending cooperation agreement as a sign that the PDS had somehow weakened – in fact,
it was seen as an entrepreneurial attempt at capturing more votes and becoming a “third
force” in the German party system (Dausend 2005). I use this case to examine how
partisans’ attitudes and behavior are affected by elite-led party relabeling.
Hypotheses
The case I examine in this chapter includes a name change that resulted from elite
responses to unexpected political events. I develop my expectations with these events in
mind. In other words, had the PDS’s decision to relabel itself been a result of a scandal or
a demand from voters, my expectations would differ. Therefore, from the instrumental
view, I do not expect a change to a party’s name to influence directly partisans’ perception
of the party or their own identification. Instead, in order for such a change to have an
effect, it would need to be indirect: by alerting voters to other changes the party has
undergone, be it ideological or issue movement, leadership turnover, or an altered coalition
agreement. Therefore, from the instrumental perspective, I expect the following:9
First, if voters are behaving instrumentally, then the closer the ideological position of
the PDS is to their own position, the more likely they will be to declare partisanship to the
party. If the PDS name change alerted voters to a change in the party’s ideological
8It is also important to note that this agreement did not require that the two parties
dissolve their individual organizations and combine to form a new party. Neither did the
parties put forth a collective party program in the election; they still submitted their own,
separate manifestos (Dietzel, Hoffmann, and Woop 2005).
9It is also possible that detecting a shift in a party’s position on an issue could affect
voters’ partisan identification independent from a perceived shift in the party’s ideology.
Unfortunately, given the data available, this hypothesis is difficult to test directly. In the
available, only two issues were discussed (nuclear energy and EU unification) across multiple




H1a: After the name change, partisans will perceive a change to the PDS’s
ideology from 2002.10
H1b: If the change that partisans perceive moves the party closer to their own
ideological position, they will be more likely to declare partisanship to the PDS
than those who perceive the party as further from their ideological position.
Whereas, from the expressive partisanship perspective, I expect that:
H2: Partisans’ perception of parties will be negatively affected by their party
relabeling, as compared to partisans of other parties.
H3: Partisans will be less likely to engage with their political party than
partisans of other parties.
H4: Partisans will be less likely to declare partisanship to their party after the
relabeling.
Data and Methods
To test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, I use the German Legislative Election Survey to assess the
consequences of the PDS-label change in 2005.11 The GLES survey data consist of four
panels, each executed across three federal electoral periods (GLES 2017). The surveys from
10Partisans could become aware of the party’s ideological or issue position change either
directly, through the party label changing, or indirectly, through the party-label change
alerting them to a change in the party’s leadership or coalition agreement, which then leads
them to update their perception of the party’s ideology and/or issue positions.
11As discussed previously, the party did not change only in 2005. In 2007, the party
officially merged with the WASG to form The Left. This is another analytically useful change
to examine, which I account for in my discussion below of the informational consequences
the label changes had for voters. Unfortunately, as I explain later, data limitations prevent
me from thoroughly examining the 2007 change and its effect on partisans.
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overlapping waves in each panel were fielded during the same time frame and the survey
questions were consistent across each panel. Therefore, to increase the number of
observations in my data,12 I created a cumulated dataset from 1994-2005 including Panels
1 through 3.13 Because the 2005 election surveys were fielded after the PDS-label change in
July, these surveys allow me to assess the respondents’ reactions to the label change shortly
after it took place. To test Hypothesis 4, I use a natural experiment embedded in the
Politbarometer, a national, rolling cross-sectional survey in Germany.
Testing the Instrumental Hypotheses
To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I limit my sample to only respondents who declared
partisanship to the PDS in the previous survey wave. This allows me to capture the effect
that perceiving a change in the PDS’s ideology had on PDS partisans’ likelihood of
declaring partisanship to the PDS again, after the party changed its name, rather than
capturing respondents who were drawn to the party because of the change. To measure the
dependent variable for H1a, ideological perception, I use an item from the GLES that asks
respondents to indicate where they place the PDS on an ideological scale from 1 (left) to 11
(right).14 The independent variable of interest for H1a is an indicator for the year 2005,
after the PDS changed its name. To account for additional factors that could drive
differences in partisans’ perceptions of their party’s ideology, I control for the respondent’s
ideology, political interest, education, and income as each of these characteristics could
influence how they perceive PDS’s ideology.
To measure the independent variable for H1b, ideological proximity, I take the absolute
12I aggregate the surveys to increase my sample size as the sample of PDS partisans for
any particular survey version in the same wave is small.
13Due to substantive changes in attitudinal and behavioral questions after the 2005 survey,
I do not extend my analyses past the 2005 survey waves.
14“Don’t know” responses were not solicited from respondents and, instead, were coded
only if the respondent volunteered that they did not know the party’s ideology. Only 8 re-
spondents answered “don’t know” when asked about the party’s ideology; these respondents
were subsequently dropped from the analyses.
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value of the difference between respondents’ ideological position and their perception of the
PDS’s ideological position during the same survey. This provides me with a measure of
ideological proximity of the party to the respondent where smaller values indicate that the
party and respondent’s ideology are closely aligned whereas larger values indicate that they
are further apart. The dependent variable, PDS partisanship, takes the value of 1 if
respondents declare partisanship to the PDS and zero otherwise.
Although research has accounted for a variety of factors that influence voters’
propensity to declare partisanship to a party, and to one party over another, it is less clear
which factors should influence a voter’s likelihood of retaining partisanship with the same
party. For the purposes of examining changing perceptions of the party’s ideology and issue
positions, I control for political interest, as it is likely that it plays a role in whether voters
perceive these changes in the first place. I also control for the respondent’s age in 2005, as
older voters are more likely to remain consistent in their partisan attachments than
younger ones (Converse 1969; Dinas 2014).
I present the results of each test in turn. Figure 3.4 displays the coefficient estimates
with 95% confidence intervals from ordinary-least squares regressions with standard errors
clustered on the individual. Each line represents a different model specification, where the
model description in the legend indicates the additional controls included in the regression
equation.
As Figure 3.4 illustrates, regardless of the controls included in the model, respondents
do not perceive a significantly different ideological position for their party after the
relabeling. Although the relabeling did not appear directly to alert partisans to a change in
the party’s ideology, it is possible that the name change altered their own ideological
positioning relative to the party, which would manifest in the ideological distance between
the party and the respondent.
The coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from the logistic regression
model used to test H1b are displayed in Figure 3.5. As these results show, the ideological
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Figure 3.4: Change in Partisans’ Perception of PDS Ideology (2002-2005)
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Figure 3.5: The Effect of Ideological Proximity on Likelihood of Retaining PDS
Partisanship
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distance between the party and its partisans did not have a significantly different effect on
partisans’ likelihood to retain their attachment to the PDS after the relabeling as
compared to before the name change occurred. This evidence does not provide support for
the revisionist perspective of partisanship.
However, other characteristics of the party could have driven voters’ instrumental
considerations and thereby altered partisans’ attachment to the party. Another high-profile
signal to partisans that the party underwent change would be turnover in the party’s
leadership. However, the PDS retained the same leader that it had since 2003: Lothar
Bisky. It is important to note that Bisky took the helm of PDS leadership after its 2002
electoral performance. One might presume that a new leader for the PDS could have
affected partisans’ evaluations of the party with regard to the utility of their partisanship –
a new leader could introduce uncertainty into the direction of the party. However, Bisky
was not a new face for the PDS – he had been the leader of the party from 1993 to 2000 as
well. Therefore, if his leadership posed instrumental concerns for PDS partisans, these
partisans would have likely already left the party during his leadership the first time
around.
Although the party’s relabeling did not signal to its partisans that the party underwent
any ideological change, it is possible that such a change could signal to voters that the
party was no longer effective under its old label, reducing the utility that PDS partisans
would gain from their partisanship. Although this was a long-term concern among PDS
leaders (Heunemann 2008), neither the media nor scholars interpreted this relabeling as a
sign of the PDS’s waning efficacy, as I described above. The role of the media is
particularly worth highlighting here, as their framing of the relabeling likely informed how
many voters and partisans perceived the change (see Chong and Druckman 2007 for a
review of framing theory and framing effects). Therefore, it is very unlikely that the party’s
relabeling signaled to its partisans that their partisan utility was decreasing because of
PDS ineffectiveness. Overall, if relabeling had any effect on how partisans perceived their
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party or considered their attachment to their party, this effect does not appear to be the
result of instrumental considerations. I examine the expressive consequences of party
relabeling next.
Testing the Expressive Partisanship Hypotheses: Comparison Groups
To assess the causal effect of the PDS-label change for partisans’ attitudes and behavior
(H2 and H3), I compare PDS partisans to similar groups of voters whose behavior was
arguably unaffected by the relabeling. What makes a group of voters similar to PDS
partisans? Because there is no true control group of voters who did not see any change in
the PDS label in 2005, I construct reasonable groups of voters who share similarities with
the PDS partisans but differ on one particular characteristic: the object of their partisan
identification. No single group of voters presents the perfect comparison to PDS partisans.
Therefore, I construct a series of groups that share different similarities with PDS partisans
and all differ in their partisan identification. By making multiple comparisons, I am
confident that the findings presented in these analyses are due to the PDS relabeling. A
description of each comparison group is included below.
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Comparison Groups
Group Ideology Party Size Party Age Geography Partisan Attach.
PDS Partisans Left-Leaning Small Young Eastern Unclear
Greens Partisans X X X – –
SPD Partisans X – – – –
Eastern Apartisans – – – X X
Left-wing Apartisans X – – – X
Table 3.1 illustrates the similarities and differences between the comparison groups
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discussed below. A description of PDS partisans’ ideology, party size, party age, geographic
location, and expected attachment to their party (prior to the change) is included in the
table. For the remainder of the groups, a check-mark denotes that the group shares the
characteristics with PDS partisans whereas a dash indicates that the group does not.
Overall, these comparison groups allow me not only to determine the effect that the PDS
relabeling had on partisans’ views of parties, but also account for a number of alternative
explanations for PDS partisans’ behavior, like their ideology, the size of their party, age of
their party, limited experience with democratic politics (as PDS partisans overwhelmingly
came from eastern Germany), and a preexisting lack of partisan attachment.
Greens partisans: To account for the possibility that a party’s ideology may play a
role in how partisans behave and attach themselves to a party, I compare the PDS
partisans with Greens partisans as they are the most ideologically similar party in
Germany. Of the main parties in Germany, both parties are rather small (as opposed to
the larger “catch-all” parties like the SPD or CDU), so this comparison rids me of the
concern that PDS partisans are unique in their partisanship because of the smaller nature
of the party. Furthermore, both are the youngest of the main parties in Germany,
alleviating concerns that the age of the party might be playing a role in partisan outcomes.
Lastly, both have experience governing with the SPD.15 Therefore, while partisans of these
parties might have been affected by the SPD’s unexpected loss in the North-Rhine
Westphalian state election and the sudden call for early elections by the SPD, I expect that
they would have been affected similarly. Therefore, any difference in the change in their
attitudes and behavior from 2002 to 2005 should be the result of the PDS-label change and
not other political events that occurred during that time period.
SPD partisans: The SPD is also a left-leaning party, although it is a large, catch-all
party in German politics while the PDS is a small, opposition party. However, I expect
that, if the SPD state-election loss and call for early elections drove a change in partisans’
15The Greens governed with the SPD as a junior coalition partner at the national-level,
whereas the PDS governed as a junior coalition partner at the state-level.
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attitudes and behavior rather than a change to the PDS-label, I would expect to see the
effect of those events most clearly among SPD partisans.
Eastern Apartisans: Most PDS partisans are from eastern Germany. Given their
experience with the German Democratic Republic and the unification of Germany, their
views of parties and their engagement in politics may be substantively different from those
in the west due to a general disillusionment with politics and parties. Therefore, to account
for the possibility that the behavior of PDS partisans is the result of their experience and
nostalgia for the GDR (Ostalgie), I compare them with apartisan easterners.
Left-wing Apartisans: Perhaps PDS partisans’ views and behavior reflect from their
ideological leanings and not their partisan identification. Therefore, to account for the
possibility that PDS partisans are already relatively unattached to their party, I also
compare them to apartisans who are left-leaning (i.e. apartisan respondents whose
ideological position fell between [1,5] on a 10-point scale).
I construct the groups described above based on those who fit the descriptors (e.g. PDS
partisan, SPD partisan, left-wing apartisan, etc.) in the panel prior to the label change in
2005. I then examine their attitudes for the year in question (e.g. for those who said they
were PDS partisans in the 1998 panel, I look at their attitudes in 2002). This ensures that
the inferences I make are drawn from partisans’ reactions to the label change and not those
who were drawn to the party in 2005 because of the change.
Perception of Parties
To address Hypothesis 2, that partisans’ perception of parties will be negatively affected by
their party relabeling, as compared to partisans of other parties, I examine the how PDS
partisans’ evaluations of political parties in Germany changed following the PDS label
change in 2005. I compare their evaluations to the perceptions of the groups discussed
above. To do measure perceptions of parties, I use ten items from the GLES that gauge
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attitudes towards political parties as a class, rather than as specific parties.16,17
I re-scaled respondents’ answers to each question such that higher values indicate a
more positive attitude toward parties. I then took the average of respondents’ answers to
all ten questions to create a variable that captures respondents’ general attitudes toward
parties. The measure of party attitudes ranges from 1-5, where 1 indicates very poor views
of parties and 5 indicates very positive views.
The figures below show the mean respondents’ party attitudes within the comparison
groups discussed previously, with 95% confidence intervals. The black lines represent those
who declared partisanship to the PDS in the previous wave and the grey lines represent the
relevant comparison group according to each figure title. The larger the value on the
y-axis, the more positive the respondents’ attitudes about parties.
All four groups saw small improvements in attitudes from 1998 to 2002, with PDS
partisans not standing out.18 From 2002 to 2005, however, PDS partisans and
non-partisans “stood still” while SPD and Greens supporters continued to increase their
affect for parties. This distinction could be the result of the label change detaching PDS
backers from their party and the party system. However, it could also be the case that
PDS partisans are fundamentally different from other partisan voters: more disenchanted
with political parties and, as a result, comparable to apartisans. With the data presented
here, I cannot rule out that possibility. However, the results in the next set of analyses
alleviate this concern.
16Questions pertaining to specific parties were limited and did not ask respondents to
evaluate each party or even “their” party in relation to different characteristics or state-
ments. Therefore, I use these ten items from the GLES under the assumption that, although
partisans are likely considering all parties in their evaluation of each statement, they will
weight their consideration of their own party more heavily. While this is a relatively strong
assumption, I expect that, even for partisans who also possess negative partisanship toward
another party and, as a result, may be evaluating the parties they dislike more heavily than
others, I do not expect that partisans of any specific party will be systematically more likely
to have strong negative partisanship toward a party than partisans of other parties.
17The questions used to create this measure are available in the Appendix.
18Unfortunately, extending this analysis to 2009 is not feasible, as only one survey version










































Figure 3.6: Respondents’ Attitudes toward Parties by Comparison Groups (1998-2005)
In comparison to the other partisan groups, PDS partisans did appear to react
differently to the 2005 events. Therefore, to test the effect of the PDS relabeling on PDS
partisans’ attitudes about parties, I use a pooled difference-in-difference design with the
SPD and Greens partisans included in the sample.19 In testing these differences, I also
account for the demographic factors that could predict partisanship to the PDS (the
independent variable) as well as partisans’ views about parties (the dependent variable).
Therefore, I control for respondents’ political interest, ideology, education, and income as
these are often correlated with partisanship and/or perceptions of the political
environment, which includes political parties. Because some respondents appear in the
data at multiple time points, I use standard errors clustered on the individual.
19The formal test for common trends is in the Appendix.
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Political interest: I control for political interest because politically interested
respondents may feel more acquainted with the party environment and therefore espouse
more positive views of the parties. This is an ordinal variable ranging from 1-5 where 1
indicates no interest in politics and 5 indicates a very strong interest in politics. I treat this
variable as interval-valued.
Ideology (standardized): I control for ideology for because it is likely associated with
respondents’ partisan identity (i.e. the more left-leaning a respondent is, the more likely
she is a PDS partisan, all else equal). Therefore, it is important to determine whether
ideology alone explains respondents’ views about parties, or if partisanship has an effect
independent of ideology. To compute this variable, I subtract respondents’ raw ideological
position (ranging from 1 to 11) from their mean placement of themselves and the political
parties in Germany. I use this standardized measure instead of the raw score to account for
the possibility that PDS partisans, as most of them come from east Germany and have
experience living under the GDR, might use the ideological scale substantively differently
from Greens or SPD partisans.20 This variable ranges from -7.5 to 7.875, where greater
negative values indicate a more left-leaning respondent and greater positive values indicate
a more right-leaning respondent.
I control for educational level and household income to account for the socioeconomic
factors that likely influence how people view parties and politics. In other words, I expect
that those with high SES will have more political resources and subsequently have the
potential to yield greater influence in politics, improving their evaluations of parties and
the political environment. I also expect that, given most PDS partisans reside in eastern
Germany, they are likely to be poorer than SPD and Greens partisans, on average.
Education level: This variable is ordinal from 1-6, where 1 indicates that the respondent
did not finish the equivalent of high school and 6 indicates the respondent received a
post-graduate degree. I treat this variable as interval-valued.
20I report the regression results using the raw ideological scores in the Appendix in place
of the standardized ones. The results do not substantively differ.
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Household income: This variable is ordinal from 1-12, where 1 indicates the lowest
income bracket included in the survey, and 12, the highest. I treat this variable as
interval-valued.
Partisanship among these respondents will not be entirely static over the years.
Therefore, to account for respondents whose partisanship switched between the parties I
am comparing, and for the possibility that their behavior and attitudes were consequently
affected by such a change, I drop respondents who switch between parties in the
comparison groups. Specifically, I drop anyone who was a PDS partisan in the previous
survey wave and declared partisanship to the SPD21 or Greens22 in 2005. Likewise, I also
dropped respondents who declared PDS partisanship after identifying with the Greens23 or
SPD24 in the previous wave, respectively. The results displayed below are robust to keeping
these respondents in the sample, as reported in the Appendix. I did not drop respondents
who switched from apartisan to PDS partisan or vice versa as scholars have shown that this
switch is fundamentally different from changing identification between specific parties.25
Figure 3.7 illustrates the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from the
pooled difference-in-difference analyses, where Greens partisans are the reference group. As
these results show, when comparing PDS partisans SPD and Greens partisans, in support
of H1, respondents who declared partisanship to the PDS in 2002 show systematically less
positive views of parties in 2005 than the relevant outpartisans (2005 × Prev. PDS Part.).
Specifically, regardless of the specification of the difference-in-difference models, PDS
partisans exhibited worse attitudes about parties following the PDS relabeling than both
2111.97% of the sample.
221.7% of the sample.
231.96% of the sample.
241.88% of the sample.
25Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph (2006) and Zuckerman and Kroh (2006) demon-
strate that, given the wording of the conventional German survey question regarding partisan
identity, it is considerably common for Germans to vacillate between declaring partisanship
to a specific party in one year and apartisanship in the next. It is much less common and,
the authors argue more deliberate, for respondents to switch partisan identification across
parties from one year to the next.
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partisan groups.
2005 x Prev. SPD Part.
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Figure 3.7: Partisans’ Change in Attitudes toward Parties following the PDS Relabeling
The comparison to the SPD partisans is especially telling, because their views of parties
improved even in the wake of the SPD’s unexpected electoral loss that spurred the early
Bundestag election in September 2005. If those political events influenced partisans’ views
of the political parties in Germany, it would follow that SPD partisans would have been
the most affected. However, their change in party attitudes are statistically
indistinguishable from Greens partisans. From this analysis, then, it appears that PDS
partisans’ views of parties were negatively affected following the PDS relabeling. This may
have been due to a weakening of partisans’ attachments to their party and subsequent
disillusionment following the PDS name change; or, PDS partisans’ views may have been
unique relative to other partisans in the way they viewed parties in the political
environment, such that they appeared more similar to apartisans (as shown in Figure 3.6).
The next analyses help adjudicate between these two possibilities.
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Engagement with Political Party
To address H3, that partisans will be less likely to engage with their political party than
partisans of other parties, I measure engagement with a partisan’s political party using
respondents’ answers to the following statement:26
“If you aimed to exercise political influence in an issue of importance to you
and express your point of view, which of the following things would you do?
Try to get support from a party/politician.”
This variable ranges from 1-5 where 1 indicates the respondent would definitely not try
to get support from a party or politician and 5 indicates the respondent definitely would.
Unfortunately, questions regarding engagement with specific parties were not available in
the survey during the 1994-2005 time period. Therefore, I use this survey question as a
proxy for partisans’ engagement with their party, under the assumption that, if they were
attempting to exercise political influence on an issue they found important, they would be
more likely to contact the party to which they were closest.27
I again compare PDS partisans to respondents in the comparison groups mentioned
above (e.g. SPD partisans, Greens partisans, left-wing apartisans, and eastern apartisans).
I make these comparisons as I argue that non-PDS partisans’ likelihood of engaging a
political party should be similarly unaffected by the PDS relabeling as their attitudes
toward parties (in the previous section). Again, using these comparison groups allows me
to account for other political events (like the early election) or characteristics (shown in
26I avoid other generic measures of political engagement like voting likelihood because of
the usual lack of variation in respondents answers to questions about voting in an upcoming
election.
27One concern here is that some parties have more influence than others, leading voters
to be more willing to contact a larger party to address a problem rather than a small one.
If this is the case, then based on the comparisons I have constructed, Greens partisans and
apartisans should also be more likely to seek help from a larger party. Therefore, if voters do
prefer to seek help from a larger party regardless of their partisanship, this behavior should
be evident in all of the comparison groups.
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Figure 3.8: Respondents’ Likelihood of Seeking Party Support by Comparison Groups
(1998-2005)
The average response among each group (with 95% confidence intervals) for each survey
year is shown in Figure 3.8. The black lines represent those who declared partisanship to
the PDS in the previous wave and the grey lines represent the relevant comparison group
according to each figure title. The larger the value on the y-axis, the more likely that
respondents would be to seek help from a politician/political party.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates how PDS partisans’ declared likelihood of soliciting help from
a political party or politician changed following the PDS-label change in 2005, in
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comparison to other groups of voters. PDS partisans appear to behave most like apartisans
(and to a lesser degree, like SPD partisans) from 1998 to 2002, decreasing in their
likelihood to solicit party support on an issue. In 2005, however, as compared to PDS
partisans, respondents’ likelihood of seeking political help increased at a greater rate
regardless of their partisan identification.
To formally test this hypothesis, I again use a pooled difference-in-difference design,
comparing PDS partisans to the three comparison groups with which they showed common
trends on the outcome: left-wing apartisans, SPD partisans, and apartisan easterners.28 In
doing so, I also account for factors that could influence respondents’ propensity to seek
help from a party or politician as well as predict their partisanship. Therefore, I again
control for respondents’ political interest, ideology, education, and income as these are
often correlated with partisanship and/or political engagement. In addition to these
controls, I also control for age (continuous variable) and gender (binary variable where 1
indicates a woman). I control for age, because PDS partisans tend to be older, on average,
than other partisans and more men tend to comprise this partisan group than others
(Decker and Neu 2013). Because some respondents appear in the data at multiple time
points, I use standard errors clustered on the individual.
The results are displayed in Figure 3.9. Again, each line represents a different model
specification, where the model description in the legend indicates the additional controls
included in the regression equation. From these results, PDS partisans are systematically
less likely to solicit support from a party or politician on an issue important to them than
SPD partisans, left-wing apartisans, and apartisan easterners by 2005. This difference is
particularly striking, because one might expect that apartisans would be the least
interested in engaging with political parties. Instead, by 2005, apartisans from both
comparison groups increased in their willingness to seek help from a political party and this
change was indistinguishable from SPD partisans’ behavior. Given the nature of the
28Tests of the common trend assumption for each comparison are available in the Ap-
pendix.
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Figure 3.9: Willingness to Solicit Help from Party
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comparison groups I constructed, the results here lend support to H2. If the lack of
improvement from PDS partisans were the result of disappointment with the SPD’s
performance, this should have also been reflected among SPD partisans. Similarly, if PDS
partisans happen to be more disillusioned with parties than other partisans, they should
more closely mimic the apartisan respondents.
Placebo Test
Despite the support for H2, it is possible that PDS partisans just behave differently than
other voters. Because PDS partisans are drawn to the SED’s successor, some might expect
that these partisans are nostalgic for the political and economic systems they experienced
as part of authoritarian East Germany. Although this perception has been disputed among
scholars (see Doerschler and Banaszak (2007)), it still warrants further examination to
ensure that the changes identified in the attitudes and behavior among PDS partisans are
not merely a reflection of large-scale changes in their beliefs. To address this concern, I
conduct a placebo test, examining PDS partisans’ attitudes toward democracy and society
in comparison to the other groups across the same time period. If PDS-partisans’ attitudes
were undergoing a shift between 2002 and 2005 unrelated to the PDS-label change, I
expect that this shift should also be reflected in their feelings about politics and society
more generally. Similar to the party responsiveness variable, I constructed a measure of
respondents’ attitudes toward political and society using six related questions from the
GLES.29 In this test, PDS partisans are indistinguishable from the other groups; their
attitudes toward democracy and society follow the same trend as respondents in the
comparison groups.





















































Figure 3.10: Respondents’ Attitudes about Politics and Society by Comparison Groups
(1998-2005)
As Figure 3.10 shows, PDS partisans’ broader attitudes about politics in Germany, do
not appear to have been affected by the PDS-label change such that they differ from
respondents in any of the comparison groups. In fact, with the exception of SPD partisans
from 1998 to 2002, PDS partisans’ sense of political efficacy and feelings towards politics in
Germany move in remarkable parallel to the respondents in the corresponding comparison
groups. Although not a definitive test, this lends support to the possibility that PDS
partisans’ views of parties were affected by the PDS-label change in 2005 and not reflective
of a general shift in their political attitudes during that time period. I also test for any
statistical differences in the change in respondents’ attitudes from 1998-2002 as well as
2002-2005 (reported in the Appendix). The results show that PDS partisans’ change in
attitudes about politics and society are statistically indistinguishable from the change in
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any other groups’ attitudes, both from 1998-2002 and 2002-2005, except for SPD partisans
in 1998-2002, as the figures also show.
Change in Partisanship
Thus far, I have shown that PDS partisans responded to the party changing its name in a
way that supports the expressive conception of partisanship: their attitudes toward parties
and willingness to seek help from a party were both negatively affected by the change in
2005. Additionally, however, among those who declared partisanship to the PDS in 2002,
the perception of a rightward shift in the party’s ideology significantly increased the
likelihood of retaining PDS partisanship in 2005. Of course, the expressive perspective of
partisanship and the instrumental perspective need not be mutually exclusive. Following
theories on social identification, group members will be more inclined to identify with a
group when they see themselves reflected in it. While this identity can follow from
demographic characteristics, for political parties and partisans, ideology is a crucial aspect
of the group. Therefore, it may well be a characteristic that voters look to, among others,
when assessing their partisan identity. From a strictly instrumental perspective, however, if
voters detected a change in the party’s ideology, it is unclear why this would also alter
their perceptions of parties as a whole or their willingness to seek assistance from a
political party, especially if the party’s ideological change were incremental. Unless the
party underwent a large change, instrumentally rational voters who were previously
inclined toward the party because of its ideology should still remain with the party,
provided that another had not surpassed it in ideological proximity.
Of course, this logic presumes that the ideological change voters may have inferred
about the party followed from an actual change in ideology. It is just as possible that
voters observed the cooperation agreement with the WASG and took this as a strong signal
about impending ideological change from the party. Conversely, the party’s new name may
have signaled to partisans that their group was changing, yielding the behavioral results
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discussed above. However, with these data it is impossible to separate whether effects on
partisans were from the party changing its name or simply entering a cooperation
agreement with the WASG. Therefore, to test Hypothesis 3, that partisans will be less
likely to declare partisanship to their party after the relabeling, I use a natural experiment
that allows me to disentangle those effects.
Natural Experiment in the Politbarometer
The Politbarometer is a rolling cross-sectional survey of a random sampling of Germans
that took place every two weeks in the summer before the September 2005 election. For
the purposes of this chapter, I focus on three consecutive waves of the 2005 Politbarometer:
May 23-26, June 6-9, and June 20-23. Near the very end of each of these surveys,
respondents were asked about their partisan identification. The May 23-26 wave took place
just after the North-Rhine Westphalian state election and the call for an early Bundestag
election. The June 6-9 wave was fielded just before the PDS and WASG officially entered
their cooperation agreement. Unlike the May 23-26 survey, the June 6-9 survey
questionnaire included a statement to voters that read:
“The PDS and WASG plan to compete together as a left-alliance in
the Bundestag election.”
The June 20-23 survey took place after the parties formally entered their cooperation
agreement, but before the PDS changed its name. This survey questionnaire indicated to
respondents at multiple points that the PDS had changed its name to “Democratic
Left.PDS” and, later in the survey, included a different statement:
“The PDS and WASG want to compete together in the Bundestag
election under the name ‘Democratic Left.PDS’.”
Given the timing and content of each of these surveys, I consider the May survey wave
to be the control, the June 6-9 survey the “Cooperation Treatment”, and the June 20-23
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survey the “Cooperation and Label Treatment.” Because the June 6-9 survey informed
respondents about the intended PDS and WASG alliance prior to the official agreement,
any variation in partisan outcomes between this survey and the control should be the result
of the treatment included in the survey and not the extant political climate. The June
20-23 survey did take place after the parties’ agreement but before the PDS changed its
name. Therefore, it is possible that partisanship variation in this survey is not due to the
treatment itself, but instead due to respondents’ knowledge of the agreement and reaction
to it. Based on the German news coverage of the PDS/WASG alliance during this time,
however, it does not seem to the be the case that the media environment was remotely
saturated with such information. This is unsurprising given that the media were occupied
with stories about the SPD’s stunning loss in the North-Rhine Westphalian election, the
Chancellor’s unexpected call for early elections, and the CDU fielding Angela Merkel as its
Chancellor candidate for the first time.30
Therefore, I consider at variation in partisanship from the June 23-26 survey wave to be
the result of the treatment and not respondents’ (unlikely) existing knowledge about the
cooperation. Of course, the treatment from the June 23-26 survey does not allow me to
disentangle the effect of the PDS changing its name from the cooperation agreement
entirely. Instead, I can only assess the effect that the name change had in conjunction with
the alliance. Furthermore, the new name of the PDS included in the Politbarometer was
incorrect. Although the party was considering that name at the time, a local party by a
similar name threatened to sue, postponing the PDS-name change until July (Heunemann
2008). I pursue this analysis with the assumption that the inclusion of “Democratic” in the
party’s name should not inhibit the applicability of the results to partisans’ responses to
the party’s actual name change the following month.
30Further details regarding the amount of media coverage of the PDS/WASG alliance are
available in the Appendix.
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Testing the Partisanship Change Hypothesis
In order to determine whether partisans’ attachment to the PDS was negatively affected by
its name change, I wish to restrict my attention to respondents who were PDS partisans
before the name change. However, the Politbarometer is a cross-sectional survey and did
not ask about respondents’ partisanship before and after the treatments in the same
questionnaire. Therefore, I use respondents’ vote in the previous election as a proxy for
their partisanship, as partisanship is often correlated with voting behavior (Bartels 2000;
Gschwend 2007; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). Although respondents’
previous vote is a proxy for their partisanship, it is not a perfect predictor. Therefore, I
also control for respondents’ ideology, education, age, and gender.31 Furthermore, I expect
that eastern respondents who previously voted for the PDS were likely more inclined
toward the party than westerners, as the PDS was a predominantly eastern party up until
this point. To account for the likelihood that easterners’ partisanship was affected more
negatively by the party’s name change, in the logistic regression models, I include an
interaction term for easterners in each treatment group.
Results from the logistic regression models are displayed in Figure 3.11.32 Easterners in
the Cooperation Agreement and Label Change condition (East × Coop. Agmt. and Name)
were significantly less likely to declare partisanship to the PDS than easterners in the
control group (East), in support of H3. Substantively, when holding other variables at their
means, easterners in the Cooperation Agreement and Label Change condition were 10.6
percentage points less likely to identify as PDS partisans than easterners in the control
group.33 Western respondents were not similarly affected. Interestingly, informing
31Unfortunately, the Politbarometer did not include a question pertaining to political
interest across the three waves included in my analysis. Therefore, I use education as a
proxy for political interest, under the assumption that more educated individuals would be
more likely to have followed the evolution of the PDS in the news.
32The full model output is available in the Appendix.
33The probability of easterners in this treatment condition declaring partisanship to the
PDS was 63.76%, whereas it was 74.38% for easterners in the control group.
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respondents that the PDS and WASG formed an alliance for the upcoming election did not
appear to have an effect, either for western PDS voters (Coop. Agmt.) or easterners (East
× Coop. Agmt.).
East x Coop. Agmt. and Name
East x Coop. Agmt.
Coop. Agmt. and Name
Coop. Agmt.
East








Figure 3.11: Likelihood of Declaring PDS Partisanship (compared to control group)
Based on these analyses, it appears as though the cooperation agreement on its own did
not elicit any effect on voters’ likelihood of being PDS partisans. If partisans were
responding to the cooperation agreement alone, then it becomes less clear that the name of
a party is an important sign for the partisan group, and perhaps highlights that partisans
were behaving instrumentally, but that behavior was not detected with the tests I ran.
Instead, it was only once eastern respondents were informed about the party’s name
change in conjunction with the cooperation agreement that their partisanship was effected.
Given the timing of the survey, this result is particularly useful for adjudicating between
the expressive and instrumental perspectives of partisanship. At the time of the second
treatment condition, the PDS and WASG had signed their cooperation agreement, but had
not officially settled on a new name for the PDS nor had the two parties released updated
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manifestos. This latter point is especially important, as these results could thus not be
driven by a change in the party’s ideology.
Even for the most politically engaged voters, available information about the party’s
ideological position would have only updated in the context of the North Rhine
Westphalian election, an event that occurred even before the control condition survey.
Furthermore, if voters used the cooperation agreement as a signal of the party’s ideological
change (and their subsequent partisan attachment), then we would expect to see a
significant difference in respondents’ partisanship following the first treatment condition
(Cooperation Agreement). These analyses cannot isolate the effect of the cooperation
agreement separately from the name change, but they do lend support to the notion that
voters take name changes seriously and these signals can prime them to the notion that
their party is undergoing a change.
Discussion and Conclusion
Altogether, these analyses revealed the partisan consequences of an elite-led decision to
change a party’s label and adjudicated between the revisionist and social identity
perspectives to partisanship. The results were neither driven by differences in the
comparison groups nor by structural changes that the party underwent. The name change
did not alter partisans’ perceptions of the party’s ideology, nor did change in the partisans’
ideological closeness to the party affect their partisan attachment, providing no support for
the revisionist perspective of partisanship. From the social identity perspective, however, it
did diminish their attitudes toward parties, reduced their willingness to engage parties on
political problems, and considerably decreased the propensity of likely supporters to
declare partisanship to the party.
Although these findings support the social identity perspective of partisanship, they
differ from some key findings regarding partisan responses to party brand changes. In
particular, as the analyses in the Testing the Partisanship Change Hypothesis section
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show, receiving information indicating that the PDS had entered into a joint-list agreement
with the WASG did not alter partisans attachments, as compared to the control. Per Lupu
(2013), we would expect that, by highlighting similarities between two parties, this
information would weaken voters’ partisan ties to the PDS; however, it had no effect on
partisans’ identities. Instead, it was not until voters were informed about the party’s name
change that we see any effect on their partisanship. Perhaps these findings are due to the
fact that PDS was a well-established political party and the WASG had not existed as an
alternative option, except for in a single state election. Therefore, voters were likely less
familiar with the WASG and did not see the resulting joint-list agreement as a sign that
the PDS was converging with the party. Evaluating such disparate findings in future
research would be valuable for uncovering the specific circumstances in which “muddying”
a party’s brand poses negative consequences for partisanship.
Similar to Marinova (2016), I argued that partisans used the name change as a heuristic
for change to the party. This name change consequently affected their partisanship and
other attitudes, reflective of the social identity perspective to partisanship. I argue that
these findings support the social identity perspective of partisanship, but they also lend
provide evidence that may seem counter-intuitive. As the success of the minimal group
paradigm shows, humans are so inclined toward self-categorization and group identification
that randomly, artificially, and arbitrarily induced groups generate ingroup and outgroup
behaviors (see Diehl 1990 for a comprehensive overview). Yet something as simple as a
change to the name of the group with which individuals identify can be enough to weaken
their attachments to the group and thereby alter their perceptions of groups (i.e. political
parties) and their willingness to engage in politics. This evidence, combined with the role
of groups names in shaping the perceptions people have as well as ingroup esteem (e.g.
Larkey, Hecht, and Martin 1993), suggests that future research on the consequences of
name changes for voters’ partisanship would not only be valuable for our understanding of
identities, but also help inform how changes to group names can influence the attachment
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that members feel toward the group.
This study also highlights a paradox in the utility of party relabeling. On the one hand,
it can help bring new voters to the party – after its name change, the PDS improved its
vote share in the 2005 Bundestag election by over 4 percentage points (to 8.7%). On the
other hand, it can not only drive partisans away from the party, but also away from politics
in general and color their perceptions of the parties available to them. Such name changes
can therefore leave some voters disenchanted and also alter the composition of a party’s
electorate, changing the demands placed on the party by its voters and potentially weaken
the durability of its support (as partisanship can take time to solidify).
This study also speaks to the role of party labels as identifying heuristics. As the
natural experiment showed, it was not until respondents were informed about the party’s
name change that they appeared significantly less likely to consider themselves partisans of
the party – merely notifying them of the planned cooperation did not alter their partisan
considerations. Relatedly, this study finds further supports for the expressive perspective of
partisanship. From an instrumental perspective, a name change to a party should not, on
its own, change partisans’ behavior and attitudes. Only if partisans also perceive a
substantive change to the party (e.g. ideological change) should their behavior be affected.
Although I did not find evidence that partisans perceived such a change to the party, I
nevertheless found that, in line with the expressive theory of partisanship, partisans’
attitudes and behavior were negatively affected by the party changing its name.
Party labels are one of, if not the most, popular information shortcut that voters use in
politics. Not only can these labels represent the stored information voters have about the
party’s ideology, issue positions, or types of supporters, but the consistency in these labels
and their change send signals to voters about the nature of the party itself (Marinova
2016). Label constancy, ceteris paribus, illustrates to voters that the party competing in
the current election is the same party that competed previously; whereas label change
signifies to voters that the party competing in the current election differs in some way from
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the party that competed previously – that is, if voters even recognize continuity between
the relabeled party and the party’s previous name.
Therefore, studies of partisanship and heuristics, especially in the comparative context,
should be attentive to whether party labels are changing as these decisions have meaningful
consequences for the way voters understand their political options, behave in politics, and
identify themselves. Given the substantial rates of party-label change shown in Chapter 2,
such changing parties could be driving the diminished rates of partisanship that some
scholars have identified, particularly in new democracies (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Tóka
1998). Additional research into the relationship between party-name change in new




TO THE LEFT? TO THE LEFT! THE CASE OF THE
LEFT PARTY.PDS IN GERMANY
Thus far, these findings have underscored that an overlooked phenomenon, party-name
changes, pose negative consequences for the information voters have about parties, their
willingness to vote for such parties (in old democracies), and their identification with these
parties. Chapter 3 further clarified the consequences of elite-led relabeling and attempts at
electorate expansion for partisans. Altogether, these findings beg the question: if, by
changing its name, a party inherently reduces the information available to voters, which
could further deter them from engaging with the party, why change names in the first
place?
Not all name changes are created equal. Despite the informational deficit that
party-name changes can create for voters, parties can use different signals in their new
name to provide additional information for voters. Using the German Party of Democratic
Socialism’s 2005 relabeling decision as a case study, I demonstrate that parties can choose
new labels such that they improve the information available to voters; in this instance, by
providing a signal to the electorate about the party’s ideological leanings.1
Of course, if party-label change only yields negative consequences for voters and,
ultimately, the relabeled party’s vote share, then it would be surprising to see the
frequency of party relabeling that we do. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, scholars have
shown that parties sometimes choose labels that deliberately convey key pieces of
information to voters, like ideological position or the group they seek to represent.
1Note, again, that the party’s name already included a strong ideological signal which,
for a variety of reasons, voters did not appear to interpret as clearly as the new party label.
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Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that parties, knowing that such a label change could
obfuscate information for voters, might also attempt to choose a new label that imparts
some information that may have otherwise been lost by the relabeling, like a specific issue
(e.g. the Conservative Peasant Party in Poland), ideological stance (e.g. the Left Wing
Alliance in Finland), or the structural change the party underwent (e.g. the Union of
Peasants’ and New Democracy in Lithuania). Such information from the label could help
attenuate the loss of information that resulted from the label change in the first place.2
Furthermore, instances of party relabeling may be less disruptive in environments where
the party label had not existed very long in the first place and voters had not yet come to
rely as heavily on the label as an information shortcut than they would have had the label
been around for longer.3
Therefore, I expect that:
The inclusion of ideological or issue position signals in a party’s new
name will reduce the informational deficit voters face toward the
party.
In the next section, I describe the case I use to examine this possibility, before turning
to the tests of my hypothesis.
A Case Study: Germany’s Left Party (Linkspartei.PDS)
As a condition of a joint-list agreement, Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism changed
its name to die Linkspartei(.PDS) in 2005. Because of the party’s history in former East
Germany and the variation in its name change, this case allows me to examine the
consequences of full and partial changes on the information voters have about the party, as
2Parties could also opt for the opposite tactic and pick a name that obscures their true
position. For example, some contend that the Center Party of the Netherlands deliberately
chose their name to hide their right-wing extremist tendencies.
3Kim and Solt (2017) suggest that this might be the case, as they find that parties with
younger labels are more likely to than older parties to change their name.
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well as how the length of experience with a party conditions the effects of relabeling for
voters. I provide a brief overview of the evolution of the party and its naming decision
before turning to empirical tests of my hypothesis.
Following the fall of the Berlin wall, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the reigning party
of the authoritarian German Democratic Republic (former East Germany), found itself in
need of serious reform if it were to have any chance of political survival in the newly
unified, democratic Germany (Hough, Koß, and Olsen 2007). After considerable debate
among party members and multiple party congresses, the SED was renamed to the Party
of Democratic Socialism (PDS) on February 4, 1990. Although many now-PDS members
hoped that this change would distance the party from its SED-past, many Germans
remained unconvinced that the party had broken ties with its past and saw the party as a
rebranded version of the SED (Bastian 1995).
Although many Germans, particularly those in the West, were skeptical of the PDS and
unhappy to see it involved in German politics (Hough, Koß, and Olsen 2007), the party’s
electoral fortunes steadily improved until 1998, when the party managed to cross the
five-percent threshold necessary for representation in the Bundestag with 5.1% of the vote.
In the 2002 Bundestag election, however, the party’s support fell to 4% and it thus failed
to cross the electoral threshold.4 Geographically, the PDS did not fare much worse in the
western states than it had previously, but a loss of approximately 4.7 percentage points in
eastern states was sufficient to put it on the wrong side of the representation threshold.
This electoral result was cause for concern among party members regarding its future
prospects and highlighted the PDS’s anemic support in western states, as many realized
they could not rely on their performance in western states to insulate the party from any
potential fluctuation in vote share in the east. Therefore, following the unforeseen
circumstances outlined in Chapter 3, the party opted to change its name following a
joint-list agreement with the WASG. In the next section, I detail the specific aspects of the
4The party did manage to secure two seats from single-member districts.
88
party’s name change that I leverage in this chapter.
From PDS to Left Party(.PDS)
The relabeling process was rather arduous for the PDS, as they needed the WASG to agree
on their new name. Ultimately, they decided on “Die Linkspartei” or, The Left Party.
Members of the PDS from eastern states worried that PDS partisans had developed a
strong identity with the PDS and changing the name altogether could be alienating and
disenfranchising for their voters.5 Therefore, members of both parties agreed that the
PDS’s new name would be “Die Linkspartei.PDS” (The Left Party.PDS) in eastern states.
This led to a debate among members of both parties in western states, as some PDS
members were concerned about a similar effect on their voters if “PDS” were excluded from
the name, but WASG members opposed the idea.
Members of the WASG were concerned that including the PDS in the name would
present problems: (1) it would signal to their voters that they were socialist when, in fact,
they considered themselves as social democrats and were attracting voters from the SPD;
(2) the WASG did not want to be swallowed up by the PDS and subsequently assimilated.
Therefore, after much debate, members of both parties agreed to vote on the name of the
party that would be used in each state. In Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg, they voted to
keep “.PDS” in the name and the remaining seven western state parties opted to remove
it.6 This meant that the term “PDS” was omitted completely from any election material,
including campaign posters and electoral ballots, and instead the party competed only as
5This paragraph and the next draw heavily on Heunemann (2008).
6For the states that opted to omit the PDS from its name, the PDS’s vote share does
not appear to differ systematically when compared to Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg, the
three western states that chose to keep PDS in its name. Furthermore, of those three states,
the PDS did not appear to have a substantially larger voter base to warrant keeping PDS
in the name. This is especially true for Bavaria, the state in which the PDS receive the
lowest party vote share across all German states in 2002. The PDS vote share in Bremen
and Hamburg do appear slightly larger than average for the western German states, with
around 2% as opposed to 1.2% in 2002.
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The Left Party in these states.
It is unclear whether the decision in Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg to keep “PDS” in
the party’s name was motivated by concerns over how a label change would be received by
PDS partisans within those states. Although this may well have been the case,7 the PDS
hardly seemed to have an established voting base within these states such that a change in
the label could yield deleterious effects from its supporters. In fact, in neither Bavaria nor
Hamburg did the PDS run in state-level elections. Furthermore, in Bavaria, the PDS had
historically obtained the smallest party vote share out of every German state in Bundestag
elections prior to the relabeling decision, with an average of 0.67% of the vote. I contend
that it was more likely that the WASG similarly lacked an established voting base within
the states8 to drive related concerns about retaining “PDS” in the label. Additionally, it is
unclear whether the WASG had an established group of party elites within Bavaria,
Bremen, and Hamburg to influence the negotiations with the PDS-party elites to prevent
the inclusion of “PDS” within the party’s new label.
From this point forward, I examine each of these groups separately: (1) eastern voters,
who had more experience with the party than western voters and saw the name change as
Left Party.PDS; (2) western “.PDS” voters, the voters in Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg,
who also saw the name change as Left Party.PDS; and (3) western voters, the voters in the
remaining western states who saw the name change as Left Party.
Before turning to the tests of my hypothesis, it is worth noting that the initial PDS
label already included an informative ideological signal in its name: socialism. However, as
I demonstrate later in this chapter, “socialism” did not appear to be as uniformly
informative to western Germans as did the word “left” in the party’s new name. Part of
7As far as I am aware, Heunemann (2008) is the only scholar to examine the decision to
relabel across the PDS’s state-level party organizations. In his interviews with party officials,
he cites the trepidation from the eastern organizations to change the label given how it might
affect partisans. However, he did not appear to ascertain explicit reasons from party officials
in the western states that voted to keep “PDS” in the label.
8Unfortunately, WASG membership statistics are unavailable by state for the time period
before the party entered the cooperation agreement with the PDS in 2005.
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this difference is likely an artifact of survey design, as I discuss later. However, it is also
likely due to western voters’ distaste for socialism (Rohrschneider 2004) and the PDS’s
historical affiliation with the authoritarian GDR, which German political parties sought to
emphasize in the years immediately following unification (Thompson 1996). Therefore,
many western voters likely knew that they disliked the PDS and had a negative perception
of socialism, but did not necessarily agree on the left-right ideological position associated
with it. Additionally, the conflation of socialism with authoritarianism could have lent to
some confusion as to the ideology.
Case Study Data and Methods
I use survey data from the German Legislative Election Study to test my hypothesis (the
inclusion of ideological or issue position signals in a party’s new name will reduce the
informational deficit voters face toward the party). I measure the informational deficit
using survey respondents’ ideological placements of the party. To assess the informational
consequences of the PDS name change in 2005, I first examine voters’ placement of the
party on a left-right ideological spectrum before and after the name change. This is not
intended as a test of any of my hypotheses. Instead it provides an overview of the variation
in where voters’ perceived the ideological position of the PDS, the variation in which I
examine in further detail to test my hypothesis. As indicated in Chapter 3, “don’t know”
responses were not solicited and, instead, were only coded if the respondent offered that
they did not know where to place a party on the ideological spectrum. These responses
were dropped from the subsequent analyses.9
Because of the variation in voters’ length of exposure to the party as well as variation in
the name change in 2005, I group voters into three distinct regional categories: (1) East,
9As a complementary analysis to Chapter 2, Appendix C examines the effect of the
PDS-label change on respondent’s propensity to indicate that they “don’t know” where the
party sits ideologically, broken out by the three regional groups I describe in the subsequent
paragraph.
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(2) West .PDS, and (3) West. The East category includes voters who reside in the former
eastern German states10. The West .PDS category includes voters who reside in Bavaria,
Bremen, or Hamburg (the three western states in which the party presented itself as The
Left Party.PDS in 2005). Finally, the West category includes voters who reside in the
remaining western states (where the party presented itself as The Left Party in 2005).
An important caveat here, however, is that the 2005 GLES survey used only the label
“The Left Party.PDS,” regardless of the region the respondent was in. That decision on the
part of the survey designers makes it less likely that I will be able to detect the
consequences of the label distinction between western states. Another concern with
assessing the consequences of the name change for voters’ ideological perceptions of the
party is the way in which the survey question regarding parties’ ideological positions is
phrased:
“Parties are often assessed as being ‘left’ or ‘right’. Please tell me how you
assess the following parties by using this scale. Let me now read the parties one
by one.”
This question, followed almost immediately by the survey enumerator asking
respondents about where they would place The Left Party(.PDS) (in 2005), likely primed
respondents to associate the party with the leftward side of the scale. Of course, if voters
do tend to think ideologically about parties, the inclusion of “Left” in the party name alone
already signals an ideological position to voters, and such a signal is not exclusive to the
design of the survey.
10Of course, breaking respondents into these comparison groups does not account for
the fact that some respondents could have moved to eastern Germany after unification
and consequently not had the same experience with the SED (and impression that may
give them of the PDS) as compared to those respondents who never left eastern Germany.
Unfortunately, the GLES does not include a question about the location of respondents prior
to unification in its 2005 survey. However, based on respondents’ answers to the question in
2002, only 7% of eastern respondents had lived in western Germany prior to unification.
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I compare respondents’ placement of the PDS (and its successor parties) to their
placement of the remaining five major parties in German politics11 and across the three
categories (eastern states, Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg, and the remaining western
states) discussed above.
Respondents’ raw placement of parties’ ideological positions range from 1 to 11, where
1 indicates the left-most position on the scale and 11, the right-most. The following figures
show respondents’ mean placement of parties over time with 95% confidence intervals
distinguished by the party exposure and labeling decision of the party discussed above.12
Respondents’ placements of the parties in 1994 are not available as the survey did not
include such questions. As the below figures show, respondents’ placement of the CDU,
CSU, FDP, SPD, and the Greens, across the three regions, tend to trend together with
rather small regional differences in the placement of the parties (with slight exception for
variation in eastern respondents’ placement of the FDP in 2005 and 2009). Time series
variance is correlated across group as well. For instance, all three series show the SPD
being perceived to shift rightward from 2005 to 2009 and again from 2009 to 2013.
For respondents’ placement of the PDS, a different pattern emerges. Respondents in
both western regions place the party considerably more rightward in 1998 and 2002 than
their eastern counterparts. Interestingly, with the change in the party’s name in 2005,
while we do see a decrease (leftward shift) in western respondents’ placement of the party,
the same shift does not occur among eastern Germans, even though they also saw the
change in the label from PDS to Left Party.PDS. Part of this discrepancy could be due to a
floor effect. Given that the leftmost place on the scale is 1 and the average placement of
11These parties include: The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union
(CSU), Free Democratic Party (FDP), Social Democratic Party (SPD), and Alliance ’90/The
Greens (Greens).
12To account for the possibility that eastern voters use the ideological scale in a sub-
stantively different way from western voters, I also standardize respondents’ placement of
each party. To do this, I subtract the mean of respondents’ placements of the parties from
the placement of a specific party. These results are substantively similar to the raw scores
reported here.
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the party among eastern Germans was approximately 2.2 in 2002, an average movement of
the same magnitude as that made by as western Germans from 2002 to 2005 would be
nearly impossible. However, it is impossible to distinguish in the data between this possible
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Figure 4.1: Respondents’ Left-Right Placements (raw) of Parties
Is the change in ideological placement of the PDS simply a reflection of westerners
learning about the party – independent of the information gleaned by the party’s
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relabeling? I cannot disprove this possibility given the data available. However, if
westerners’ convergence with easterners’ placement of the party were evidence of learning,
then it is unclear why we do not see similar pathways toward convergence for easterners’
placements of the other German parties. Most easterners did not have any experience with
these other parties until after the reunification of Germany in 1990. There are two
potential explanations for this disparity. Eastern Germans are substantively different from
westerners in that they learned about five of the main political parties so quickly that their
ideological perceptions of the parties mirrored those of western respondents (either in
trend, exact placement, or both) within 8 years of reunification, whereas westerners took
more time to learn about one of the parties. Or, although westerners may have been
learning about the ideological position of the PDS prior to the label change, the label
change facilitated additional learning that would not have otherwise occurred.
Given the difference in trends among eastern Germans’ placements of the
initially-western German parties and the fact that the PDS did not appear to be making
any substantial inroads in its campaigns in western German states prior to the change, I
argue that the change in western respondents’ placement of the party between 2002 and
2005 was due, in part, to the relabeling of the party. Now that I have provided a picture of
where respondents’ perceive the PDS on an ideological spectrum, both over time and in
comparison to other parties, let us turn to formally testing the informational hypothesis.
Tests of Variance
To formally test whether there is a significant difference in the variation within the regional
groups’ ideological placements of the PDS from 2002 to 2005 and across the regional
groups’ placements in 2005, I conduct a series of tests for differences in variance within the
groups. I use Levene’s test (also with a trimmed mean), the Brown-Forsythe test, and the
Fligner-Killeen test. Each of these tests are designed to assess whether the variances of two
or more groups are equal. Although Levene’s test is less sensitive than others to
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non-normally distributed data, it does not perform well with relatively large deviations
from normality (Conover, Johnson, and Johnson 1981). Therefore, I also conduct the
Brown-Forsythe test which determines the spread of the data from the median rather than
the mean, which is used in Levene’s test. Lastly, I use the Fligner-Killeen test, which is
more robust against departures from normality than other tests, include Levene’s and the
Brown-Forsythe test (Conover, Johnson, and Johnson 1981). I perform these tests on
respondents’ raw left-right placement of the PDS as well as their standardized placement
(their placement of the PDS subtracted from their mean placement of all German parties
they placed in the survey.)
Table 4.1: Variance Tests: Raw Left-Right Placement of PDS (2002-2005)
Test (Statistic) West West(.PDS) East(.PDS)
Levene’s (F) 481.12*** 189.41*** 0.59
Levene’s: trimmed mean (F) 284.03*** 106.23*** 0.01
Brown-Forsythe (F) 219.77*** 57.56*** 0.03
Fligner-Killeen (med. chi-sq) 372.35*** 41.03*** 0.13
Table 4.2: Variance Tests: Standardized Left-Right Placement of PDS (2002-2005)
Test (Statistic) West West(.PDS) East(.PDS)
Levene’s (F) 332.73*** 168.03*** 0.07
Levene’s: trimmed mean (F) 195.01*** 96.30*** 0.25
Brown-Forsythe (F) 126.47*** 53.04*** 0.29
Fligner-Killeen (med. chi-sq) 115.61*** 31.98*** 0.34
As the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate, regardless of the test used or the
specification of the test (e.g. Levene’s test vs. Levene’s test with a trimmed mean), the
variance in eastern respondents’ placement of the The Left Party.PDS in 2005 was
statistically indistinguishable from their placement of the PDS in 2002.13 For both groups
13These findings are also robust to excluding PDS partisans from the analysis, demon-
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of western respondents, however, the variance in their placement of the party in 2005 as
compared to 2002 is statistically significantly different from each other. In conjunction
with the figures above, these results illustrate that, not only are the variances between the
years different from one another, but the variance in respondents’ placement of the party
decreased considerably from 2002 to 2005. These results therefore support hypothesis that
the relabeling increased the information available to voters. Importantly, these results do
not hold for eastern voters. This is unsurprising as the PDS retained its abbreviation in
the new name and easterners had more experience with the party in order to have a clearer
idea of where the party stood ideologically even before it changed its name.
Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, this chapter examined a case where a political party used a strategic signal within
its new name and doing so helped reduce the information deficit that voters faced toward
the party. This chapter also provided further distinction regarding the relationship between
party label change, the age of a party, and voters’ exposure to it. In particular, I found
that voters who had been exposed to the PDS for longer (i.e. those in eastern Germany)
were unaffected in their knowledge of the party’s ideological position.14 Those with less
experience with the PDS (i.e. voters in western Germany) appear to have gained
information by the party’s new label, improving the consensus with which voters placed the
party’s ideological position in both western groups.
It is worth noting, again, that this is likely not just an effect of the party’s new name,
but also the survey question itself asking voters to place parties on a left-right scale.
strating that it is not the consensus of PDS partisans regarding the party’s ideology driving
these results.
14Interestingly, according to the analyses in Appendix C, eastern voters were more familiar
with the PDS’s ideological position after the name change, similar to voters in both western
groups. Therefore, although the party relabeling did not elicit an aggregate effect in the
variation in easterner’s placement of the party, it did appear to reduce ideological uncertainty
for some voters.
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Therefore, it is difficult to infer the degree to which the new name improved the inferences
that voters made about the party’s anticipated behavior or general party platform. It is,
however, remarkable that such a name change drastically reduced the variance in voters’
placement of the party; even if it is in part an artifact of the survey design, such findings
lend support to the notion that new party names can provide informative signals to voters.
Therefore, future work that examines the types of inferences voters make about relabeled
parties, particularly with respect to the information conveyed in a party’s new name, would
be valuable for further understanding the consequences of party relabeling and the dataset
provided in this dissertation offers a resource for doing so.
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CHAPTER 5
ADDITIONAL HEURISTICS: PARTISAN IDENTITIES
AND LEADER ATTACHMENT
Thus far in this dissertation, I have examined the rate and consequences of party-label
change for voters. I have demonstrated that party relabeling can introduce additional
information complexity into voters’ electoral environments, wherein they are less likely to
be familiar with these parties and their ideologies, deterred from voting for parties with
new names (in old democracies), and generally less attached to such parties. I showed that
the consequences of elite-driven party relabeling can be especially troubling for partisans –
weakening their attachments, engendering disillusionment with their party options, and
reducing their likelihood of engaging with parties in politics. The picture is not entirely
bleak, however: the signals that parties opt to include in their new labels can help voters
overcome informational deficits and improve the accuracy and consensus with which they
identify parties’ ideological leanings.
None of these studies, however, provide a glimpse into the compounding effects of party
relabeling. Although some of the analyses in Chapter 2 highlight the heterogeneous effects
of party relabeling, particularly when they are frequent, this dissertation has not
established how repeated instances of relabeling, over time, alter the information that
voters take in and the shortcuts they use to make political decisions. If the effectiveness of
a given heuristic decreases over time, we would generally expect voters to rely less on that
heuristic, as it is not a reliable or informative shortcut for the behavior or outcomes that
voters are attempting to infer by using them.
This is not to say that voters never use heuristics inappropriately, or that they always
make more accurate decisions when they employ heuristics (see Lau and Redlawsk (2001)
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for an overview of common political heuristics and their influence on biased
decision-making). However, a heuristic is only as valuable as the information that voters
can associate with it (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). In contexts where party labels
change frequently, as I argued in Chapter 2, voters must, at the very least, engage in an
additional cognitive step in order to import the information they had associated with a
party’s previous label with the new label – they must recognize the continuity in the party
that the names represent. As Chapter 2 also illustrated, voters are less familiar with
relabeled parties, which further emphasizes the likely infrequent scenario where voters
seamlessly update their party-label heuristics as parties rename themselves.
Therefore, in contexts where party labels change with considerable frequency, voters
will likely rely less on party-label heuristics to make inferences about candidates and
parties. This does not mean, however, that these voters will rely less on heuristics
altogether. The electoral environments they find themselves in are at least as complex as
others that are not characterized by such relabeling. As a result, these voters will still
employ information shortcuts as a cost-saving measure to make political decisions;
however, the specific heuristics that these voters rely on will likely be different as the
party-label shortcut will no longer be as popular. To which heuristics do these voters turn?
One possibility is party leaders. In a variety of electoral environments, party leaders are
high-profile politicians who, in some cases, become inseparable from the party itself,
especially when they are charismatic and cultivate their own political following; some
examples include Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Emmanuel Macron in France, and numerous
leaders in South Korea who have become tied to their party’s label (Gale 2016). If voters
come to rely on the leaders of parties as an information shortcut to infer information about
the party’s expected ideology, policy positions, or other characteristics, particular in
contexts where the name of the party itself is less meaningful, how might this condition the
way these voters interact with such organizations or develop their own political identities?
One possibility is that voters develop attachments to a specific leader instead of a party
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group.
This possibility clashes with the growing concern that has emerged among political
scientists in recent years: democratic politics is becoming increasingly personalized. Some
scholars fear that gone are the days where political parties operate as mass-based
organizations, aggregating preferences of large portions of the electorate into effective
policies. Instead, politics appears to be ever more personalized, where power is being
consolidated among executive leadership positions and individual candidate evaluations
have usurped other identity-based factors in voters’ ballot box decisions (Garzia 2013a;
Rahat and Kenig 2018), albeit with some mixed evidence (see King (2002); Kriesi (2011)).
From the voter perspective, this increasing attention to individual candidates could
imply that partisan attachments are falling by the wayside and, instead, voters are being
drawn to political parties because of a few charismatic party members. This concern has
been bolstered by studies that show that voters’ candidate evaluations appear to be
stronger predictors of their vote choice than partisanship (Garzia 2013a; Garzia 2013b;
Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2015). Some scholars have argued that this evidence highlights the
waning role of partisanship as an affective attachment or social identity (Garzia and
Angelis 2016), where voters are instead engaging in short-term evaluations of a few
political actors to determine their partisan leanings rather than a strong, emotional and
psychological pull toward one party group over the others. These conclusions, however,
appear to be founded on flawed interpretations of the social psychology foundations of
social identity, and ignore the relationship between group leaders and group membership.
In order to disentangle the relationship between partisanship and the behavioral
personalization of politics, we must develop a stronger understanding of the role of
archetypal group membership in social identity strength and conceptually separate group
identities from identities formed around individual politicians. Therefore, using an original
survey instrument fielded on a convenience sample of undergraduate students, I adapt a
measure of leader prototypicality from social identity of leadership studies to identify the
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degree to which partisans believe their party’s leader embodies prototypical group
characteristics. I also create a measure of leader attachment and compare rates of this
attachment across partisans and leaders to better understand the political personalization
among voters. This study provides new measures for capturing this phenomenon and
illustrates some interesting patterns of leader prototypicality and attachment among U.S.
partisans.
The concern regarding political personalization is one that has been near absent among
scholars of American politics in recent years, who, instead, have been largely preoccupied
with concerns over growing political polarization both in the American electorate and
between the American political parties (see Hetheringon 2001; Layman, Carsey, and
Horowitz 2006; Hetheringon and Rudolph 2015 for overviews and Fiorina and Abrams
(2008) for a rebuttal to the mass polarization thesis.) In the aftermath of the 2016 election,
however, some political scientists have shifted their focus to the role of personalist aspects
of the presidential candidates and how they influenced voters’ electoral decisions (e.g.
Fortunato, Hibbing, and Mondak 2018). Therefore, although this chapter is largely
motivated by theoretical perspectives advanced outside of U.S. politics, this investigation is
a timely one following the 2016 election.1
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the role of leader prototypicality in
social identity formation and strength and apply this perspective to interpretations of
existing findings. Next, I describe the measures I develop to capture leader prototypicality
and leader attachment separately from partisanship. Afterward, I discuss the sample of
respondents used in this study, including the advantages and drawbacks of the making
inferences from the population. Then, I show the perceived prototypicality of leaders
among the respondents as well as the relationship between leader attachment and
partisanship, highlighting key differences among Democrats and Republicans. Finally, I
discuss these findings in the context of the political personalization phenomenon, highlight
1Analyses in Appendix D lend additional support to the role of candidate evaluations in
vote choice in the 2016 election.
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limitations to the study, and offer some future directions for this work.
The Social Identity of Leadership and Role of Prototypicality
According to social identity theory, group members develop “prototypes” that they
associate with their group (Hogg 2003; Turner et al. 1987). This prototype can be
comprised of demographic characteristics, personality traits, values and beliefs, and other
normative attributes that group members consider to be archetypal to membership
(Knippenberg 2011). Because group members are often exposed to similar information
about their group, these prototypes are generally shared among members (Hogg, Terry,
and White 1995).
Political science research that has found a strong relationship between candidate
evaluations and voter behavior could be driven by the prototypicality of political leaders
rather than voters’ waning attachment to their party and increasing attraction to
individual candidates. Building on social identity theory, the social identity of leadership
theory contends that, when group leaders exhibit the attributes that are deemed
prototypical to the group, other members are likely to profess greater trust and affect
toward the leader than they would in the absence of such prototypicality (Knippenberg
2011; Ullrich, Christ, and Dick 2009). How does this relate to the personalization of
politics? Studies in political science that seek to capture the degree to which voters are
exhibiting politically personalized behavior frequently rely on measures of affect toward
political candidates to capture this personalization (e.g. Garzia 2011; Garzia 2013a;
Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2015). Drawing from social identity of leadership theory, however,
we see that group members are likely to profess not only greater affect and trust toward
those group members who demonstrate attributes that are prototypical to the group, but
also greater propensity to endorse leaders who they perceive as group prototypical (Hogg,
Terry, and White 1995; Hogg, Knippenberg, and Rast 2012; Knippenberg and Knippenberg
2005; Ullrich, Christ, and Dick 2009). Therefore, using leader affect as an indicator of
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personalization among voters conflates the role of leader prototypicality in engendering
leader affect and presumes that when partisans indicate strong, positive feelings towards a
party leader, this comes at the detriment to their feelings toward the party.
Even if it were the case that the growing leader affect were the result of g, it does not
necessarily dispel the concerns that voters may be exhibiting greater personalization in the
political behavior. In fact, in the company of a prototypical group leader, “followers allow
the leader to be innovative in taking the group in new directions” (Hogg and Reid 2006,
20). In other words, by embodying characteristics that are closely associated with the
group itself, leaders can find latitude in their ability to redefine what it means to be a
group member, thereby reconstructing the group prototype, in extreme cases (Hogg and
Reid 2006). Therefore, it is also possible that increased rates of candidate affect and the
greater explanatory power of candidate evaluations for voting behavior are demonstrative
of this phenomenon, where voters are growing more tolerant of leaders who behave in ways
that are not typical of party members.
It is impossible to differentiate between these two possibilities with existing studies or
data. In order to do so, we would need to measure partisan identity, leader prototypicality
and leader attachment separately. Therefore, I develop two new measures in this chapter:
(1) a measure of leader prototypicality and (2) a measure of leader attachment. While the
social identity of leadership theory provides us with a meaningful framework for
understanding the role of leader prototypicality in group membership and leader
evaluations, it does not provide much in the way of distinguishing leader attachment from
group attachment. This is largely an artifact of the contexts in which this theory has been
applied: primarily within fixed groups and organizational structures like the military,
corporations, or universities. In these contexts, the concern that group members may
develop an attachment to a particular leader separate from their own group identity, to my
knowledge, has not been evaluated. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this possibility
would pose a concern for such groups in the same way that it would for political parties as
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the individual cost for leaving the military, a job, or school, if a leader does as well is much
higher than the individual cost for abandoning a political party. Therefore, I create a
measure of leader attachment based on the concerns that scholars have for the way voters
make their decisions in personalized political contexts.
Measures of partisan identity in voter personalization studies are also in need of
revision. To my knowledge, these studies have relied on the following types survey
questions to capture voters’ partisanship: “Do you think of yourself as close to any
particular political party?”; “If yes, which one?”; and finally, “How close do you feel toward
[party]?”. As Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015) and Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017)
have shown, these questions do not adequately capture the degree to which partisans are
attached to their party, nor do they account for the nature of their identity: some partisans
may be inclined toward a party simply because of a policy position, whereas others may
feel a strong, psychological connection to the group. In order to make inferences about the
role of partisan attachment in voter personalization, it is necessary also to update the
traditional measures of partisan identity and use the social identity measure developed by
Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015) and Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017). This allows us
to better identify whether voters’ identities toward parties are weakening in favor of
specific leaders.
Design: Capturing Leader Prototypicality and Attachment
I created a survey instrument to measure respondents’ attachment toward party leaders,
the perceived prototypicality of leaders, as well as respondents’ partisan attachment. The
survey began by asking respondents whether they felt close to any particular political
party. Following that question (and regardless of whether they indicated that they felt
close to a party), respondents were asked which political party they felt closest to: the
Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Libertarian Party, and the Republican Party.
Respondents were then presented with the social identity of partisanship battery developed
105
by Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017). Following these questions, respondents were asked
who they believed to be the leader of the party they professed feeling closest to. This
question was open-ended. Then, participants were asked about their general affect toward
the leader they named in the previous question, where zero indicated very negative feelings
toward the leader and ten, very positive. Finally, respondents were presented with a
battery of questions designed to measure their perceptions of leader prototypicality and
attachment to the leader.
Leader Prototypicality
To measure respondents’ perceptions of party leader prototypicality, I adapted survey
items from Platow and Knippenberg (2001). Social psychology’s measures of leader
prototypicality are usually captured with the following questions: “Overall, I would say
that the leader: (a) represents what is characteristics about [group members]; (b) is
representative of [group members]; (c) is a good example of the kind of people who [belong
to the group]; and (d) stands for what people [in the group] have in common; (e) is not
representative of the kind of people who [belong to the group]; and (f) is very similar to
most people [in group]” (Platow and Knippenberg 2001; for a similar measurement
strategy, see Knippenberg and Knippenberg 2005).
Because representation in a political context can be interpreted in a number of a ways
(Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999), I did not include the “representative” questions in
my measure (items a, b, and e). Instead, I included survey items 1 and 2 listed below. I
opted to ask respondents about the typicality of the leader when it comes to other
politicians and supporters separately. I separated these two types of group members to
ensure that I had some indication about the group members respondents had in mind when
answering the questions. The remaining two items, 3 and 4, were adapted from items (c)
and (d) listed above, respectively. The only difference between them is that I refer to the
group as the party.
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These items (included below) followed the prompt: “Thinking about this party leader,
please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree,
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.”
1. This leader is typical of other politicians in the party. (Typ. Pol.)
2. This leader is typical of people who support the party. (Typ. Supp.)
3. This leader is a good example of the kind people who belong to the party. (Example)
4. This leader stands for what people in the party have in common. (Common)
Leader Attachment
To my knowledge, a measure that captures attachment to leaders does not exist.
Furthermore, the type of leader attachment that is of concern for personalization scholars
is not merely positive feelings toward a party’s leader. Instead, it is the type of attachment
that would weaken voters’ partisanship in the absence of the leader or, in more extreme
cases, lead voters to abandon their partisan identity altogether should the leader no longer
be part of the group. Therefore, a measure of leader attachment that captures this type of
behavior must tap into voters’ feelings toward a leader with respect to their feelings toward
a party. Designing the survey items in this way also allow me to push respondents to
“control” for their feelings toward the party in their leader attachment evaluations. In this
way, I am creating a measure of relative leader attachment, where both those who are
strongly and weakly identified with the party would score high on leader attachment so
long as their feelings toward the leader were stronger than their feelings to the party.
Therefore, to measure leader attachment effectively, I aimed to create statements that
explicitly required respondents to evaluate their attachment toward the leader in
comparison to or in light of their attachment to the party.
1. If this leader left the party, I would feel less connected to the party. (Connect)
2. I care more about this leader than I do the party. (Care)
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3. If this leader left the party, I would be less likely to vote for the party. (Left)
4. If this leader formed a new party, I would consider voting for this new party. (New)
In my creation of the leader attachment measure, I aimed to include questions that
tapped into how voters felt about the leader relative to the party (items 1 and 2) and how
the leader encouraged their voting behavior (items 3 and 4). If voters are growing more
inclined toward specific leaders at the consequence of their partisan identity, then the
degree to which voters feel connected to the party should be conditioned on the leader’s
presence within the party (item 1). Additionally, if voters are growing more politically
personalized, the positive feelings that voters have as members of a partisan group should
be usurped by their feelings toward the leader (item 2). Finally, from a behavioral
perspective, personalized voters should make ballot box decisions driven by the leader’s
membership in their party (item 3) and even encourage vote-switching if the leader left the
party to form a new one (item 4).
Survey Population
In order to assess the rate of leader attachment and leader prototypicality evaluations
among partisans, I created a survey instrument administered to undergraduate students
enrolled in political science courses at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in
October 2018.2 Of the approximately 500 students who were fielded the survey, 385
completed it. Of those respondents, 250 indicated they felt closest to the Democratic
Party, 82 toward the Republican Party, 25 toward the Libertarian Party, and 4 toward the
Green Party.3
Administering a survey designed to capture leader prototypicality and partisans’ leader
attachment among respondents living in a presidential system is likely to bias my results
2A complete copy of the survey instrument is included in the Appendix.
3See Appendix D for comparisons between this sample and a nationally representative
one.
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upward. In other words, because of the personal nature of presidential regimes (Carey and
Shugart 1994; Curtice and Lisi 2015; Samuels and Shugart 2010), respondents in my
sample are likely already more inclined toward individual politicians than those in pure
parliamentary systems. However, this study can still provide meaningful information and,
perhaps, a glimpse at the upper limit of leader attachment in a system that encourages
such behavior.
Who Are the Leaders?
Before turning to the validation of the survey instruments I created, let us first examine
who respondents believed to be the leader of their party. Table 5.1 includes the politicians
named as leaders of the Democratic party along with the proportion of respondents who
named that particular politician.4 Table 5.2 shows the same information for Republicans.
Two coding decisions are worth mentioning here. First, the name of a party leader was
coded as “other” when the name listed referred to a group of people, more than one named
candidate, or a general concept (e.g. some Democratic respondents wrote “The People” as
the leader of the Democratic Party; some Republican respondents wrote “Not Trump” or
“Republican Candidates”). Second, the party leader is coded as “none” only if the
respondent’s answer indicated they did not believe the party had a leader.
4To code each of the answers while accounting for variations in spelling and name usage
(e.g. some referred to leaders by both their first and last name while others opted to include
their professional title or last name only), I used the agrep function in R to execute fuzzy
matching against a list of politicians and the leaders included in the survey results. After the
initial matching procedure, I manually fixed any errors and coded the remaining, unmatched
observations.
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Table 5.1: Perceived Democratic Party Leaders
Politician Named as Leader Percent
Barack Obama 79 31.60
None 32 12.80
Other 31 12.40
Chuck Schumer 30 12.00
Nancy Pelosi 19 7.60
Don’t Know 18 7.20
Tom Perez 10 4.00
Elizabeth Warren 8 3.20
Hillary Clinton 8 3.20
Bernie Sanders 7 2.80
Cory Booker 3 1.20
Joe Biden 2 0.80
Table 5.2: Perceived Republican Party Leaders
Politician Named as Leader Percent
Donald Trump 40 48.78
Paul Ryan 11 13.41
None 8 9.76
Other 7 8.54
Don’t Know 6 7.32
Mitch McConnell 4 4.88
Ben Shapiro 1 1.22
Two things stand out among the perceived leaders of the Democratic Party: (1) the
largest proportion of respondents coalesced around Barack Obama as the party leader,
even though he has largely stayed out of the political spotlight after leaving office in 2016;
and (2) the next most common response to the perceived leader question is “none”. In a
study motivated by concerns over the increasing personalization of politics, this result is a
bit surprising. On the one hand, the survey itself was administered just before the 2020
presidential primary season started to pick up speed – before any major politicians
announced their campaigns – so it is likely that this result is partly an artifact of the time
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period in which the survey was administered. On the other hand, for a system that
embodies the structural incentives for personalized politics, it is curious that so many
Democrats did not immediately associate a specific politician with party leadership. One
possible explanation for these findings is unique the timing and sample of my survey. Just
weeks before this survey was administered, Barack Obama delivered a speech at the
University’s campus. Attendance to this event was determined via a lottery; therefore,
while I might expect that political science students would be more inclined to enter such a
lottery, I do not expect that even a sizable number of them could attend. Furthermore,
among those who would be interested in attending, I expect that these same respondents
would already be more inclined to name Barack Obama as the leader of the Democratic
Party.
The results among Republicans are less surprising. Respondents named Donald Trump
as the party leader almost with majority and Paul Ryan was the second most common
name mentioned in the survey. Like the Democratic respondents, although with less
frequency, a sizable minority of Republican respondents did not name a specific leader
when prompted, and approximately 16% indicated they did not believe the party had a
leader or they did not know who the leader was.
A Caveat on Measuring Leader Prototypicality and Attachment in this Sample
Asking respondents an open-ended question about who they believed to be the leader of
their party could drive some selection problems when assessing the prototypicality of and
attachment to the leader they named. Specifically, it is possible that respondents named a
specific leader because they believed the leader to be the most archetypal member of the
party. Likewise, it is also possible that respondents named the politician to whom they felt
the most attached, regardless of whether the politician stood as the leader of the party.
The variation in the perceived prototypicality and attachment to the leaders named in the
survey assuages some of these concerns. Nevertheless, a survey where respondents rank
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each possible leader would be the only way to know.















Simulated Data (95 %ile)
Figure 5.1: Factor Analysis with Partisanship, Leader Prototypicality and Leader
Attachment Batteries
My validation procedure is as follows. First, I dropped from my data the respondents
who did not name a specific leader to their party,5 which resulted in a remainder of 235
respondents. Next, I rescaled these the prototypicality and attachment items between [1,4]
to match the range of values for the partisan identity items. Then, I conducted parallel
analysis (Horn 1965; Preacher and MacCallum 2003) by (1) simulating a random data set
with n=2356 and 16 variables7 each with range=[1,4]; (2) extracting the eigenvalues from
the random data and, separately, from the observed data; (3) plotting eigenvalues from the
random data and observed data in the plot in Figure 5.1; (4) retaining the maximum
number of factors with observed eigenvalues larger than those extracted by the random
5This includes respondents who left the question blank, answered “none”, “don’t know”,
or whose answers were coded in the “other” category. I offer descriptive comparisons between
6The same number of actual respondents in my data.
7The same number of total variables for the partisan identity, prototypicality, and leader
attachment measures, combined.
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data (demarcated by the dashed vertical line in the plot); (5) conducting factor analysis for
all 16 variables from the partisanship, prototypicality, and leader attachment measures,
allowing for three factors (the number of factors determined in step 4).
Table 5.3: Factor Loadings for Partisanship, Leader Prototypicality, and Leader
Attachment Batteries









Typ. Pol. (Prototypicality) 0.61
Typ. Supp. (Prototypicality) 0.79
Example (Prototypicality) 0.32 0.72





The factor loadings are included in Table 5.3.8 The information in parentheses next to
each factor indicate the concept that it is intended to measure. As the factor loadings
illustrate, the battery of partisanship questions capture a separate factor from both
leadership survey instruments. Within the leadership survey instruments, the factors
generally load as expected, with the exception of two items with loadings over 0.3 for two
factors (“This leader stands for what people in the party have in common”; “This leader is
a good example of the kind of people who belong to the party.”). However, both of these
items have larger factor loadings for Factor 3, together with the other items that are
intended to measure prototypicality. Therefore, I include these two items within the
8Factor loadings with values less than 0.3 are omitted from the table.
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prototypicality factor score (α=0.77) and include the remaining four items loading onto
Factor 2 within the attachment score (α=0.88).
Now that I have validated the measures intended to capture prototypicality and leader
attachment,9 I turn to examining the prototypicality respondents’ associated with the
leaders they named in the survey.
Perceived Prototypicality of Leaders
How prototypical are the leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties? The
histograms presented in Figure 5.2 illustrate respondents’ perceived prototypicality for the
leader they associate with their party. The dashed vertical line represents the mean
prototypicality rating for respondents who named that politician as the party leader.
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Figure 5.2: Perceived Prototypicality by Leader
As Figure 5.2 illustrates, the prototypicality of each leader is slightly greater than 3 (the
maximum of the scale is four), with the exception of Donald Trump. His prototypicality
9I also conducted confirmatory factor analysis. These results are available in Appendix
D.
114
appears to be roughly a full point lower than the other leaders. This result fits the
conventional wisdom that he appears to be an unconventional Republican as president
(Lieberman et al. 2018; Ware 2016). These results also lend some support to the idea that
respondents did not simply name the politician that seemed the most prototypical to them,
although with existing data it is impossible to determine if this is true.
At this point, it is unclear whether the prototypicality perceptions among respondents
are driven by the leaders they named in the survey or by variations in the types of
respondents who listed one leader over another. I use an Ordinary-Least Squares model to
try to adjudicate between these two possibilities. In the model, I control for respondents’
strength of partisan identification, political interest, ideology, age, gender, citizenship
status. I also include indicator variables for the five leaders discussed above to see whether,
after controlling for demographic differences among respondents, the perceived
prototypicality of these leaders10 differ significantly from one another. The model results
are shown in Figure 5.3.
Strength of Partisan Identification: I control for respondents’ strength in partisanship
to account for the possibility that stronger partisans may have different perceptions than
weaker partisans about the prototypical qualities associated with their group. In addition,
stronger partisans may associate different politicians as party leaders than weaker
partisans. This variable is the factor-based score from the partisan battery that ranges
from 1 to 4 where higher values indicate stronger partisan identification.
Political Interest: I control for respondents’ political interest to account for the
possibility that politically interested respondents are more aware of the prototypical traits
associated with their partisan group than politically uninterested respondents.
Ideology: I control for respondents’ ideology to account for the possibility that
ideologically similar respondents name the same party leader and subsequently assess that
leader’s prototypicality in the same way, particularly relative to their ideological position.
10Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Chuck Schumer, Nancy Pelosi, and Paul Ryan.
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This variable ranges from 1 to 7 where higher values indicate the respondent is more
conservative.
Age and Gender : I control for respondents’ age and gender to account for the
possibility that they may make respondents more inclined toward one leader over another.
Citizenship Status: I control for respondents’ citizenship status to account for the
possibility that U.S. citizens in this sample may be more attentive to U.S. politics or more
aware of the prototypical characteristics associated with partisan groups. However, as all
students in the sample are enrolled in at least one political science courses, I expect that
this would have less of an effect in this population than it would among a general
population. This is a binary variable where 1 indicates a citizen of the U.S. and 0,
otherwise.
As the results in Figure proto.print illustrate, demographic variation among
respondents seemed to bear no effect on the prototypicality they associated with the leader
they named in the survey. Partisanship strength is positively and statistically significantly
associated with leader prototypicality. After controlling for demographic differences among
respondents, it is clear that the prototypicality ratings for Donald Trump, Barack Obama,
and Paul Ryan are all statistically significantly different. Specifically, Donald Trump’s
prototypicality rating is approximately 0.75 lower than the average, whereas Barack
Obama’s and Paul Ryan’s ratings are approximately 0.28 and 0.41 points higher than the
average, respectively.
I also examine whether heterogeneous effects among Democrats and Republicans exist.
As it is unclear whether any single variable is accountable for variation in the perceptions
of the two partisan camps, I run the same analyses on each of the sub-populations
separately. The results are reported in Figure 5.4. The results of these analyses largely
mirror those from the previous analysis: demographic characteristics appear to bear no
statistically significant effect on respondents’ leader prototypicality ratings.11 One
11Democratic women tend to rank leaders as slightly more prototypical (0.14) than men,
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Figure 5.3: Leader Prototypicality Coefficient Plot
interesting difference, however, is the role of partisanship strength. Among Democrats,
partisanship strength has no statistically significant effect on the perceived prototypicality
of the leaders; however, for Republicans, a one unit increase in partisanship strength
corresponds to a statistically significant 0.51 increase in leader prototypicality ratings.
Leader Attachment
In the previous section, I examined the prototypicality ratings of the main leaders named
to the Republican and Democratic parties. Now, I turn to assess the level of attachment
respondents profess toward the leaders. The histograms in Figure 5.5 show the distribution
and average level of attachment (dashed vertical line) for the main 5 leaders mentioned in
the survey. Among the Democratic leaders, attachment toward Barack Obama appears to
be nearly a full point higher than attachment toward Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi.
Among the Republicans, attachment toward Donald Trump and Paul Ryan looks nearly
the same.
Just as with the prototypicality ratings, different types of respondents may have named


















Figure 5.4: Leader Prototypicality: Heterogeneous Effects between Democrats and
Republicans
address this possibility, I use an Ordinary-Least Squares model to tease out the effects
driven by the specific candidates versus respondents. I control for respondents’
partisanship strength, age, gender, citizenship status, political interest, and ideology. I also
control for leader prototypicality.
Strength of Partisan Identification: I control for respondents’ strength in partisanship
as this may be inversely related to leader attachment. Because the nature of the leader
attachment items required respondents to compare their inclination toward the leader to
their party, it is possible that those with stronger partisan attachment may be less inclined
toward feeling attached to any particular leader.
Political Interest: I control for respondents’ political interest as those who follow
politics more closely may be more aware of leader behavior and activities, which could
condition their level of attachment to the politician (Gidengil 2002).
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Figure 5.5: Respondents’ Attachment to Leader
with a specific politician may have been more inclined to name that politician as the leader
of the party, subsequently affecting the level of attachment they professed toward the
leader.
Age and Gender : I control for respondents’ age and gender to account for the
possibility that respondents’ age or gender may make them more inclined toward one
leader over another.
Citizenship Status: I control for respondents’ citizenship status to account for the
possibility that U.S. citizens in this sample may be more attentive to U.S. politics or more
attached to U.S. politicians than non-citizens. However, as all students in the sample are
enrolled in political science courses, I expect that this would have less of an effect in this
population than it would among a general population.
Leader Prototypicality: I control for leader prototypicality as this may be a key
determinant of leader attachment. This expectation relates back to the social identity of
leadership theory. While group leaders tend to be looked on more favorably when they
exhibit characteristics that are prototypical of the group, this can also engender a certain
amount of leeway that fellow group members may grant the leader. In other words, as a
leader’s prototypicality increases, their ability to represent the group with which they
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belong can lead group members to be more inclined toward that leader reframing or shifting
the types of attributes associated with group membership, particularly if that leader is new
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Figure 5.6: Leader Attachment Coefficient Plot
The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 5.6. Again, the demographic
variables have no statistically significant effect. However, leader prototypicality is
positively and statistically significantly associated with leader attachment. Specifically, a
one-unit increase in the prototypicality of a leader corresponds with a 0.27 unit increase in
respondents’ attachment to the leader, on average. Of particular interest are the results for
the individual leaders: naming Barack Obama as the leader corresponds with a 0.36 unit
increase in leader attachment; whereas naming Chuck Schumer or Nancy Pelosi result in a
0.75 and 0.72 unit decrease in leader attachment, respectively. The two Republican leaders,
Donald Trump and Paul Ryan, do not appear to elicit any statistically significant
differences in leader attachment as compared to the other leaders named in the survey.
To account again for the possibility that demographic variation, along with
prototypicality differences, elicit disparate effects for Democrats and Republicans, I also
run the same analyses separately on the two populations. These results are presented in



















Figure 5.7: Leader Attachment: Heterogeneous Effects between Democrats and
Republicans
analysis. In particular, it appears that leader prototypicality plays no role in Democrats’
attachment to a leader, but is positively and statistically significantly associated with
leader attachment among Republicans. Specifically, a one-unit increase in perceived leader
prototypicality corresponds with a 0.54 unit increase in Republicans’ leader attachment.
Gender also appears to have disparate effects among the two groups. While it bears no
effect among Democrats, Republican women indicate statistically significantly lower levels
of leader attachment than Republican men (their average level of leader attachment is 0.67
units lower than their male co-partisans). Among Republicans, attachment to Donald
Trump and Paul Ryan is also statistically significantly higher than for other leaders.
Specifically, those who named Donald Trump as the leader demonstrated, on average, a
level of attachment to him that was 1.03 units higher than the remainder of the Republican
respondents; and those who named Paul Ryan, 0.86 units higher.
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Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, I reexamined political personalization in the context of voters: their
perceptions of party leaders and their attachment to individual politicians. I argued that
the personalization literature has overlooked key components of the social identity of
leadership. In particular, leader prototypicality encourages positive feelings towards
leaders, irrespective of feeling attached to a leader to the detriment of group membership.
Therefore, I set out to develop measurements of leader prototypicality and leader
attachment. I demonstrated that these new measures appropriately measure their
corresponding concepts and that these concepts are distinct from partisan attachment.
This chapter also provided insights into the leaders that partisans associate with their
party. Surprisingly among Democrats, many could not think of a specific politician that
they associated with leading the party and many others explicitly believed that no clear
leader existed. Furthermore, the politician most often considered the leader of the
Democratic Party, Barack Obama, is a politician who has been largely absent from the
political arena since the 2016 presidential election. The lack of leader recognition and
continued association between Obama and party leadership could be driven by the timing
of the survey (October 2018), where Democratic front-runners of the 2020 presidential
campaign had not yet come to the fore. Therefore, additional studies conducted at multiple
points in time would help clarify whether the lack of perceived leadership among the
Democratic Party is a persistent trend among its partisans. The results among
Republicans were less surprising, where Donald Trump and Paul Ryan were the most
common politicians that partisans considered to be leaders of the party.
The prototypicality ratings of each party leader revealed some stark differences.
Controlling for partisanship and other demographic characteristics, Barack Obama and
Paul Ryan appeared to be especially prototypical party leaders, whereas Donald Trump
was particularly less prototypical. While this study did not intend to identify why certain
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leaders were considered more prototypical than others, future research to ascertain whether
specific characteristics that partisans associate with their party are mirrored in their
party’s leader could help address this question. It would be especially interesting to see a
study similar to this one run during the height of the 2020 presidential campaign to
determine who partisans start to see as their party’s leader as election time looms and how
leader attachment changes during such a high profile, candidate-centric election period.
Examining the two partisan groups separately revealed that partisanship strength
played a role only in Republican’s prototypicality evaluations: stronger partisanship was
associated with higher prototypicality ratings of the leader. While these results do not
point to the specific cause for this relationship, it is possible that stronger Republicans are
engaging in some motivated reasoning. For example, they may feel very strongly aligned
with their party and, when faced with party leaders that may not encompass all of the
necessary characteristics to constitute the party prototype, be inclined to reconfigure those
necessary characteristics such that they fit the leader at hand. However, if this were the
case, social identity theory would predict that those Republicans would also have to
reevaluate their own place in the group in light of these revised characteristics. Therefore,
future research to determine the direction of the causal arrow is necessary.
In terms of leader attachment, this study revealed interesting differences between the
two partisan groups. First, partisanship was unrelated to leader attachment, lending to the
possibility that, while these are separate concepts, they are not directly related to one
another. Second, the more prototypical Republican respondents believed the party leader
to be, the greater their attachment to that leader. The relationship between prototypicality
and leader attachment among Republicans could pose a concern for personalized political
behavior among voters. In particular, this relates back to some theoretical expectations in
the social identity of leadership theory where group members afford newer leaders with
greater latitude to change the narrative about the attributes that make a group member
archetypal (Hogg and Reid 2006). This could point to signs that Republican leaders have
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started to modify the narrative and subsequently have attracted group members to their
own leadership such that they express willingness to follow the leader away from the party.
However, this analysis cannot provide definitive proof of this phenomenon and is instead
merely suggestive about its existence. Further research into the connection between
prototypical leaders and leader attachment is necessary to understand the magnitude of
this relationship.
Is politics becoming more personalized for voters? If this phenomenon were of particular
concern for any electorate, we would expect it to be most stark within a presidential
system where voters are already incentivized to make decisions about their partisanship
and behavior based on candidate-centric evaluations. The results presented in this chapter
do not necessarily correspond with the pressing concern that some scholars have about this
phenomenon. Even if some voters appear to be developing strong attachments to individual
party leaders, it is unclear that this is at the expense of their own partisan identity.
Furthermore, the average rates of leader attachment among respondents remain lower than
their average rates of partisanship strength, across each of the five main leaders discussed
in this chapter.12 However, it is not clear the conditions under which partisans would be
more or less inclined to abdicate their partisan ties in favor of a specific politicians or how
certain politicians have reshaped what it means to be a member of the partisan group, such
that voters have already reconfigured their own partisan identification. Therefore, future
research that tracks leader attachment over time and experimentally manipulates the
conditions under which voters are faced with the opportunity to behavior in a more
personalist manner would help shed light on this phenomenon.
While this chapter does not offer a definitive say on the development of personalization
in politics, it does provide scholars with a new measure to capture better this phenomenon.
One of the key advantages that the leader attachment measure has over other ways that
scholars have tried to capture this concept is that this measure is created by requiring
12Results not reported here.
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individuals to evaluate their feelings toward the leader in comparison to their feelings
toward the party. Therefore, as the measurement validation shows, this measure is not
conflated with partisan attachment. It also captures individuals’ willingness to “follow” the
leader should they leave the party – a possibility that would be of key concern to political
personalization scholars.
However, the results of the chapter should be interpreted in light of the sample from
which they are derived. College students enrolled in political science classes undoubtedly
differ from the general electorate in important ways, most obvious of which are political
interest, age, and general experience in politics and elections. Furthermore, this study
cannot offer any information about trends in political personalization outside of the United
States. Therefore, additional research validating the measures proposed in this chapter and
tracking leader attachment over time would be fruitful additions to this line of work.
Studies using the measure to predict rates of personalist voting could help offer a solution
to the mixed results that have popularized this field of study. Examining the role of voters’
personalities in their propensity to feel attached toward a leader over a party (Caprara
2007) would help address the relationship between individual characteristics and the
manifestation of personalized voting behavior.
Finally, this chapter provided a way forward for operationalizing leader prototypicality
and attachment – a necessity for uncovering the compounding consequences of party-label
change. Although the United States is arguably somewhat unique in that its parties’ labels
are especially consistent (at least for Democrats and Republicans), this case demonstrated
that leader attachment takes place even in this constant context. In some respects, that is
unsurprising, given the electoral system of the United States, as I discussed earlier.
Nevertheless, investigating the phenomenon of leader attachment in contexts where the
party-label heuristic is less useful could help improve our understanding of voter
decision-making, offer another explanation for the perceived persistence of personalization





This dissertation began with a discussion of the various elements of electoral politics that
can engender instability and increase the complexity of information environments voters
confront. I argued that one of the primary tools that political scientists have found voters
to use to simplify this complexity – party-label heuristics – can themselves change due to
party relabeling. As a result, one of the hallmarks of information shortcuts in politics can
actually lend to greater complexity rather than serve as ways to reduce it. Therefore, I
sought to examine (1) the role that these changes play in the knowledge voters have about
parties, (2) how voters’ partisan identities are shaped by such changes, and (3) the
alternative heuristics voters seek out when party-labels are no longer informative.
In Chapter 2, I assessed the relationship between party-label change, voters’ information
about parties, their voting behavior, and partisanship. Using an original dataset of
party-label change in 43 democracies from 1990-2017, I characterize the rate of name
changes and demonstrate the frequency of the phenomenon in new and old democracies.
Overall, I find that party-name changes inhibit the information that voters have about the
party. With less information about such parties, I argue and find that citizens will be less
likely to select such parties at the polls and less inclined to declare partisanship to them.
These findings demonstrate that consistency in the electoral menu presented to voters is
rarer than may be expected. Additionally, changes to parties’ names are not trivial
superficialities of electoral politics. They reduce the information that voters have and alter
the utility of the party-label heuristic such that these changes are associated with a
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decrease in citizens’ willingness to vote or identify with these parties. Therefore, scholars of
partisanship or voter decision-making to take into account the nature of the electoral
environment when assessing variation in these facets of voters.
Chapter 3 investigated the phenomenon of party-label change more deeply using the
case of the Party of Democratic Socialism in Germany. In particular, I assessed the
consequences of the PDS relabeling for its partisans. In this chapter, I argued that the
nature of partisanship does not fit neatly into either of the two predominant perspectives
in extant scholarship: an unwavering identity, or a sum of short-term considerations.
Instead, political scientists should be more attentive to the object of partisans’ attachments
in order to understand partisan instability: the political party. I used the case of the PDS
to advance an updated theory of partisanship as a social identity, while addressing the
observable implications of my theory and those of the revisionist theory of partisanship.
In doing so, I adjudicated between these two theories and also pinned down the causal
effect of party relabeling. Overall, I found no evidence in favor of the revisionist perspective
of partisanship in this case. Instead, I found that the PDS’s decision to change its name,
while successful in expanding its electoral based and nearly doubling its vote share from the
previous election, ultimately disenchanted its partisans, diminishing their views of political
parties, decreasing their willingness to engage with parties in politics, and weakening their
partisan attachments. These findings highlight the need to attend to the party side of the
partisanship coin to understand better the phenomenon of partisan instability.
Party relabeling is not exclusively a hindrance for voters, however. As Chapter 4
illustrated, again using the case of the PDS in Germany, that political parties can use
informative signals in their new names to improve the information that voters have about
them. By leveraging variation in the length of time voters were exposed to the party and
variation in the new name of the party, I illustrated that the effects party relabeling can be
contingent on the amount of time a party has been involved in the electorate and the
content of the party’s new name. In particular, I found that the relabeling decision
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dramatically reduce the variation in voters’ placement of the party and, in an appendix
analysis, also improved voters’ familiarity with the party.
Finally, Chapter 5 began to address the types of heuristics that voters might come to
rely on once party labels are no longer meaningful information shortcuts, namely, party
leaders. Using the case of the United States, I validated two new survey measures: (1)
leader prototypicality and (2) leader attachment. These measures offer new ways to
operationalize political personalization without conflating the phenomenon with
partisanship or leader affect.
Future Work
This dissertation offered some initial steps for identifying the role of party-label change in
voter information and behavior, reevaluating partisanship; and understanding the
relationship between party leaders, parties, and voters. In offering some answers to my
initial research agenda, this line of study also opens new questions for examination that fell
outside the scope of the dissertation.
First, how do voters adapt to frequent instability in the names that parties present to
them? Although Chapter 2 identified some distinctions for the manifestation of
party-relabeling consequences in new and old democracies, it could not assess how the
persistent occurrence of relabeling affects voters over time. It would be interesting to
discern whether voters in these contexts adapt such that the party-label heuristic’s utility
diminishes and, instead, voters rely on other heuristics to reason about their party options.
Chapter 5 offered a new direction for heuristics in these contexts and provided new
measures to capture voters’ leader attachment and their perceptions of the typicality of a
leader relative to the political party.
Second, how does partisanship, leader prototypicality, and leader attachment affect one
another in contexts outside of the United States? Although the purpose of Chapter 5 was
to develop measures of the two latter concepts and not quantify its existence in a variety of
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electoral contexts, it is important to note that the substantive findings from the U.S.
sample are difficult to generalize to other contexts – particularly those with different
electoral incentives and constraints. Regardless, these measures provide scholars with the
opportunity to better capture these phenomena and start to address more directly the
concerns relating to leader attachment usurping partisan identity in voter decision-making.
Third, what is the causal relationship between party relabeling and voter behavior?
Chapter 3 started to address this question in the context of partisan stability among
PDS-partisans in Germany. The answers to this question were likely fairly unique to the
party being examined: an unexpected call for early federal elections and a rogue politician
making an unanticipated statement to the media about a coalition initiated the party to
consider changing how it presented itself to voters. To better understand the overall
phenomenon of party-label change, attending to the endogeneity between partisan
attachment, anticipated electoral outcomes, and the strategic incentives parties face to
revamp themselves must be accounted for.
Fourth, how do the names that parties choose signal information to voters? Chapter 4
provided an initial examination of this question in the context of a party in Germany.
However, the dataset that I introduced in Chapter 2 provides a rich source of information
to address this question more broadly. In particular, it would be valuable to compare the
types of information conveyed in a party’s old label with the information conveyed in its
new label. Although I provided an aggregate, descriptive examination of the words that
parties use in their labels (both old, new, and unchanged), additional work specifically on
old and new party-name pairs would be valuable for further understanding this
phenomenon.
Fifth, how does party relabeling alter voters’ ballot-box decisions. Chapter 2 provided a
first cut at this question, demonstrating that, on average, party relabeling is associated
with a decreased willingness among voters in old democracies to vote for such parties.
There are many worthwhile extensions to be made to those analyses. In particular,
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examining the relationship between party relabeling and voters’ propensities to switch their
votes (particularly among those who voted for a party prior to its relabeling) could help us
better understand how party relabeling affects voters’ decision-making. Furthermore, time
series analyses that account for compounding party relabeling in a given country could help
us understand the nuances of this phenomenon rather than the average, aggregated effects.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Description of Coding Process
As discussed in the main text, the unit of observation for the party-label change dataset is
a country’s party-election year. I use the coding of Belgium’s 2003 election as a guiding
example throughout this description of the coding process (presented in Table C.1). The
ID column is included for ease of reference to observations in this discussion. The column
labeled t− 1 represents the previous election year, whereas the column labeled t, the
current election year (in this case, 2003). Party (t− 1) is the name of the party during the
1999 election, and Party (t), the name during the 2003 election.
Name Chg. is coded as 1 if the observation’s name differs between Party (t− 1) and
Party (t). Here, seven parties’ names differed between 1999 and 2003, found in IDs 1, 5, 8,
9, 10, 11, and 13. Full Chg. is coded as 1 if none of the substantive words in the party
label at time t− 1 were included in the party label at time t. For example, the Flemish
Christian People’s Party’s (ID 1) name changed to Christian Democratic & Flemish by the
2003 election. Because both names included the “Christian” in their labels, this is not
coded as a full change. Whereas, the Christian Social Party (ID 5) changed its name to
Humanist Democratic Center for the 2003 election. As these labels differ entirely from one
another, this was coded as a full change. Partial Chg. is coded 1 provided that at least one
of the substantive words in the party label at time t were included in the party label at
time t− 1, like the Flemish Christian People’s Party’s name change.
Struct. Chg. is coded as 1 if the party underwent any structural change subsequently
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coded in the data (e.g. new party, disbanded, merged, entered or exited a joint-list, split
from an existing party). This category is not mutually exclusive from the name change
variables. In other words, if a party changed its name and underwent a structural change,
both Name Chg. and Struct. Chg. will be coded as one. For example, People’s Union split
into two parties in 2003: New Flemish Alliance (ID 8) and Spirit (ID 9). Therefore, Struct.
Chg. is coded as 1 for both observations in the dataset.
New is coded as 1 so long as the party existed by time t but did not exist at time t− 1.
Parties that participated in mergers or underwent a split are not coded as new. Disb. is
coded as 1 provided that the party existed at time t− 1 but ceased to exist by the election
at time t. Similar to new parties, this variable is intended to capture parties that no longer
participated in elections in any form; therefore, joint list exits, and constituent parties of
mergers are not coded as disbanded. No new parties or disbanded parties exist in the data
for Belgium’s 2003 election.
Merger is coded as 1 if the party at time t− 1 merged with another party by time t.
This includes instances where two parties merged together to form a newly named party
and situations where as party acquired another one under its same name. For example, the
Francophone Democratic Front (ID 10) and the Liberal Reformation Party (ID 11) merged
by 2003 to form the Reformists’ Movement. Each of these observations are coded as 1
under Merger. Because both parties also underwent a name change as a result of the
merger, Name Chg. is also coded as 1.
JL Entry is coded as 1 provided that the party at time t entered into a joint-list
agreement with another party after time t− 1 for the election at time t. For example,
Spirit (ID 9) and Socialist Party – Different (ID 13) entered into a joint-list for the 2003
election; therefore, both parties are coded as 1 under this variable. It is important to note
that these structural changes are not generally mutually exclusive categories.1 If a party
1The only exception here is a logical one wherein a disbanded party cannot opt to enter
a joint-list, merge with another party, split from a previous party, or emerge as “new” on
the electoral scene.
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mergers with another before time t and consequently leaves a prior joint-list agreement,
both Merger and JL Exit would be coded as 1.
JL Exit is coded as 1 provided that the party at time t exited a joint-list agreement
that it had been in for the election at time t− 1. Split is coded as 1 provided that the
party at time t was created as the result of party members splintering off from its parent
party after time t− 1. Spirit (ID 9) is an example of a party that split from its predecessor
(People’s Union); between this time period, the prior joint-list agreement between the
People’s Union and ID21 was also dissolved. Therefore, JL Exit is also coded as one.
Finally, because Spirit entered a joint-list with Socialist Party – Different, as mentioned
above, JL Entry is also coded as one. The other main component of the People’s Union
split was the New Flemish Alliance (ID 8), which was also coded as one for JL Exit and
Split for the same reasons as Spirit.
As this example illustrates, different types of structural changes can occur in
conjunction with one another and I code them accordingly. Therefore, the description of
party-label changes and structural changes from this dataset represent somewhat of an
upper bound of these changes (conditional on the party receiving at least 1% of the vote in
the previous election, or current one for new parties). I chose this manner of coding as I
believe it most closely approximates the reality that voters face. For example, a joint-list
between two parties could be their pick in the previous election, only for voters to see that,
not only does that joint-list no longer exist, but the constituent parties are no longer

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3
B1. Testing the Common Trends Assumption: Attitudes toward Parties Analy-
ses
Table B.1: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. Greens Partisans (1998-2002)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 2.77∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.19) (0.20)
2002 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Prior PDS Part. −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
2002 x Prior PDS Part. 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Pol. Int. 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.07∗ 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ideol. (norm) −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Gender 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)






R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09
Adj. R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07
Num. obs. 720 708 698 698 698 670 582
RMSE 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.55
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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Table B.2: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. SPD Partisans (1998-2002)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 2.70∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.76∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
2002 0.09∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.08∗ 0.08∗ 0.08∗ 0.10∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Prior PDS Part. −0.18∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
2002 x Prior PDS Part. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Pol. Int. 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.03† 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ideol. (norm) −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)






R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
Adj. R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Num. obs. 1817 1775 1734 1734 1734 1570 1359
RMSE 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
137
B2. Model Output: Attitudes toward Parties Analysis
Table B.3: Partisans’ Attitudes about Parties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) 2.89∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 2.27∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
2005 0.30∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Prior PDS Part. −0.27∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Prior SPD Part. −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.27∗ −0.26∗ −0.27∗ −0.28∗ −0.43∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
2005 x Prior SPD Part. −0.13 −0.13 −0.07 −0.07 −0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Pol. Int. 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)






R2 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10
Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
Num. obs. 1871 1858 1669 1668 1380
RMSE 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B3. Robustness Checks: Attitudes toward Parties Analyses
B3.1. Keeping Party Switchers (Attitudes toward Parties)
Table B.4: PDS Partisans’ Attitudes about Parties (compared to Greens Partisans)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) 2.85∗∗∗ 2.65∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16)
2005 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Prior PDS Part. −0.21∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.13∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.22∗ −0.22∗ −0.21† −0.23∗ −0.31∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Pol. Int. 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.06† 0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)






R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.13
Adj. R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12
Num. obs. 685 680 621 619 512
RMSE 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.57
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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Table B.5: PDS Partisans’ Attitudes about Parties (compared to SPD Partisans)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) 2.79∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
2005 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Prior PDS Part. −0.14∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.14 −0.14 −0.17† −0.17† −0.24∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Pol. Int. 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.03†
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)






R2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
Adj. R2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
Num. obs. 1905 1885 1661 1660 1360
RMSE 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B3.2. Separate Analyses by Comparison Group (Attitudes toward Parties): Greens, SPD
Table B.6: PDS Partisans’ Attitudes about Parties Compared to Greens Partisans
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) 2.89∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18)
2005 0.30∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Prior PDS Part. −0.27∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.27∗ −0.27∗ −0.27∗ −0.27∗ −0.41∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Pol. Int. 0.06∗ 0.06† 0.05 0.06†
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)






R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.16
Adj. R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.15
Num. obs. 566 561 521 521 432
RMSE 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.57
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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Table B.7: PDS Partisans’ Attitudes about Parties Compared to SPD Partisans
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) 2.84∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
2005 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Prior PDS Part. −0.22∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.13 −0.13 −0.19† −0.19† −0.42∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Pol. Int. 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)






R2 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10
Adj. R2 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09
Num. obs. 1497 1484 1326 1325 1096
RMSE 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.60
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B3.3. Raw Ideology instead of Standardized Ideology Score as a Control (Attitudes toward
Parties)
Table B.8: Partisans’ Attitudes about Parties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) 2.89∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
2005 0.30∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Prior PDS Part. −0.27∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Prior SPD Part. −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.27∗ −0.26∗ −0.25∗ −0.25∗ −0.38∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
2005 x Prior SPD Part. −0.13 −0.13 −0.09 −0.09 −0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Pol. Int. 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)






R2 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10
Num. obs. 1871 1858 1825 1824 1512
RMSE 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B4. Testing the Common Trends Assumption: Engagement with Parties
Table B.9: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. SPD Partisans (1998-2002)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 3.21∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 3.77∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.24) (0.26)
2002 −0.16∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.18∗ −0.18∗ −0.15∗ −0.04 −0.15†
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Prior PDS Part. 0.22† 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.08 −0.07
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
2002 x Prior PDS Part. −0.15 −0.15 −0.16 −0.15 −0.16 −0.25 −0.10
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Pol. Int. 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Ideol. (norm) −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender −0.07 −0.12∗ −0.10 −0.15∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)






R2 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.10
Adj. R2 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09
Num. obs. 2259 2190 2111 2111 2111 1924 1648
RMSE 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.26 1.25 1.23
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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Table B.10: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. Eastern Apartisans (1998-2002)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 2.86∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.29) (0.32)
2002 −0.21∗ −0.21∗ −0.18∗ −0.18∗ −0.16† −0.17 −0.16
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Prior PDS Part. 0.58∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.32∗ 0.28∗ 0.21 0.21
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
2002 x Prior PDS Part. −0.10 −0.14 −0.15 −0.16 −0.16 −0.14 −0.13
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)
Pol. Int. 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Ideol. (norm) −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender 0.05 0.03 0.05 −0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)






R2 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.12
Adj. R2 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11
Num. obs. 1483 1402 1321 1321 1321 1185 1008
RMSE 1.31 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.25 1.23 1.22
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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Table B.11: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. Leftwing Apartisans (1998-2002)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 3.17∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 2.94∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.30) (0.36) (0.38) (0.40) (0.53) (0.59)
2002 −0.16 −0.26 −0.21 −0.21 −0.13 0.07 0.12
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.37)
Prior PDS Part. 0.26 0.06 −0.00 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.31
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.36)
2002 x Prior PDS Part. −0.15 −0.09 −0.13 −0.13 −0.20 −0.38 −0.42
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.39)
Pol. Int. 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Ideol. (norm) −0.05† −0.05† −0.06∗ −0.04 −0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gender 0.02 −0.02 0.01 −0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)






R2 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10
Adj. R2 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08
Num. obs. 594 571 561 561 561 526 459
RMSE 1.30 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.22
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B5. Model Output: Engagement with Parties
Table B.12: PDS Partisans’ Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Intercept) 3.04∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20)
2005 0.53∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Prior PDS Part. 0.07 0.00 −0.12 −0.10 −0.11 −0.17† −0.14
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
W/L apart. −0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
East apart. −0.40∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.38∗ −0.36† −0.34† −0.37† −0.36† −0.36† −0.36
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22)
2005 x w/l apart. 0.03 0.02 −0.01 −0.10 −0.11 −0.13 −0.20
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27)
2005 x east. apart. 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Pol. Int. 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ideol. (norm) −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






R2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12
Num. obs. 3437 3351 2804 2802 2802 2802 2300
RMSE 1.38 1.36 1.33 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.29
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B6. Robustness Checks: Engagement with Parties
B6.1. Keeping Party Switchers (Engagement with Parties)
Table B.13: PDS Partisans’ Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Intercept) 3.04∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20)
2005 0.53∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Prior PDS Part. 0.07 0.00 −0.12 −0.10 −0.11 −0.17† −0.14
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
W/L apart. −0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
East apart. −0.40∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.38∗ −0.36† −0.34† −0.37† −0.36† −0.36† −0.36
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22)
2005 x w/l apart. 0.03 0.02 −0.01 −0.10 −0.11 −0.13 −0.20
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27)
2005 x east. apart. 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Pol. Int. 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ideol. (norm) −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






R2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12
Num. obs. 3437 3351 2804 2802 2802 2802 2300
RMSE 1.38 1.36 1.33 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.29
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B6.2. Separate Analyses by Comparison Group (Engagement with Parties): SPD, Eastern
Apartisans, Leftwing Apartisans
Table B.14: PDS Partisans’ Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party (compared to SPD
Partisans)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 3.09∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 3.41∗∗∗ 3.59∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23) (0.26)
2005 0.53∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Prior PDS Part. 0.11 0.02 −0.06 −0.04 −0.04 −0.09 −0.02
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.37† −0.36† −0.45∗ −0.45∗ −0.42∗ −0.42∗ −0.47†
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.25)
Pol. Int. 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ideol. (norm) −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.04†
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






R2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11
Adj. R2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Num. obs. 1865 1839 1588 1588 1588 1588 1313
RMSE 1.36 1.35 1.32 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
149
Table B.15: PDS Partisans’ Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party (compared to Eastern
Apartisans)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 2.64∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.28) (0.31)
2005 0.69∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Prior PDS Part. 0.47∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.05 0.03 0.03 −0.02 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.54∗∗ −0.51∗ −0.46∗ −0.48∗ −0.48∗ −0.48∗ −0.51∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23)
Pol. Int. 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ideol. (norm) −0.10∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Gender −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






R2 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Adj. R2 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
Num. obs. 1223 1177 976 974 974 974 821
RMSE 1.37 1.35 1.32 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.29
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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Table B.16: PDS Partisans’ Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party (compared to
Left-Wing Apartisans)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 3.01∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 1.43∗∗
(0.13) (0.25) (0.30) (0.32) (0.37) (0.44) (0.48)
2005 0.55∗∗ 0.50∗ 0.52∗ 0.50∗ 0.52∗ 0.50∗ 0.41
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26)
Prior PDS Part. 0.11 −0.00 −0.10 −0.09 −0.07 −0.09 −0.00
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.40 −0.38 −0.35 −0.32 −0.37 −0.35 −0.23
(0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.32)
Pol. Int. 0.20∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.26∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Ideol. (norm) −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gender −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






R2 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08
Adj. R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06
Num. obs. 554 540 464 464 464 464 394
RMSE 1.35 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.32 1.29
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B6.3. Raw Ideology instead of Standardized Ideology Score as a Control (Engagement with
Parties)
Table B.17: PDS Partisans’ Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Intercept) 3.04∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 3.65∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.19) (0.21)
2005 0.53∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Prior PDS Part. 0.07 0.00 −0.11 −0.11 −0.11 −0.17† −0.16†
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
W/L apart. −0.03 0.01 0.01 −0.07 −0.06 −0.07 −0.10
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
East apart. −0.40∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.38∗ −0.36† −0.33† −0.35† −0.34† −0.34† −0.33
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21)
2005 x w/l apart. 0.03 0.02 0.04 −0.03 −0.05 −0.07 −0.13
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26)
2005 x east. apart. 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.17
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Pol. Int. 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ideol. (raw) −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Gender −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Num. obs. 3437 3351 3181 3179 3179 3179 2589
RMSE 1.38 1.36 1.35 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.30
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B7. Placebo Test: Attitudes toward Politics and Society
If PDS-partisans’ attitudes were undergoing a shift between 2002 and 2005 unrelated to the
PDS-label change, I expect that this shift should also be reflected in their feelings about
politics and society more generally. Similar to the party responsiveness variable, I
constructed a measure of respondents’ efficacy using the six questions from the “Efficacy”
section of the GLES. These items followed the prompt:
“Here is a list of often-heard opinions about politics and society in Germany.
Please tell me whether you strongly agree, rather agree, neither agree nor
disagree, rather disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.”
1. People like me do not have any influence on the government.
2. The Members of the Bundestag try to get in close contact with the population.
3. Everyone should have the right to defend their own views.
4. Politics is such a complex issue that people like me cannot understand what is going
on.
5. Democracy will not work without a political opposition.
6. In a democracy it is the duty of all citizens to vote regularly in elections.
I also test for any statistical differences in the change in respondents’ attitudes from
1998-2002 as well as 2002-2005. The results show that PDS partisans’ change in attitudes
about politics and society are statistically indistinguishable from the change in any other
groups’ attitudes, both from 1998-2002 and 2002-2005, except for SPD partisans in
1998-2002, as the figures also show.
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Table B.18: Efficacy: Common Trends (1998-2002)
Apart. East. Left-Wing Apart. Greens SPD
(Intercept) 3.04∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09)
2002 −0.08† −0.16∗ 0.01 0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
Prior PDS Part. −0.05 −0.16† −0.10 −0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Pol. Int. 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ideol. (norm) −0.02∗∗ −0.01 −0.02† −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Edu. 0.04∗∗ 0.02 −0.01 0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Income 0.01 −0.00 0.01 0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
2002 x Prior PDS Part. 0.06 0.12 −0.07 −0.15∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.10
Adj. R2 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09
Num. obs. 606 372 412 973
RMSE 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.39
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table B.19: Efficacy among PDS Partisans and Comparison Group (2002-2005)
Apart. East. Left-Wing Apart. Greens SPD
(Intercept) 2.90∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07)
2005 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Prior PDS Part. 0.01 −0.03 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Pol. Int. 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Ideol. (norm) −0.02∗ −0.01 −0.02† −0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Edu. 0.05∗∗ 0.03 0.01 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Income 0.01 −0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
2005 x Prior PDS Part. −0.03 −0.05 −0.11 0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
R2 0.14 0.11 0.26 0.16
Adj. R2 0.13 0.10 0.25 0.15
Num. obs. 599 404 471 1287
RMSE 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.41
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
154











Figure B.1: Distribution of Prior PDS Partisans’ Perception of the PDS’s Ideological
Change between 2002 and 2005
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B9. Model Output: Propensity to Declare PDS Partisanship
Table B.20: Propensity to Declare PDS Partisanship
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(Intercept) −0.25 0.80 0.51 0.56 −0.25
(0.50) (0.59) (0.72) (0.74) (0.88)
East 0.96† 1.52∗ 1.52∗ 1.54∗ 1.49∗
(0.56) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61)
Coop. Agmt. −0.73 −0.20 −0.17 −0.20 −0.29
(0.84) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.90)
Coop. Agmt. and Name 0.84 1.33† 1.34† 1.32 1.44†
(0.75) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) (0.82)
East x Coop. Agmt. 0.65 −0.18 −0.22 −0.20 −0.12
(0.91) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.98)
East x Coop. Agmt. and Name −1.10 −1.71† −1.75† −1.74† −1.94∗
(0.84) (0.90) (0.90) (0.90) (0.91)
Ideol. −0.32∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)






AIC 330.32 293.91 294.97 296.80 295.92
BIC 351.36 318.13 322.61 327.90 330.47
Log Likelihood -159.16 -139.96 -139.48 -139.40 -137.96
Deviance 318.32 279.91 278.97 278.80 275.92
Num. obs. 246 235 234 234 234
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B10. Total Number of News Stories with Keywords by Weeks in the Politbarom-
eter
Table B.21: Number of News Stories by Keyword
Until PDS + WASG Angela Merkel SPD Election (Bundestagswahl)
May 25, 2005 157 871 2226 475
June 9, 2005 402 2306 5802 1371
June 23, 2005 958 3288 9426 2177
Note: Number of articles identified through Nexis Uni.
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B11. Predicting Partisanship in the Politbarometer Sample (Control Week)
Table B.22: Predictors of Partisanship in Control Group (full sample)

















Log Likelihood -131.93 -131.21
Deviance 263.86 262.41
Num. obs. 1532 1518
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
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B12. PDS / Linkspartei.PDS Ideology Over Time
One concern regarding the PDS-name change is that the party did undergo an ideological
change that altered the way the voters saw the party. Figure 1 in the main text illustrates
that PDS-partisans’ perception of the party’s ideological position did not significantly
differ from 2002 to 2005. However, it is still possible that the party did, in fact, modify its
ideological stance in ways that were not perceptible from the German survey data.
Therefore, I include information about the party’s ideological stance in 2002 and in 2005
according to the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES). The CMP classifies party manifestos across electoral periods; therefore
any change in the party’s ideological position as indicated by their manifestos will be
captured with these data. The left-right position computed from classifying the manifestos
ranges from -100 to 100, where -100 indicates the left-most party and 100, the right-most.
The CHES relies on expert judgements of parties and, following a series of issue position
questions, creates a composite left-right ideological score ranging from 0 to 10, where 0
indicates the left-most party and 10, the right-most. I rescaled the CMP left-right score to










Classification Type CHES CMP
Figure B.2: Ideological Position of PDS (before and after label-change)
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As Figure B.2 shows, the PDS underwent a small leftward ideological change from 2002
to after the name change (for the CMP, 2005; for the CHES, the party was not coded until
2006). This small change was not captured by PDS partisans. Interestingly, this change
was identified by non-partisans, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. I do not anticipate that
this is a reflection of ignorance among PDS partisans; instead, that non-partisans identified
a leftward shift in the party is likely a reflection of the informativeness of the new party
label rather than politically attentive voters.
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4
As a complement to the analyses in Chapter 2 that assessed the relationship between party
relabeling and voters’ unfamiliarity with parties’ ideologies, I conduct the same analysis
here on the Germany sample, using voters’ responses to placing only the PDS’s ideology.
Separating these voters into the three groups I described in this chapter, I find that the
PDS’s relabeling decision improved voters’ familiarity with its ideology across the board.
Note that this sample excludes partisans, as I expect that they would be distinct from
other voters in their familiarity with the party.
Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4 Model C5
2005 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Western States 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Western .PDS States 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2005 x Western States −0.01 −0.02 −0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2005 x Western .PDS States −0.04∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political Interest −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






AIC 5817.42 4581.99 1632.93 1481.67 408.42
Log Likelihood -2901.71 -2283.00 -807.47 -730.84 -193.21
Deviance 1164.46 1025.84 761.17 748.39 563.46
Num. obs. 12503 11961 11264 11221 9229
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table C.1: DV: Familiarity with PDS Ideology
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APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 5

























Adj. R2 0.51 0.12
Num. obs. 61 164
RMSE 0.51 0.41
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table D.1: DV: Leader Prototypicality
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D2. Model Output: Leader Attachment Analysis
All Republicans Democrats
Partisanship 0.04 0.18 0.05
(0.10) (0.12) (0.20)
Leader Proto. 0.27∗ 0.01 0.54∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.17)
Age −0.03 −0.00 −0.10†
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Gender −0.05 0.12 −0.67∗∗
(0.11) (0.13) (0.19)
Citizen −0.05 0.13 0.01
(0.22) (0.28) (0.35)
Political Interest −0.04 −0.08 0.28†
(0.08) (0.10) (0.15)












R2 0.31 0.37 0.44
Adj. R2 0.27 0.33 0.34
Num. obs. 225 164 61
RMSE 0.71 0.69 0.63
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table D.2: DV: Leader Attachment
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1. Do you think of yourself as close to any particular political party? 
o No   
o Yes   
 
2.   Which party do you feel closest to? 
o Democratic Party   
o Green Party   
o Libertarian Party  
o Republican Party   
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3. Thinking about that political party, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following 
statements. 
 Strongly disagree (1) 
Somewhat disagree 
(2) Somewhat agree (3) Strongly agree (4) 
When I speak about 
this party, I usually 
say ‘‘we’’ instead 
of ‘‘they’’.  
o  o  o  o  
I am interested in 
what other people 
think about this 
party.  
o  o  o  o  
When people 
criticize this party, 
it feels like a 
personal insult.  
o  o  o  o  
I have a lot in 
common with other 
supporters of this 
party.  
o  o  o  o  
If this party does 
badly in opinion 
polls, my day is 
ruined.  
o  o  o  o  
When I meet 
someone who 
supports this party, 
I feel connected 
with this person.  
o  o  o  o  
When I speak about 
this party, I refer to 
them as ‘‘my 
party’’.  
o  o  o  o  
When people praise 
this party, it makes 
me feel good.   o  o  o  o  
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5. Generally speaking, how do you feel about this leader? Please use the following scale. "10" 
means that you have a very positive view of this leader and "0" means that you have a very 
negative view of this leader. 
o 0  
o 1  
o 2  
o 3  
o 4  
o 5   
o 6  
o 7  
o 8   
o 9   
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6. Thinking about this party leader, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following 
statements. 









This leader is 
typical of other 
politicians in the 
party. 
o  o  o  o  o  





o  o  o  o  o  
This leader is a 
good example 
of the kind of 
people who 
belong to the 
party. 
o  o  o  o  o  
This leader 
stands for what 
people in the 
party have in 
common.  
o  o  o  o  o  
If this leader left 
the party, I 
would feel less 
connected to the 
party.   
o  o  o  o  o  
I care more 
about this leader 
than I do the 
party.  
o  o  o  o  o  
If this leader left 
the party, I 
would be less 
likely to vote 
for the party.  
o  o  o  o  o  
If this leader 
formed a new 
party, I would 
consider voting 
for this new 
party.  





One concern with convenience samples is about their representativeness to other population
groups. Given that my sample include students enrolled in political science courses at a
large, public university, these students are likely to be more politically interested and
potentially more partisan than other subsets of the U.S. population. Therefore, I compare
rates of Democratic partisanship in my sample to those in the 2016 U.S. wave of the
CSES.1 Because of the demographic composition of my sample (college-educated adults
generally under the age of 30), I compare rates of Democratic partisanship2 to respondents






CSES (2016) My Sample
Figure D.1: Rates of Democratic Partisanship in CSES vs. My Sample
Figure D.1 shows the rates of Democratic partisanship in each sample with 95%
confidence intervals. As the figure illustrates, although rates of Democratic partisanship
are high in both samples, hovering around approximately 75%, and are not statistically
distinguishable from one another.
1Ideally, this comparison would be with a more recent sample of the population around
the time of the 2018 midterm elections; however, I was not able to get access to any data of
such recency.
2Among those who declare partisanship to Democrats or Republicans.
3The distribution of age in these two samples still differs from each other. My sample
is skewed younger, with a median age of 20; whereas the subsetted CSES sample has a
median age of 26. Unfortunately, the youngest respondents in the CSES were 22, making it
impossible to compare a population of respondents with the same distribution of ages.
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D5. Partisanship Strength
I also examine the differences in partisanship strength between the two samples. In both
samples, partisan strength ranges from 1 to 3. In my sample these numbers correspond
with “independent leaning [partisan]”, “[partisan]”, “strong [partisan]”. In the CSES, these
numbers are in response to the question “how close do you feel to [party]” and correspond
with “not very close”, “somewhat close”, and “very close”. As both figures illustrates,
respondents in the CSES sample were strong partisans than the respondents in my sample,









CSES (2016) My Sample
Figure D.2: Democrats’ Partisanship Strength in CSES vs. My Sample
It is unclear how these differences might alter the generalizability of my results, because
I do not rely on this measure of partisanship strength in my analysis. Unfortunately, the
measure I do use – the one created from the social identity of partisanship battery – has
been shown to better capture partisanship strength than this conventional measure here











CSES (2016) My Sample
Figure D.3: Republicans’ Partisanship Strength in CSES vs. My Sample
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D6. Dropped Respondents
As discussed in the main text, survey participants who did not provide the name of a
specific politician when asked who they believed to be the leader of their party were
dropped from my analyses. These respondents may differ in substantively important ways
from those who could think of a specific party leader when prompted. I examine this
possibility with regard to partisanship strength, ideology, and political knowledge.












Figure D.4: Distribution of Partisanship Strength among Dropped and Retained
Respondents
As Figure D.4 shows, respondents who indicated that their party did not have a leader
(i.e. dropped respondents) express much weaker partisan attachment than those who
named a specific leader. One potential reason for this difference could be that weaker
partisans are dissatisfied with the efficacy of their party because they do not feel it is being
effectively led, thereby generating the concentration of “none” responses when prompted
about the party leader.
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D6.2. Dropped Respondents: Ideology
With regard to ideology, the distribution among dropped respondents indicates that these
participants were generally more left-leaning than those who remained in the sample.
Based on the proportion of Democratic respondents who answered “none” to the party
leader question, this result is unsurprising. It would be interesting to replicate this analysis
after party changeover in the executive, to see whether Republicans were more likely to












Figure D.5: Distribution of Ideology among Dropped and Retained Respondents
D6.3. Dropped Respondents: Political Knowledge
Finally, I examine the differences in the distribution of political knowledge among dropped
and retained respondents. Dropped respondents may be less knowledgeable about politics
than their retained counterparts, leading some of them to state that the party did not have
a leader. However, these dropped respondents do not include those who volunteered “don’t
know” in response to the question, so these participants may be just as knowledgeable as
those who named a specific leader, especially among Democrats who did not necessarily
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have an easily identifiable leader in office at the time of the survey. Figure D.5 shows the
distribution of respondents’ average political knowledge across 19 political knowledge
questions in the survey, where 1 indicates the respondent answered all 19 questions













Figure D.6: Distribution of Political Knowledge among Dropped and Retained Respondents
Based on this figure, it is clear that the dropped respondents were generally less
knowledgable about politics than those who remained in the survey. This could point to an
interesting distinction for personalization studies: perhaps those who are less
knowledgeable about politics are less likely to be attracted to a specific leader than those
who are knowledgeable about politics. Of course, I cannot test that conjecture with these
data, but it would be worth exploring in the future.
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D7. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Because I have theoretical expectations about the manner in which individual survey items
should load onto the latent concepts I am interested in (partisanship, leader
prototypicality, and leader attachment), I also conduct confirmatory factor analysis using
the lavaan package in R. I hypothesized a three-factor model where the social identity of
partisanship items, leader prototypicality items, and leader attachment items respectively
load onto the latent concepts mentioned above. I standardized the variables such that they
each have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation of 1. The distributions of each variable
are presented below.
psoc_opinion psoc_praise psoc_think psoc_we
psoc_common psoc_connect psoc_insult psoc_my
lead_left lead_new lead_typ_pol lead_typ_supp
lead_care lead_common lead_connect lead_example





























Figure D.7: Density Plots of Each Variable
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The factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis are included in the table
below.
Table D.3: Factor Loadings
Latent Factor Indicator Estimate SE Z p-value Beta
psocid psoc_we 0.698 0.061 11.454 0 0.700
psocid psoc_think 0.371 0.067 5.528 0 0.372
psocid psoc_insult 0.678 0.061 11.183 0 0.679
psocid psoc_opinion 0.448 0.066 6.821 0 0.449
psocid psoc_common 0.565 0.063 8.917 0 0.566
psocid psoc_connect 0.691 0.061 11.397 0 0.692
psocid psoc_my 0.689 0.061 11.273 0 0.690
psocid psoc_praise 0.786 0.058 13.586 0 0.788
proto lead_typ_pol 0.380 0.069 5.529 0 0.380
proto lead_typ_supp 0.659 0.063 10.374 0 0.660
proto lead_example 0.887 0.058 15.287 0 0.890
proto lead_common 0.735 0.060 12.249 0 0.737
ldrattach lead_connect 0.758 0.057 13.286 0 0.760
ldrattach lead_care 0.895 0.052 17.065 0 0.897
ldrattach lead_left 0.796 0.056 14.323 0 0.798
ldrattach lead_new 0.788 0.056 14.151 0 0.790
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D8. Factor-Weighted Index
Finally, using the factor weights presented in the table above, I constructed factor-weighted
indices using the standardized variables for each of the latent concepts (partisanship, leader
prototypicality, and leader attachment). I replicated the analyses from the main text using
these variables. These findings are similar to those from the main text, but the role of
partisanship appears to differ. Instead, partisanship strength among Democrats is
positively associated with perceptions of leader prototypicality; whereas it bears no effects
among Republicans (Table D4). For predicting leader attachment, perceptions of leader
prototypicality are positively associated with leader attachment for both Republicans and
Democrats. It appears to have a stronger and larger effect among Republicans than
Democrats. These results highlight the robust relationship between leader prototypicality
and leader attachment, but also the inconsistent relationship between partisanship and
these two outcomes. Therefore, further validation of these measures is necessary to
adequately capture these concepts.
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All Republicans Democrats
Partisanship (wt.) 0.13∗∗ 0.16 0.13∗
(0.05) (0.13) (0.06)
Age −0.03 −0.04 0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Gender 0.09 0.00 0.14†
(0.06) (0.15) (0.08)
Citizen −0.04 −0.22 −0.01
(0.13) (0.37) (0.17)
Political Interest 0.05 −0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.12) (0.06)












R2 0.43 0.40 0.30
Adj. R2 0.40 0.30 0.26
Num. obs. 225 55 158
RMSE 0.41 0.46 0.45
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table D.4: DV: Leader Prototypyicality
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All Republicans Democrats
Partisanship (wt.) 0.04 0.32 −0.01
(0.07) (0.20) (0.08)
Leader Proto (wt.) 0.33∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.23∗
(0.10) (0.22) (0.11)
Age −0.03 0.03 −0.04
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03)
Gender −0.05 −0.16 −0.04
(0.09) (0.23) (0.10)
Citizen −0.04 −0.13 −0.11
(0.18) (0.56) (0.22)
Political Interest −0.05 −0.20 −0.04
(0.07) (0.18) (0.08)












R2 0.32 0.28 0.29
Adj. R2 0.28 0.13 0.24
Num. obs. 225 55 158
RMSE 0.59 0.70 0.60
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table D.5: DV: Leader Attachment
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D9. Effect of Candidate Evaluations on Vote Choice (over Time)
In this section, I assess the role of candidate evaluations in American voters’ vote choice for
each presidential election year from 1984 to 2016. I examine voting for Democratic
candidates and Republican candidates separately, using data from the American National
Election Survey. The outcome for both analyses are respondents’ vote choice, where 1
indicates they voted for the candidate of the party with which they identified and zero,
otherwise. I control for respondents’ education, age, gender, ideology, and race. I also
include respondents’ evaluations of the economy in the current year (ranging from 0 to 5,
where 0 indicates the economic was much worse than the year prior and 5, much better).
Finally I include an indicator for voters’ partisanship. The main variable of interest in
these analyses are respondents’ evaluations of the presidential candidate, on a scale of 0 to
5. This variable represents an average of respondents’ considerations of the candidate’s
strength in leadership, perception that the candidate really cares about voters, and
perception that the candidate is very knowledgeable. As the analyses for both partisan
candidates show, candidate evaluations played a significant, but relatively small effect on
vote choice in comparison to partisan identification from 1984-2012. Interestingly, the
magnitude of candidate evaluations appears to become more important in 2016, echoing
some political scientists’ impressions and investigations that candidate characteristics
played an important role in the most recent presidential election.
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1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Democrat 2.69∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.13) (0.11)
Candidate Eval. (avg.) 1.06∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06)
Econ. Eval. −0.30∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.12 −0.29∗∗ 0.01 0.36∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.05) (0.06)
Education 0.32∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04)
Age 0.01† 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender 0.17 −0.10 0.22 −0.11 −0.11 0.01 0.43∗ −0.08 0.02
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.09) (0.10)
Ideology −0.19∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.17∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.25∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Black 0.39 0.30 0.46∗ −0.28 0.09 0.56† 0.52† 0.61∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26) (0.42) (0.31) (0.31) (0.14) (0.16)
Latinx −0.05 0.05 −0.54† −0.03 −0.50 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.41∗∗
(0.36) (0.30) (0.28) (0.27) (0.42) (0.36) (0.29) (0.12) (0.16)
Other 0.05 0.32 −0.14 0.27 −0.62 −1.39∗ 0.51 −0.10 0.18
(0.63) (0.44) (0.51) (0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.61) (0.19) (0.17)
AIC 982.17 956.88 1167.99 1055.35 491.95 611.19 579.98 3210.59 2689.64
BIC 1038.31 1011.94 1225.45 1111.48 539.38 662.50 629.48 3281.09 2758.88
Log Likelihood -480.08 -467.44 -572.99 -516.67 -234.98 -294.59 -278.99 -1594.29 -1333.82
Deviance 960.17 934.88 1145.99 1033.35 469.95 589.19 557.98 3188.59 2667.64
Num. obs. 1217 1103 1372 1215 551 784 665 4487 4002
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table D.6: DV: Voting for Democratic Presidential Candidate
180
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Republican 1.37∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 2.42∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.14) (0.11)
Candidate Eval. (avg.) 1.06∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.06) (0.06)
Econ. Eval. 0.32∗∗∗ 0.19† 0.31∗∗∗ −0.18 −0.02 0.24† −0.39∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.05) (0.06)
Education 0.34∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.07 0.33∗∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗ −0.00 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender 0.14 0.11 0.43∗∗ 0.05 0.21 0.34 −0.28 0.03 −0.13
(0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26) (0.10) (0.11)
Ideology 0.23∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04)
Black −1.20∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −1.49∗ −3.05∗∗ −1.40 −0.83 −17.41 −1.94∗∗∗ −2.05∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.64) (0.58) (1.16) (1.05) (0.56) (885.14) (0.32) (0.40)
Latinx −0.74∗ −0.63 −0.38 −1.12∗ −0.63 −1.22∗∗ −0.93∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.38) (0.31) (0.44) (0.45) (0.40) (0.35) (0.16) (0.21)
Other −0.13 −1.63† −0.03 −0.77 −0.28 −0.54 −0.34 −0.53∗ −0.31
(0.58) (0.84) (0.46) (0.57) (0.54) (0.55) (0.79) (0.22) (0.19)
AIC 1183.11 889.27 1106.22 768.89 456.51 542.94 417.52 2576.80 2421.47
BIC 1240.22 944.60 1165.01 824.58 503.84 594.86 466.95 2647.19 2490.69
Log Likelihood -580.55 -433.63 -542.11 -373.44 -217.26 -260.47 -197.76 -1277.40 -1199.73
Deviance 1161.11 867.27 1084.22 746.89 434.51 520.94 395.52 2554.80 2399.47
Num. obs. 1329 1130 1548 1168 546 829 661 4444 3995
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table D.7: DV: Voting for Republican Presidential Candidate
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